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Ambiguity
When looking around in daily life, we perceive the world around us as stable and 
unambiguous. Sometimes, however, we come across a situation in which what we 
see can be interpreted in different ways. When this happens, the brain has to choose 
a certain interpretation from the possible options.
A few well known examples of pictures that can be interpreted in more than one 
way, so called ambiguous figures, are shown in Figure 1.1. Figure 1.1A shows the 
Necker cube (Necker, 1832). There are two ways in which this figure can be seen as 
a picture of a 3D cube; either with the frontal surface at the bottom left (B) or at the 
top right (C). When looking at the ambiguous version of the Necker cube, the brain 
has to choose one of these two mutually exclusive percepts. But rather than choos-
ing one and sticking to that choice, the actual percept flips back and forth between 
the two possible interpretations. This is a case of so called perceptual rivalry: the 
two different interpretations of the 3D configuration of the cube rival for perceptual 
dominance. As soon as you have noticed the possibility of seeing both percepts, it is 
possible to actively force one of the interpretations into dominance. It is not possi-
ble, however, to completely prevent the other percept from popping up occasionally 
(Blake, 1988). 
Figure 1.1D and 1.1E show other examples of perceptual ambiguous figures. When 
observing Figure 1.1D, you can see either a black vase on a white background or two 
white faces facing each other against a black background (Rubin, 1915). In Figure 
1.1E, you can see both a young lady and her old grandmother (Boring, 1930). Note, 
A B
C
D E
Figure 1.1
Examples of ambiguous fig-
ures.  A: Necker cube. B-C: 
unambiguous solutions of the 
Necker cube. D: Face-Vase. E: 
Young lady and old woman.
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while watching these figures, that it is hard to see both interpretations at the same 
time. When you see the vase, the faces merge into background, whereas seeing the 
faces reduces the black vase to mere background. And although the ear of the young 
lady is also the eye of the old woman, it cannot be both at the same time.
Binocular rivalry
A different kind of rivalry is the so called binocular rivalry. In binocular rivalry, it is 
not the two possible interpretations of a single figure that rival for dominance, but 
rather the images as seen by the left and the right eye, respectively. 
Normally, we use the slight differences in the images on the left and right retina to 
construct a 3D percept of the world. When the images in the left and the right eye be-
come too different, however, the brain is no longer able to combine them in a single 
meaningful image. If that is the case, binocular rivalry can occur. 
Wheatstone, in his paper on stereovision (1838), was one of the first scientists who 
described binocular rivalry. After observing that both eyes see near objects under 
slightly different angles and concluding that this must be the source of three-dimen-
sional vision, he describes what is perceived if two dissimilar images are presented 
to the two eyes:
If a and b [the letters S and A, each in a circle, JK] are each presented at 
the same time to a different eye, the common border will remain constant, 
while the letter within it will change alternately from that which would be 
perceived by the right eye alone to that which would be perceived by the left 
eye alone. At the moment of change the letter which has just been seen breaks 
into fragments, while fragments of the letter which is about to appear mingle 
with them, and are immediately after replaced by the entire letter. It does not 
appear to be in the power of the will to determine the appearance of either of 
the letters […].
Wheatstone clearly describes in this paragraph the most important properties of ri-
valry: the alternating suppression of the left and right eye images, the unclear percept 
around the moment of the switch and the inability to influence the process by the 
power of will. 
An example of a stimulus eliciting binocular rivalry can be seen in Figure 1.2 (and 
on the cover of this thesis). In Figure 1.2A, a house is shown in red and a face in 
green. When you watch this stimulus through glasses with a red and a green filter, 
the percept alternates between a red house and a green face. Occasionally, usually 
around a moment of a percept switch, you can experience a mixture of the two im-
ages, for example a face with a roof. There are also periods, however, in which one 
of the images is completely suppressed, despite it being still present in the stimulus. 
In the same way, observing the grating in figure 1.2B through red/green glasses 
results in an alternating percept of red left oblique and green right oblique gratings. 
Part of the work in Chapter 2 has been done with red/green stimuli similar to the 
one shown in Figure 1.2. However, the use of red/green glasses has some practical 
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disadvantages. In order to achieve perfect separation and a good balance of the two 
images, the filters in the glasses need to match the colors of the stimulus exactly and 
the luminance of the colors should be closely matched, which can only be achieved 
in a rather subjective way. This is hard to achieve, even with careful preparation. 
Therefore, in the last experiment described in Chapter 2 and in the experiments de-
scribed in the Chapters 4 and 5, we used a mirror stereoscope to present the different 
images to the two eyes. This enabled us to present perfectly separated stimuli with 
identical luminance in any color (usually white), thereby solving the problems that 
arose from the use of red/green glasses. 
Properties of rivalry
When watching an ambiguous stimulus, at each moment, one eye or one percept is 
dominant, while the other is suppressed. Periods of exclusive dominance, which typ-
ically last for a few seconds, are usually interleaved with short periods in which both 
images are perceived partially or transparently. Rivalry can be quantified by measur-
ing the length of the dominance durations or the alternation rate of the two percepts.
The percept switching that occurs during binocular rivalry is a stochastic process. 
That means that each time you watch the same ambiguous stimulus, you will see 
a different pattern of variation between the image in the left eye and the image in 
the right eye. Each switch occurs at a random moment in time, independent of the 
previous dominance state (Blake, et al., 1971; Fox and Herrmann, 1967; Lehky, 
1995; Levelt, 1965; Wade, 1975; Walker, 1975). However, all dominance states re-
sulting from prolonged viewing of an ambiguous stimulus together typically follow 
a gamma-like distribution: a skewed distribution with a tail towards longer dura-
tions (Figure 1.3). The parameters of this distribution can be altered by changing the 
properties of the stimulus, e.g. luminance (Fox and Rasche, 1969), contrast (Hollins, 
1980; Whittle, 1965), contour density (Levelt, 1965), spatial frequency (Andrews 
and Purves, 1997; Fahle, 1982; Hollins, 1980), size (O’Shea, et al., 1997), velocity 
(Blake, et al., 1998; Breese, 1899; Wade, et al., 1984) or retinal eccentricity (Fahle, 
1987). In addition, the shape of the distribution differs between subjects.
Dominance between the left and the right eye does not have to be equally distributed. 
Changing the stimulus properties in one eye can result in an imbalance between the 
eyes (Fox and Rasche, 1969; Levelt, 1965). Many people also have a natural prefer-
B A 
Figure 1.2
Examples of stimuli that 
illicit binocular rivalry 
when viewed through 
red/green glasses. A: 
red house and green 
face. B: oblique grat-
ings.
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ence for one eye over the other. Such eye dominance can result in longer average 
dominance durations for one eye as compared to the other, or in a tendency for one 
of the eyes to always become dominant first after stimulus onset.
There is a certain degree of voluntary control over the percept switches. Subjects 
can increase or decrease the switch rate or increase the dominance time of a given 
percept. However, voluntary control is typically poor (Hancock and Andrews, 2007; 
van Ee, 2005). Binocular rivalry is harder to control voluntarily than perceptual ri-
valry (Meng and Tong, 2004; van Ee, et al., 2005) suggesting that binocular rivalry 
involves a more automatic, stimulus-driven form of visual competition than percep-
tual rivalry.
Why study binocular rivalry?
The work in this thesis is on ambiguous perception in general and on binocular 
rivalry in particular. Binocular rivalry has been studied extensively by researchers 
all over the world ever since the invention of the stereoscope, which made it pos-
sible to show different images to the two eyes (reviews in Blake, 2001; Blake and 
Logothetis, 2002; Leopold and Logothetis, 1999; Logothetis, 1998; Tong, 2003). 
Binocular rivalry is mainly observed in a laboratory setting, but it has been studied 
so extensively, because it gives insight in the process that takes place in the visual 
system between the moment that light falls on the retina and actual perception. We 
might think that we see everything around us, but in fact only a fraction of all the 
information that enters the eyes actually reaches awareness. Much is simply ignored 
because it is unchanging and uninteresting. It is possible, for example, to see your 
nose, but we are hardly ever aware of that. Besides, perception depends partly on 
context. Focusing attention on one particular feature in the environment can drasti-
cally decrease the awareness of other, otherwise very salient, features (so called 
inattentional blindness, Kim and Blake, 2005; Neisser and Becklen, 1975; Simons 
and Chabris, 1999).
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Figure 1.3 
Example of a dominance du-
ration distribution. Note the 
typical asymmetrical pattern 
with a peak at relatively short 
durations and a tail towards 
much longer durations. The 
data (gray bars) can be ap-
proximated with a gamma dis-
tribution (black line).
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Of course, the daily visual environment is very complex to study. Binocular rivalry, 
on the other hand, offers a nice and clear study object: the number of possible per-
cepts is strongly reduced (usually only two) and while the stimulus on the screen 
stays exactly the same, the percept varies considerably. Therefore it has been found 
a useful tool to investigate the neural correlates of conscious experience (Logothetis, 
1998) and the limits of unconscious visual processing (Fang and He, 2005). In addi-
tion, by studying the synchronicity of the perceptual switches in two different stimuli 
that are presented simultaneously or sequentially, it has been used to investigate 
perceptual organization (Maier, et al., 2003).
Models of binocular rivalry
Many models have been created that can correctly capture (part of) the automatic 
and stochastic switching behavior observed in binocular rivalry. Although some-
times very different, most share a few common elements (Figure 1.4): two popula-
tions of cells, each representing one of the two possible percepts, form the basis of 
such models. To account for the complete dominance of one percept over the other, 
the two cell populations are connected with each other via mutual cross-inhibition. 
This way, while one population is active, the other remains suppressed. Without any 
further additions, such a model would predict endless dominance of one of the two 
images. To achieve percept switching, each cell population is subject to self-adap-
tation: the activity decreases over time. After a while, the activity of the dominant 
population has become too low to sufficiently suppress the other population any 
longer and a switch occurs. 
A simple model like this, with one stage of competition in which each of the cell 
populations represent the  input of one eye (with some noise added), is able to cor-
rectly simulate the basic properties of traditional binocular rivalry: dominance of 
one eye’s percept over the other and stochastic switching between the two percepts 
resulting in a gamma-like distribution of the dominance durations (Laing and Chow, 
2002; Lehky, 1988). It assumes, however, that rivalry takes place between the eyes 
at a relatively low level (e.g. primary visual cortex), but electrophysiological studies 
on monkeys (Leopold and Logothetis, 1996; Logothetis and Schall, 1989; Sheinberg 
and Logothetis, 1997) and fMRI studies in human subjects (Tong, et al., 1998) have 
shown that rivalry modulates activity in many higher cortical areas, where cells have 
been shown to be binocularly tuned. 
In accordance with these findings in the brain, numerous behavioral experiments 
have shown results that are not compatible with this simple model. For example, if 
the stimuli are divided between the eyes, so that each eye sees half of a consistent 
pattern, instead of rivalry between the two monocular images, subjects report seeing 
the combined pattern for at least part of the time, a strong argument against pure in-
terocular rivalry (Carlson and He, 2000; Kovács, et al., 1996; Ngo, et al., 2000). Also 
rivalry with higher order patterns such as faces and houses suggest a higher cortical 
locus for rivalry (Kovács, et al., 1996; Tong, et al., 1998). Yet another experimental 
result that cannot be explained with interocular rivalry is so called flicker and switch 
13
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(F&S) rivalry (Logothetis, et al., 1996). In this paradigm, 18Hz on-off flicker of 
orthogonal monocular gratings is combined with swapping the gratings between the 
eyes at 1.5 Hz. This procedure leads to perceptual dominance durations of ~2.0s. 
This indicates that (within a limited range of temporal and spatial parameters, Lee 
and Blake, 1999) observers can perceive a single pattern while it switches back and 
forth between eyes several times, a result clearly incompatible with a monocular ba-
sis for rivalry. To account for these kind of experimental results, multistage models 
have been designed (Freeman, 2005; Wilson, 2003). 
Onset rivalry
For a long time, studies have been focusing on the occurrence of switches during 
prolonged viewing of an ambiguous stimulus and on how changes in stimulus pa-
rameters effect the dominance durations of the two eyes. This approach starts from 
the assumption that rivalry is a constant process that stays the same over the duration 
of a trial. Recently, however, several studies have shown that the choice for one of 
the two images at the onset of the ambiguous stimulus differs significantly from the 
switches that occur later in the rivalry process and may be ruled by different mecha-
nisms (Carter and Cavanagh, 2007; Chong and Blake, 2006; Klink, et al., 2008; Ma-
massian and Goutcher, 2005). Onset rivalry has been found to show a large degree 
of predictable bias as compared with the stochastic nature of sustained viewing of 
rivaling stimuli (Carter and Cavanagh, 2007; Mamassian and Goutcher, 2005) and a 
greater influence of attention on the initial percept choice than on subsequent rivalry 
Cross-inhibition
Self-
adaptation
Percept 1
Percept 2
Input
time
Output
Figure 1.4
Key elements of rivalry models. Two cell populations code for the two possible percepts, re-
spectively. Cross-inhibition between the two populations ensures suppression of each percept 
during the dominance of the other. Self-adaptation within each population enables switching.
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phases (Chong and Blake, 2006).
The classification of sensory information into distinct categories and the probabilis-
tic outcome of the rivalry process are very similar to a perceptual decision process 
(Braun and Mattia, ; Noest, et al., 2007). Therefore, we also studied binocular rivalry 
in relation to decision making in uncertain or ambiguous situations.
Decision making in ambiguous situations
Our life is one long chain of decisions. Sometimes decisions are large and notable 
and we are aware that and when we make a decision. Examples of notable deci-
sions are the decision to buy a car, to get a certain job, or, a bit smaller, deciding 
what you are going to eat today. Other decisions are largely unaware and automatic, 
for example the decision to make an eye movement. Neural processes involved in 
decisions that lead to complex actions are difficult to investigate. Simple decisions, 
however, e.g. those involved in basic actions such as eye movements, are accessible 
experimentally.
Visual decision making has often been studied using noisy motion stimuli. Subjects 
are presented with a field of moving dots with various levels of noise and have to 
make a decision on the direction of the coherent motion (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; 
Newsome, et al., 1989; Schall, 2001; Shadlen and Newsome, 1996). The accura-
cy and the reaction time of such motion judgments depend systematically on the 
strength of the stimulus, i.e. in this example, the fraction coherently moving dots. 
These kind of two-choice decisions have often been modeled with a diffusion model 
(Figure 1.5) which assumes additive accumulation of sensory evidence over time to 
a decision bound (Ditterich, 2006b; Palmer, et al., 2005; Smith and Ratcliff, 2004). 
In the FEF of rhesus macaque monkeys, cells have been found that fire in a pattern 
accumulating evidence
threshold  1 
threshold  2
decision
time
rate of rise
stimulus
response
reaction time
Figure 1.5
Schematic illustration of 
the diffusion model. After 
stimulus onset, evidence 
for one and against the 
opposite alternative is ac-
cumulated. When the sig-
nal reaches one of the two 
decision thresholds, a deci-
sion is made. The difficulty 
of the task is associated 
with the rate of rise, result-
ing in a reaction time that 
varies systematically with 
task difficulty.
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consistent with the diffusion model (Hanes and Schall, 1996; Schall and Thompson, 
1999), reaching a constant threshold level just before the response is made. Different 
types of models, however, make different assumptions on how the information for 
and against the alternative choices is combined (independent race, feed-forward or 
feedback competition). But despite these differences, most models predict the same 
behavior on a decision task: a choice for the strongest target and reaction times that 
increase with task difficulty, a problem known as model mimicry (Bogacz, et al., 
2006; van Zandt and Ratcliff, 1995). 
When confronted with an ambiguous stimulus, the brain somehow has to decide 
which of the two possible images is perceived, making binocular rivalry and visu-
al decision making in a way comparable processes. It is therefore remarkable, that 
these two processes have been described in the literature using such different mod-
els. The diffusion model, although accurately describing the outcome of unambigu-
ous decision tasks, cannot explain state changes in perception and does not take into 
account stimulus history. Rivalry models, on the other hand, cannot readily cope 
with unambiguous stimuli. 
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis handle about rivalry and decision making. In Chap-
ter 2, we studied decision making using moving dot stimuli that differed between 
the left and the right eye. We propose a model that combines the key elements of 
diffusion and rivalry models and show that this model is able to predict the choice 
behavior and reaction times in both an unambiguous but noisy decision making task 
as well as in a situation with ambiguous motion.
In Chapter 3, we studied saccade target selection based on target luminance. Subjects 
were asked to make a saccade towards the brighter of two simultaneously presented 
targets. By reversing the luminance of the two targets in the middle of target pres-
entation, we created an ambiguous choice. We show that a model with feedback 
cross-inhibition, designed originally to describe the choice behavior at the onset of 
binocular rivalry was very well able to predict our subjects’ choices.
Binocular rivalry and saccades
There is only a very small part of the retina, the so called fovea, with which we can 
see details. To see a whole scene, we continuously scan the visual environment with 
fast eye movement. These eye movements, that we make approximately three times 
per seconds, are called saccades. 
A large part of the visual system in the brain has a retinotopic organization. This 
means that neighboring parts of the retina project to neighboring cells in the visual 
cortex so that the cortex forms a (distorted) map of the retina and the outside world. 
A saccade moves the image over the retina. Because of the retinotopic organization 
of the visual system, after the saccade a different cell population is stimulated by the 
stimulus than before. This new population clearly has a different adaptation history. 
Indeed, there is quite some evidence showing that there is some interaction between 
eye movements and perceptual alternations in binocular rivalry (e.g., Einhäuser, et 
al., 2004; Ito, et al., 2003; Pheiffer, et al., 1956; van Dam and van Ee, 2005). Several 
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studies, however, have shown by either compensating for occurring eye movements 
(Pritchard, 1958; Scotto, et al., 1990b) or using afterimages (Blake, et al., 1971; 
Lack, 1971; McDougall, 1903) that eye movements are not necessary for perceptual 
alternations to occur. 
Thus, the effects of saccades on binocular rivalry are not trivial and studying sac-
cades is an interesting way to study the location of the rivalry process in the brain. 
If rivalry is purely a low level, local process, the new population of cells that gets 
stimulated after the saccade would see the stimulus after the saccade as a whole new 
stimulus, resulting in onset rivalry that is undistinguishable from the situation in 
which the stimulus moved, instead of the eyes. In contrast, if higher order processes 
are involved in binocular rivalry, the percept after a saccade might be different from 
the percept after a passive stimulus movement. 
We studied the effect of saccades on binocular rivalry in two studies, described in 
chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 4, we studied the effect of a single, 4° saccade on the 
rivalry process in comparison with a similar but passive movement of the stimulus 
over the retina. We found that both active saccades and passive stimulus movements 
trigger onset rivalry, but not to the same extend, suggesting the involvement of extra-
retinal signals in binocular rivalry. 
In the study described in Chapter 5, we instructed subjects to make many saccades 
of different sizes while watching an ambiguous stimulus and compared the switch 
probability around the time of the saccades with the behavior around similar but 
passive stimulus movements. We found a strong relation between large (>1°) sac-
cades and perceptual switches, but small (<1°) saccades did not seem to influence 
the rivalry process at all. Stimulus jumps of all amplitudes, on the other hand, were 
found to be related to perceptual switches. These results confirm the conclusion that 
extra-retinal signals are involved in the rivalry process. 
Motion discrimination 
under uncertainty 
and ambiguity
Joke Kalisvaart
Igor Klaver
Jeroen Goossens
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Introduction
The process of decision making has often been studied using simple two-choice 
visual motion discrimination tasks in which subjects indicate the perceived direction 
of coherent motion in a noisy random dot pattern (Gold and Shadlen, 2007; 1989; 
Schall, 2001; Shadlen and Newsome, 1996). Both the accuracy and the reaction 
times of subjects’ motion judgments depend systematically on stimulus strength, 
manipulated by changing the fraction of coherently moving dots (Palmer, et al., 
2005). The resulting psychometric and chronometric functions can be understood 
from diffusion models which assumes additive accumulation of sensory evidence 
over time to a decision bound (Ditterich, 2006b; Palmer, et al., 2005; Smith and 
Ratcliff, 2004). Typically, these experiments are done with unambiguous stimuli, 
that is, both eyes are watching the same motion pattern and there is only one correct 
response. But, how does the brain decide when the sensory evidence is ambiguous 
such as in binocular rivalry?
Binocular rivalry arises when the two eyes are presented with random dots moving 
in opposite directions (Blake, et al., 1985; Moutoussis, et al., 2005; van de Grind, et 
al., 2001).  Under such conditions, the brain not only needs to resolve the direction 
of motion, but it also needs to decide which of the competing percepts will reach 
awareness first. Previous studies have shown that stimulus timing and percept his-
tory both influence the choice process at rivalry onset (Klink, et al., 2008; Leopold, 
et al., 2002; Pearson and Clifford, 2004). The underlying mechanisms and interac-
tions, however, remain poorly understood. 
The diffusion model, although accurately describing the outcomes of the decision 
process in unambiguous motion discrimination tasks, may not readily describe the 
percept choice probability at the onset of a bistable stimulus. One reason for this is 
that the diffusion model does not account for stimulus history. More importantly, the 
diffusion model does not accommodate any state changes in perception. As a result, 
it cannot, in its present form, account for stochastic percept alternations that occur 
during prolonged stimulus viewing. On the other hand, recent findings suggest that 
rivalry at the beginning of a trial, so called onset rivalry, is different from sustained 
rivalry (Carter and Cavanagh, 2007; Mamassian and Goutcher, 2005). During sus-
tained rivalry, dominance is much more balanced between the two alternative inter-
pretations than at stimulus onset, where large location and subject specific biases 
have been found.
Models describing percept alternations in binocular rivalry differ distinctly from the 
diffusion model. They typically feature cross-inhibition between two neuronal pools 
coding for the two different stimuli, in combination with an adaptation process that 
causes the percept to switch after a certain period. Noest et al. (2007) proposed a 
model that can explain history-dependent percept choices at the onset of bistable 
stimuli as well as percept switches during sustained viewing. This model is based on 
competition between cell populations that encode the rivaling percepts and a near-
threshold interaction between local adaptation mechanisms and a small neuronal 
bias. It can successfully describe choice probabilities, but it is not clear whether it 
19
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can also describe choice latencies. In addition, the Noest model, as well as many 
other rivalry models (Freeman, 2005; Lankheet, 2006; Wilson, 2003) cannot readily 
cope with unambiguous stimuli to describe the behavior in an unambiguous task. 
Thus, it appears that there exist a number of fundamental problems with both dif-
fusion models and rivalry models that have been overlooked so far. In the present 
study, we therefore investigated response latencies and choice probabilities at stimu-
lus onset under ambiguous and unambiguous conditions. 
In a first series of experiments, we showed subjects dynamic random dot stimuli in 
which the direction and coherence level of the visual motion was the same in the two 
eyes. Signal dots, however, were presented either at identical or at different, uncor-
related locations on the retina. 
By combining the images from the two eyes, the visual system can, in principle, ex-
tract more information about the direction of motion when all signal dots appear at 
different locations in the two eyes. We found, however, that subjects do not use this 
possible advantage, which is consistent with the idea that sensory evidence from the 
two eyes may be integrated separately, and that there might be a race between the 
two resulting signals to reach the decision threshold first.
In a second series of experiments, we compared the 0% correspondence condition 
from the first experiment with a bistable condition in which the direction of coherent 
motion was opposite in the two eyes. We found that subjects reacted significantly 
slower in the rivalry condition which indicates that the choice process cannot be 
understood from an independent race between two monocular discrimination proc-
esses. Instead, competitive interactions are required.
In a final experiment, we repeated the second experiment using motion signals that 
were spatially balanced in the two eyes. By using this stimulus, we could exclude the 
possibility that the increase in reaction time found in Experiment 2 was confounded 
by motion transparency.
We propose a model, based on the rivalry model by Noest et al. (2007), which can 
account for percept choices and reaction times of human observers under both am-
biguous and unambiguous conditions.
Methods
Subjects and setup
Nine adult human subjects participated in the experiments after giving informed 
consent. All subjects had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity. Subjects S2, 
S3 and S5 were authors; the other subjects were kept naïve of the purpose of the 
experiments. 
The subjects were seated in a darkened room in front of a screen on which stimuli 
were back-projected (Panasonic PT-AE700E LCD projector). A chin support mini-
mized head movements. Dichoptic stimuli were presented through red/green ana-
glyph glasses. The intensities of red and green were adjusted before each experiment 
until the subject judged a red and a green probe stimulus (3x1.5°, viewed through the 
anaglyph glasses) equiluminant. 
20
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Visual stimulation
The dichoptic stimuli consisted of two superimposed red/green dynamic random 
dot patterns (frame rate 60 Hz) that were generated on a personal computer using 
OpenGL rendering software. The dots were red/green squares of approximately 4x4 
minutes of arc (3x3 pixels) that appeared against a black background. Each frame of 
the animation typically displayed 400 red and 400 green dots within a 3°-diameter 
circular area. A small fixation cross always appeared at the center of this circular 
region.
Motion stimuli were presented to the two eyes for a fixed period of 2 seconds. Sub-
jects were instructed to fixate the central fixation cross and to judge the direction of 
coherent motion as fast and accurately as possible by pressing one of two buttons in 
a two-alternative forced choice (2AFC) task.
We tested motion stimuli that contained either zero-order or first-order flow com-
ponents: translating and spiraling dot patterns. Both types of stimuli consisted of 
randomly placed signal dots and noise dots, having limited, asynchronous lifecycles. 
In the translating stimulus, signal dots were moved horizontally to the left or to the 
right with a velocity of 7.4°/s. In the spiraling stimulus, expansion/contraction at a 
rate of 2.4 s-1 and rotation with a frequency of 0.38 cycles/s was combined to yield 
either clockwise-inward motion or counterclockwise-outward motion. Noise dots 
always appeared at a random location in the image, and were replaced at a new, ran-
dom location after their lifetime of three frames (50ms) expired.
Stimulus strength was manipulated by changing the proportion of signal dots. Positive 
coherence levels indicate rightward translation or clockwise-inward spirals, whereas 
negative coherence levels indicate leftward translation or counterclockwise-outward 
spirals. Spiraling and translating stimuli were presented in separate sessions.
Experiment 1: 0% versus 100% correspondence
Paradigm
In the first experiment (subjects S1, S2, S3 and S4), the dots presented to the left eye 
and the dots presented to the right eye moved in the same direction. Coherence lev-
els in the monocular images ranged between 0 and 60%. Signal dots, however, were 
presented with either 0% or 100% retinal correspondence between the two eyes. In 
the 100% correspondence condition, the images presented to the right and the left 
eye were identical, so that all dots fell on the same locations on the retinas (Figure 
2.1A and 2.1C). In the 0% correspondence condition, signal dots in the left eye fell at 
different, uncorrelated retinal locations as compared to those in the right eye (Figure 
2.1B). Thus, images in the left and the right eye were different, but there was no mo-
tion conflict, because the signal dots moved in the same direction. By combining the 
images from the two eyes, there is, in principle, more information about the direction 
of movement in the 0% correspondence condition than in the 100% correspondence 
condition. If the brain uses this extra information, performance should be better in 
the 0% correspondence condition than in the 100% correspondence condition. Al-
ternatively, if the brain only uses the information present in two monocular images 
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without extracting the extra information provided in the combined images, responses 
in the two conditions should be similar. 
The coherence levels of the stimuli with 100% correspondence were chosen in such 
a way that they either matched those of the monocular view (Figure 2.1A and 2.1B) 
or those of the combined view (Figure 2.1B and 2.1C) in 0% correspondence trials. 
In the latter case, twice as many signal dots were necessary, which was achieved by 
increasing the total number of dots. Noise dots were always presented with 100% 
retinal correspondence. The stimuli were arranged in blocks of 144 trials in which 
each combination of coherence level, motion direction and correspondence condi-
tion was presented twice. Subjects completed 6-12 of these randomized blocks, re-
sulting in 12-24 trials per test condition.
In an alternative version of the experiment (with subjects S2 and S4, and two new 
subjects S5 and S6), we tested the effect of 0% correspondence for the noise dots, 
keeping all other parameters the same. In the 0% correspondence condition of this 
experiment, the coherence level of the combined images from the two eyes does not 
change compared with the monocular view. Instead, combining the images from the 
two eyes would decrease the amount of information in the 100% signal correspond-
ence condition.
 Coherence matched 
for monocular image  
Coherence matched 
for combined image  
left eye image (50%)  right eye image (50%) 
combined image (50%) 
A: 100% correspondence,  
monocular match   
left eye i mage (50%) right eye image (50%) 
combined image (67%) 
B: 0% correspondence  
left eye image ( 67%) right eye image ( 67%) 
combined image (67%) 
C: 100% correspondence,  
binocular match   
Figure 2.1: Schematic illustration of the translating stimulus conditions used in Experiment 1. 
Subjects watched the red and green random dot stereograms shown at the top through red/
green glasses while fixating the straight-ahead fixation cross. The images below result from 
combining the monocular images. Percentages between brackets indicate signal coherence 
levels for this example. A: 100% correspondence condition; matched with the 0% correspond-
ence condition in B for the monocular image. B: 0% correspondence condition; signal dots in 
the left and the right eye were shown at different and uncorrelated locations. C: Alternative 
100% correspondence condition; matched with the 0% correspondence condition for the com-
bined image. Spiraling stimuli (not shown) were constructed in a comparable way.
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Psychometric and chronometric functions
For each subject, choice probabilities and reaction times obtained under the 0% 
and 100% correspondence conditions were compared using a χ2 test and a two-way 
ANOVA, respectively. Independent variables in the ANOVA analysis were coher-
ence level and correspondence condition. 
In addition, we analyzed the response patterns with a quantitative model descrip-
tion of the psychometric and chronometric response functions derived from a diffu-
sion model (Palmer, et al., 2005). This diffusion model describes a decision between 
two mutually exclusive choices by assuming the accumulation of small amounts 
of evidence over time, until one of two boundaries is reached, triggering one of 
the possible decisions. Accumulation depends on the coherence level (C), with a 
constant scaling factor k. Coherence level is a signed measure: positive coherence 
levels indicate motion to the right; negative levels indicate motion to the left. C=0 is 
the condition with pure noise; A is the level of the boundary. The proportion of right 
decisions (PR) as function of coherence level (the psychometric function) can then 
be described with: 
     PR(C)=
1
1+e−2AkC
.                                                                (2.1)
The chronometric function (the reaction time (tr) as function of stimulus strength) 
is assumed to be the sum of two variables: the decision time (tD), depending on the 
coherence level and a residual time (tR), representing processes independent of the 
decision process, such as sensory delays and motor execution. 
The decision time as function of coherence levels was described using the same 
parameters (A and k) we used for the psychometric function, and the additional pa-
rameter tR was added, resulting in the following set of equations for the total reaction 
time: 
     tr(C) =
A
kC tanh(AkC) + tR
A2 + tR{ for C≠0for C=0           (2.2)  
The psychometric and chronometric functions were fitted simultaneously, using a 
maximum likelihood method. Likelihoods for the observed proportion were esti-
mated from a binomial probability density function. The likelihoods of the observed 
mean response times were approximated with a Gaussian, using measured standard 
deviations as an estimation of the variability.
For each subject and each correspondence condition we thus obtained 3 fit param-
eters: the three parameters A, k and tR. Standard errors of these parameters were ob-
tained by bootstrapping. Mean values were compared using student’s t-tests
Results
By presenting signal dots with 0% and 100% retinal correspondence, we tested if 
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the brain can extract more information about the direction of motion when the signal 
dots appear at different locations in the two eyes. Figure 2.2 shows the results from 
all subjects obtained with the translating stimuli. Data for the spiraling stimuli, for 
which we obtained very similar results, can be found in Supplementary Figure 2.1 
at the end of this chapter. Top panels in Figure 2.2 show the proportion of trials in 
which the subject perceived rightward motion and bottom panels show the corre-
sponding mean reaction times, both as function of coherence level. Filled symbols 
represent the data. Solid lines show model fits (Methods).
The two correspondence conditions were compared in two different ways. First, 0% 
and 100% correspondence trials were matched for monocular coherence levels (see 
Methods, Figure 2.1A and 2.1B). When the responses are based purely on monocular 
information from one eye, or if the brain combines the monocular information from 
the two eyes before fusion, the data from the 0% and 100% condition would overlap 
in this matching procedure. Alternatively, when the information from the combined 
image is used, responses to the 0% correspondence condition should be better and/
or faster. Results for this analysis procedure are shown in Figure 2.2A. Secondly, we 
compared the two correspondence conditions by matching trials for the coherence 
level in the combined image (Figure 2.1B and 2.1C). Overlap of the two response 
curves in this binocular matching procedure would indicate that the decision is based 
on information from the combined image. The results for this procedure are shown 
in Figure.2.2B. 
It can be observed in Figure 2.2A, that the curves from the 0% and 100% corre-
spondence condition were almost identical when the responses were matched for 
monocular coherence levels (χ2-tests on choice data, p>0.7, ANOVAs on reaction 
times, p>0.1). The data thus demonstrate that the subjects’ performance did not ben-
efit from the extra information that was available in the combined image in the 0% 
correspondence trials. Accordingly, matching for coherence level in the combined 
image (Figure 2.2B) resulted in a significant difference between the 0% and 100% 
correspondence data; although the information in the combined image is the same, 
the curves do not overlap. Instead, the higher number of signal dots in the monocular 
images in the 100% correspondence condition resulted in a higher accuracy (signifi-
cant for subjects S2 and S3 in the spiraling conditions, χ2-tests, p<0.05) and shorter 
reaction times (ANOVAs, p<0.001 for all four subjects) for both stimulus types. 
Table 2.1 compares the fit parameters of the psychometric and chronometric func-
tions that were obtained under the two conditions for all four subjects. No significant 
differences (t-tests, p>0.05) were found between the two correspondence conditions 
when the responses were matched according to the monocular coherence level. For 
the matching according binocular coherence levels, on the other hand, the diffusion 
rate (k) was found to be significantly higher in the 100% condition for all subjects 
and for both stimulus types (t-tests, p<0.05), suggesting that accumulation of evi-
dence follows the higher, monocular coherence levels. 
The combined matching procedure resulted in significantly higher tR values (rep-
resenting fixed response delays) for the 100% correspondence condition compared 
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Figure 2.2
Psychometric and chronometric response functions obtained for translating stimuli. Positive 
coherence corresponds with motion to the right, negative coherence with motion to the left. A: 
Responses are matched according to monocular coherence level. B: Responses are matched 
according to combined coherence level (c.f., Figure 2.1). Each column shows data from one 
subject. Top: percentage rightward motion percept. Bottom: mean reaction time. Black: 0% 
retinal correspondence between images in the two eyes. Gray: 100% retinal correspondence 
between the images in the two eyes. Solid lines show model fits (Methods). Note that the data 
for the 0% correspondence condition are the same between A and B, but that these data are 
shown as function of monocular coherence in A and as function of combined coherence in B. 
See Supplementary Figure 2.1 for the results from the spiraling stimulus.
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with the 0% correspondence condition. In most cases, however, this was due to a 
somewhat unrealistically low value of tR in the 0% condition, even though the fit 
provides a good description of the response patterns. This further corroborates the 
notion that the combined matching procedure provides an inadequate characteriza-
tion of the behavior.
Since we found that subjects do not seem to combine information from the two eyes, 
at least not beyond the benefit from having two independent monocular views, it is 
better to look at the parameters found for the monocular matching procedure. The fits 
obtained with this latter matching procedure indeed resulted in realistic t
R
 values that 
were not significantly different between the two correspondence conditions. Also no 
significant differences were found for parameter A for any of the subjects or stimulus 
types in this analysis. 
In an alternative version of this experiment (Figure 2.3 and Supplementary Figure 
St
im
ul
us
 
ty
pe
M
at
ch
in
g 
pr
oc
ed
ur
e
Pa
ra
m
et
er
Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4
Corresp. Corresp. Corresp. Corresp.
0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0 % 100%
Transl. Mono. A 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.05 1.01 0.61 0.56
k 5.27 5.48 9.30 7.95 4.87 6.30 11.86 11.34
tR 0.35 0.38 0.40 0.35 0.31 0.41 0.60 0.61
Comb. A 1.14 0.98 1.08 0.95 1.22 0.99 0.66 0.57
k 2.46 5.8 4.64 10.08 2.17 6.67 6.12 14.23
tR 0.07 0.42 0.27 0.44 -0.06 0.45 0.54 0.61
Spiral Mono. A 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.97 0.91 0.81 0.83
k 5.42 5.19 7.50 6.55 7.73 7.96 7.92 6.17
tR 0.45 0.42 0.41 0.37 0.51 0.56 0.49 0.41
Comb. A 1.12 0.96 1.06 0.88 1.06 0.89 0.88 0.73
k 2.57 5.69 3.74 9.99 3.76 8.98 4.05 8.99
tR 0.19 0.50 0.25 0.55 0.34 0.59 0.38 0.54
Table 2.1
Fit parameters A, k and tR of the psychometric and chronometric response curves obtained 
in Experiment 1 for all four subjects for translating (transl.) and spiraling stimuli. 0% corre-
spondence (corresp.) and 100% correspondence conditions were compared in two different 
ways, indicated here with ‘monocular’ and ‘combined’, respectively. See text for details on the 
analysis. Shading indicates significant differences between the 0% and 100% correspond-
ence condition (t-test). Light gray p<0.05, Dark gray p<0.01.
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2.2), we tested the effect of presenting noise dots with 0% retinal correspondence in 
subjects S2, S4, S5 and S6. Consistent with the results presented above, we found 
that when we matched for monocular coherence level, the choice probabilities did 
not show any significant differences between the 0% and 100% signal correspond-
ence conditions (χ2-tests, p>0.2). For the translating stimulus, differences in reac-
tion time were also not statistically significant (ANOVAs, p>0.08), except in sub-
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0% correspondence
100% correspondence
Figure 2.3
Psychometric and chronometric response functions in the alternative version of experiment 
1, in which noise was presented with 0% coherence. Results from the translating stimulus. 
Positive coherence corresponds with motion to the right, negative coherence with motion to 
the left. A: Responses are matched according to monocular coherence level. B: Responses 
are matched according to combined coherence level. Figure layout as in Figure 2.2. See Sup-
plementary Figure 2.2 for the results from the spiraling stimulus.
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ject S6 (p<0.05). For the spiraling stimulus, there were some differences (ANOVAs, 
p<0.05), but these differences were small, and sometimes opposite. Accordingly, the 
parameters of the response curves fitted to the data were not significantly different in 
any of the subjects (t-tests, p>0.05).
Conversely, when trials were matched for combined coherence levels, differences 
in reaction times between the 0% and 100% correspondence conditions were high-
ly significant (ANOVAs, p<0.0001). Subjects responded faster in the 100% corre-
spondence condition, where the monocular coherence levels were higher. The differ-
ence in reaction times between the two conditions could be captured by a significant 
increase in diffusion rate (k) for the 100% correspondence condition, as compared 
to the 0% correspondence condition. This excludes the possibility that the difference 
observed in Figure 2.2B result merely from the higher number of dots in the 100% 
correspondence condition. 
Discussion
Taken together, the results from Experiment 1 indicate that (in the absence of depth 
cues) the brain only uses the information provided by the monocular images when 
making a categorical decision about the direction of movement. Clearly, this result 
does not exclude the possibility that the brain still uses the information from both 
eyes because it is possible that the brain combines the available information before 
fusion. Whether or not this would lead to enhanced performance under the 0% cor-
respondence condition tested in Experiment 1 depends on how the information is 
combined. In the context of the diffusion model, there are (at least) two distinctly 
different possibilities. 
Firstly, the brain could pool the sensory evidence from the two eyes to achieve a 
better signal to noise ratio (Figure 2.4A). Note, however, that the benefit provid-
ed by pooling is substantially limited by the amount of covariation in the neuronal 
responses (Zohary, et al., 1994). Thus, the benefit that would result from pooling 
is expected to be larger in the 0% correspondence condition compared with in the 
100% correspondence condition, because in the former condition signal dots in the 
two eyes appeared asynchronously at different locations.  Consequently, this scheme 
would predict enhanced accuracy in the 0% condition. Our data do not support this 
interpretation.
Secondly, the sensory evidence from the two eyes could be integrated separately, and 
there might be a race between the two resulting signals to reach the decision thresh-
old first (Figure 2.4B). Such a scheme provides enhanced performance by virtue of 
statistical facilitation in reaction times. But, in contrast with the pooling scheme, it 
would predict equal performance under the 0% and 100% correspondence condition, 
as was observed in the experiments.
This raises the interesting question what will happen if the information is conflicting 
between the eyes. Is it possible to describe motion discrimination under such condi-
tions as a race between two independent decision units, each relying on temporal 
integration of monocular motion information? If so, we would expect similar deci-
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sion speeds for ambiguous versus unambiguous conditions. Alternatively, the two 
motion percepts might compete for dominance through subtractive cross-inhibition 
(as assumed in rivalry models), which would predict a drop in decision speed. In 
the second experiment, we therefore compared the responses to unambiguous and 
ambiguous motion stimuli.
 
B. Race between independent decision units for each eye 
A.  Pooled sensory evidence from the two eyes  
Right eye 
Left eye 
Σ 0.5 ∫dt 
Right eye ∫dt 
Left eye ∫dt 
time 
bound for response ‘right’ 
bound for response ‘left’ 
A 
-A 
evidence left eye 
evidence right eye 
decision moment 
pooled evidence 
0 
-A 
kl 
A 
-A 
time 
evidence left eye 
bound for response ‘right’ 
winner 
evidence right eye 
kr 
A 
0 
bound for response ‘left’ 
0 
Figure 2.4: Schematic illustration of the two ways information from the right and the left eye 
can be combined in a diffusion-type model. A: Sensory evidence from the left and the right eye 
is pooled and integrated (∫dt ). The decision is made when the pooled evidence reaches one of 
the decision bounds. B: Sensory evidence from the two eyes is integrated separately and the 
two accumulated evidence signals race for their thresholds. The decision is made when one 
of the two signals reaches one of the decision bounds (dashed vertical line).
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Experiment 2: Reaction times for ambiguous versus 
non-ambiguous stimuli
Paradigm
In the second experiment (subjects S1, S2, S3 and S4), we compared our subjects’ 
performance on judging the direction of motion of ambiguous (rivaling) and non-
ambiguous stimuli. In both conditions, the monocular images gave the same amount 
of information.
The two stimulus conditions are illustrated in Figure 2.5. In the unambiguous condi-
tion, the direction of the motion in the images presented to the left and the right eye 
was the same, but signal dots were presented at different retinal locations in the left 
and right eye images (this condition was identical to the 0% correspondence condi-
tion in Experiment 1). In the ambiguous condition the dots moved to the left (or 
counterclockwise-outward) in the left eye and to the right (or clockwise-inward) in 
the right eye or vice versa, resulting in binocular rivalry. Retinal locations of signal 
dots in the left and right eye were again uncorrelated. 
Stimuli were arranged in blocks of 96 trials in which rivaling and non-rivaling trials 
as well as trials with different coherence levels and motion directions were randomly 
interleaved. Each test condition was presented twice per block. Subjects completed 
6-9 blocks, resulting 12-18 trials per test condition. 
Subjects were instructed to indicate their first motion percept as fast and accurately 
as possible (2AFC-task). Observers reported afterwards that they rarely saw transi-
tions in motion direction (< 3% of the trials), and that those transitions, if they oc-
curred, happened only after the button press.
  right eye image    left eye image     right eye image     
combined image     
B: Ambiguous  
left eye image    
combined image    
A: Unambiguous  
Figure 2.5: Schematic illustration of the two translation stimulus conditions in Experiment 2. 
A: Unambiguous condition, identical to the 0% correspondence condition from Experiment 1. 
B: Ambiguous or rivalry condition. Signal dots in the two eyes moved in opposite directions.
30
Chapter 2
Psychometric and chronometric functions
Following the same procedure as described for Experiment 1, choice probabilities 
and reaction times obtained in ambiguous and unambiguous conditions were com-
pared using χ2 tests and two-way ANOVAs, respectively. 
We also fitted psychometric and chronometric curves to the data from the unambigu-
ous trials using Equations 1 and 2, respectively (see Experiment 1). To fit the chrono-
metric curve from the rivalry condition, the parameters A and tR were assumed not to 
be affected by the rivalry condition, so these parameters were kept fixed at the level 
fitted for the unambiguous condition. For the rivalry condition, we thus only fitted 
k (Equation 2). Psychometric curves were not calculated for the rivalry condition 
because there was no correct answer in this condition.
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Figure 2.6: Psychometric and chronometric response functions for ambiguous and unam-
biguous translating stimuli. Each column shows results of one subject. Top: percentage of 
rightward response as function of motion coherence in both eyes (unambiguous stimuli) or the 
right eye (ambiguous stimuli). Bottom: mean reaction times in the same trials. Black triangles: 
Unambiguous stimuli.  Gray squares: Ambiguous stimuli.  Arrows marked L and R underneath 
the horizontal axis (top) show the direction of motion in the left and the right eye, respectively, 
in the ambiguous condition. Solid lines show the model fit. See Supplementary Figure 2.3 for 
the results from the spiraling stimulus.
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Results
Figure 2.6 shows the percentage of rightward motion percepts and the correspond-
ing mean reaction times as a function of coherence level in the translating stimulus. 
For the unambiguous condition, positive coherence levels indicate rightward motion 
and negative coherence levels refer to leftward motion in either eye. For the ambigu-
ous condition, the direction of motion was opposite in the two eyes. The responses 
for this condition are shown as function of motion coherence in the right eye (as 
schematically depicted below the top axes in Figure 2.6). So, for this condition, 
positive coherence means rightward motion in the right eye (and to the left in the left 
eye), whereas negative coherence means leftward motion in the right eye (and to the 
right in the left eye). In this way, any preference for perceiving motion in one eye 
over the other becomes manifest as a response bias for motion direction.
In the unambiguous condition, subjects correctly indicated the motion direction in 
trials with high coherence levels, but the percentage of correct responses dropped 
to chance level when the coherence level decreased to zero. Rightward responses 
in ambiguous trials did not show such a pattern. Instead the data scattered roughly 
around 50%. There were, however, subject specific biases, suggesting an idiosyn-
cratic eye preference. For example, at high coherence levels, subject 1 tended to 
respond rightward when the right eye was watching rightward motion (data in top 
right corner), but leftward when the right eye was watching leftward motion (data in 
bottom left corner). This bias, suggesting a preference for the right eye, was strong-
est in trials with the highest coherence levels.
Reaction time decreased with increasing coherence level in both conditions. Inter-
estingly, however, reaction times were significantly shorter for unambiguous stimuli 
than for rivaling stimuli for all but the lowest and highest coherence levels (t-tests, 
p<0.05). This systematic difference in reaction time was present for all subjects. 
Moreover, the same pattern of results was observed for spiral motion (Supplemen-
tary Figure 2.3).
Stimulus 
type
Para-
meter
Subject 1 Subject 2 Subject 3 Subject 4
Unam-
biguous
Ambiguous Unam-
biguous
Ambiguous Unam-
biguous
Ambiguous Unam-
biguous
Ambiguous
Translation A 0.97 0.97 0.85 0.85 0.98 0.98 0.65 0.65
k 7.30 4.23 9.53 4.75 5.68 2.95 12.8 4.07
tR 0.36 0.36 0.47 0.47 0.44 0.44 0.55 0.55
Spiral A 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.72 0.72
k 5.01 3.17 7.38 4.33 4.94 3.02 9.70 1.84
tR 0.40 0.40 0.60 0.60 0.38 0.38 0.70 0.70
Table 2.2: Fit parameters A, k and tR from Experiment 2 for all four subjects. For fitting the 
ambiguous condition, the parameters A and tR were kept fixed at the level found in the unam-
biguous condition. Shading indicates significant differences between the unambiguous and 
the ambiguous condition. Light gray p<0.05, dark gray p<0.01.
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To further quantify this effect, we fitted chronometric response functions to the data 
(see Methods).  The resulting fit parameters are listed in Table 2.2. The difference 
in reaction times between the two conditions could be captured by a significant de-
crease in diffusion rate (k) for the ambiguous condition, as compared to the unam-
biguous condition.
Discussion
Our data thus show that subjects reacted slower on ambiguous trials compared with 
unambiguous trials. Apparently, the conflicting information present in the suppressed 
eye in ambiguous trials slows down the decision process. Clearly, this behavior can-
not be understood from a simple race between two independent decision units each 
relying on temporal integration of monocular motion information. Instead our obser-
vations suggest competitive interactions. 
Unfortunately, it is not immediately clear from these experiments whether the slower 
responses are caused by rivalry alone. Motion detection thresholds also drop un-
der opposite transparent motion conditions, i.e., when the two patterns of motion 
are presented to both eyes simultaneous (Mather and Moulden, 1983; Snowden and 
Braddick, 1989), so discrimination speed might have dropped because of that. Inter-
estingly, however, the percept of transparent motion only exists if the two patterns 
of motion contain locally unbalanced motion signals (which is the case, e.g., when 
two random dot motion patterns are uncorrelated), but it is destroyed if the two op-
posite components of motion are spatially balanced (Qian, et al., 1994). In fact, such 
stimuli look like flickering noise.
We thus decided to conduct control experiments in which the motion patterns in the 
left and right eye were either uncorrelated (as in Experiment 2) or spatially balanced. 
If the observed increase in reaction times is due to rivalry alone, no difference be-
tween these two types of rivaling stimuli is expected. But, if transparency was indeed 
a major confound, the increase in reaction times should be attenuated considerably 
for the spatially balanced motion patterns compared with unbalanced motion pat-
terns.
Experiment 3: Rivalry of paired dot patterns
As explained above, we could not exclude from Experiment 2 that the drop in dis-
crimination speed under the rivalry condition was partly due to motion transparency. 
Another limitation of the experimental setup in Experiment 1 and 2 was that the 
anaglyph glasses (Methods) might have produced an insufficient separation between 
the left and right eye’s images. In the third experiment, we therefore used a setup that 
allowed us to present the stimuli through a front-mirror stereoscope. We repeated 
the test conditions of Experiment 1 and 2 for translating motion patterns, but with 
slightly different parameters. We also included a new rivalry condition in which mo-
tion signals in the two eyes were spatially balanced to control for the possible influ-
ence of motion transparency.
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Subjects and Setup
Four subjects participated in this experiment. Subject S2 also participated in the first 
two experiments. The three new subjects S7, S8 and S9, were naïve with regard to 
the purpose of the study. The subjects were seated in front of an LCD monitor (Dell 
2007WFPb) on which the visual stimuli were displayed at 60 Hz. Subjects watched 
the screen through a front-mirror stereoscope (HyperView, Berzin, U.S.) at an effec-
tive viewing distance of 67 cm.
Paradigm
Figure 2.7 illustrates the four stimulus conditions used in Experiment 3. In all four 
conditions, the motion patterns in each eye consisted of 200 dots (4x4 minutes of 
arc) in a circular aperture of 3°. Signal dots moved horizontally at a speed of 2.4°/s. 
The signal dots and noise dots had asynchronous, limited lifetimes of 100 ms (6 
frames) and 17 ms (1 frame), respectively. 
There were two ambiguous conditions, one with paired dots and one with unpaired 
dots. In the paired condition, each signal dot in the left eye was paired with a signal 
dot in the right eye, and the two dots moved in opposite direction without verti-
cal offset, crossing each other at 50% of their lifetime. The unpaired condition was 
similar to the rivalry condition from Experiment 2, except that the number of dots, 
the speed of motion, and the life times of the signal and noise dots were different. 
These latter parameters were modified in such a way that the paired motion patterns, 
when presented transparently to both eyes simultaneously, were perceived as flicker-
ing noise while the unpaired motion patterns produced a clear transparent motion 
left eye
left eye left eye
left eyeright eye right eye
right eyeright eye
combined image combined image
combined imagecombined image
Unambiguous Ambiguous
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d
U
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re
d
A B
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Figure 2.7
Schematic illustration of the stimulus con-
ditions used in Experiment 3. Subjects 
watched the random dot kinematograms 
shown at the top of each panel through 
a front-mirror stereoscope while fixat-
ing the straight-ahead red fixation cross. 
The images below result from combining 
the monocular images. Signal dots either 
moved in the same direction in the left and 
the right eye (unambiguous motion, A and 
C) or in opposite directions (ambiguous 
motion, B and D). In addition, signal dots 
could be presented at unrelated locations 
(unpaired, A and B) or in pairs (paired, C 
and D). Noise dots were always presented 
at identical locations in the left and the 
right eye images. Note that the unambigu-
ous conditions (A and C) parallel the 0% 
and 100% correspondence conditions 
used in Experiment 1. Likewise, the un-
paired conditions (A and B) correspond to 
the conditions used in Experiment 2.
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percept (Supplementary Figure 2.4 shows the results of a separate 2AFC experiment 
which confirmed this for all four subjects). There were also two unambiguous con-
ditions with paired and unpaired dots. These conditions were similar to the 100% 
and 0% correspondence conditions of Experiment 1, respectively, except for density, 
speed and lifetimes of the dots. 
As in the previous experiments, subjects were instructed to indicate the direction 
of motion by pressing one of two mouse buttons as fast and accurately as possi-
ble (2AFC-task). Stimuli were presented until the subject responded, or until the 
maximum presentation time of 2 seconds was exceeded. All four test conditions and 
coherence levels were randomly interleaved and presented in blocks of 160 trials 
in which each condition was shown twice. Each subject completed 10-15 blocks, 
resulting in 20-30 trials per condition.
Results
Figure 2.8 shows the percentage of rightward motion percepts and the corresponding 
mean reaction times as a function of coherence level for each of the four test condi-
tions. Data are presented in the same way as in Figure 2.6. Solid and dashed lines 
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Figure 2.8
Psychometric and chronometric response functions for ambiguous and unambiguous with 
paired and unpaired signal dots. Same layout as Figure 2.5. Black triangles: Unambiguous, 
paired motion. White triangles: Unambiguous, unpaired motion. Gray squares: Ambiguous, 
paired motion. White squares: Ambiguous, unpaired motion.  Solid and dashed lines show fit 
results. Note the different scale on the vertical axis for subject S9.
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show fit results obtained with the diffusion model, and the corresponding fit param-
eters are listed in Table 2.3. Note that the overall pattern of results is very similar to 
the results from Experiment 2. 
In the unambiguous condition, subjects were fast and accurate in discriminating the 
motion direction in trials with high coherence levels, but the percentage of correct 
responses dropped to chance level and reactions got slower when the coherence level 
decreased to zero. No difference was found between the unambiguous paired and un-
paired condition (χ2 tests on choice probabilities, p>0.2; two-way ANOVAs on reac-
tion times, p>0.05, except for S7), thereby replicating the results from Experiment 1. 
In the ambiguous conditions, rightward motion percepts either scattered around 50% 
(S8) or showed strong individual eye biases (left eye preference in subjects S2 and 
S9 and right eye preference in subject S7). As in Experiment 2, reaction times were 
shorter for unambiguous stimuli than for rivaling stimuli for all subjects. This dif-
ference was statistically significant in all subjects except S9 (ANOVAs, p<0.001), 
and also reflected in significant decreases in the diffusion rate (k) for the ambiguous 
conditions as compared to the unambiguous condition (Table 2.3).
Stimulus 
type
Para-
meter
Subject 2 Subject 7 Subject 8 Subject 9
Unam-
biguous
Ambi-
guous
Unam-
biguous
Ambi-
guous
Unam-
biguous
Ambi-
guous
Unam-
biguous
Ambi-
guous
Paired and 
unpaired 
pooled
A 0.75 0.75 1.01 1.01 0.66 0.66 0.58 0.58
k 28.0 7.32 6.23 3.12 19.4 3.71 21.2 12.1
tR 0.45 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.56 0.56 0.43 0.43
Table 2.3: Fit parameters A, k and tR from Experiment 3 for all four subjects. Data from the 
paired and the unpaired condition were pooled to test the effect of ambiguity. For fitting the 
ambiguous condition, the parameters A and tR were kept fixed at the level found in the unam-
biguous condition. Shading indicates significant differences between the unambiguous and 
the ambiguous condition, (t-tests, p<0.01).
Stimulus 
type
Para-
meter
Subject 2 Subject 7 Subject 8 Subject 9
Paired Unpaired Paired Unpaired Paired Unpaired Paired Unpaired
Unam-
biguous
A 0.76 0.74 1.03 1.03 0.65 0.67 0.56 0.59
k 33.8 23.1 7.93 4.69 20.0 17.9 26.4 17.3
tR 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.33 0.55 0.55 0.44 0.41
Ambiguous A 0.76 0.74 1.03 1.03 0.65 0.67 0.56 0.59
k 8.38 6.30 3.22 2.92 2.79 4.81 12.2 11.6
tR 0.46 0.44 0.42 0.33 0.55 0.55 0.44 0.41
Table 2.4: Fit parameters A, k and tR from Experiment 3 for all four subjects, calculated sep-
arately for the paired and the unpaired condition. For fitting the ambiguous condition, the 
parameters A and tR were kept fixed at the level found in the unambiguous condition. No sig-
nificant differences between the paired and the unpaired condition were found for any of the 
parameters in any of the subjects (t-tests, p>0.05).
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Importantly, the decrease in reaction time under the ambiguous conditions was not 
significantly different between the paired and the unpaired conditions (ANOVAs, 
p>0.05). If anything, the paired stimuli produced the largest drop in discrimination 
speed, while the opposite is expected if this decrease were (partly) due to transpar-
ency. Also the fit parameters (Table 2.4, t-test, p>0.05) obtained for the chronometric 
response functions were not significantly different (although it should be noted that 
the fit for the ambiguous conditions did not provide a good description of the data 
from subject S2). The results thus indicate that the increases in reaction time are 
primarily due to rivalry.
General discussion 
In this study, we presented subjects with a motion discrimination task in which the 
left and the right eye were shown dissimilar stimuli. The 0% correspondence con-
dition that we used in Experiment 1 could be regarded as a condition in between 
binocular rivalry and unambiguous motion. On the one hand, the images in the left 
and the right eye differ, while on the other hand, the information in the two images, 
i.e. the direction of movement, is the same. This way the stimulus, although different 
for the left and the right eye, does not give rise to a binocular conflict nor to a depth 
percept. To use all the information from the two eyes when presented with such a 
stimulus, images should be combined, not by using stereovision but by superimpos-
ing the images of the two eyes, or by simply averaging the sensory evidence pro-
vided by each eye. None of our subjects were able to use these possible benefits to 
improve performance, neither for zero-order (translation) nor for first-order (spiral) 
motion patterns.
Alternatively, subjects could take advantage of the binocular correlation at zero dis-
parity between signal dots to perform better in the 100% correspondence condition. 
The strong overlap of the data from the two correspondence conditions, however, 
showed that subjects did not use this possible advantage either. In all subjects, the 
parameters of the diffusion model (drift rate, k, and bound levels, A), as derived from 
the observed psychometric and chronometric functions, were identical. These results 
corroborate and extend the work by Muller et al. (2004). Using random pixel ar-
rays, they found that binocular correlation in translating stimuli did not significantly 
improve nor decrease the thresholds for motion detection. In the present study, we 
confirmed these findings for translating stimuli by showing that binocular correlation 
of dynamic random dot patterns has no effect on accuracy in a motion discrimina-
tion task. In addition, we found that the chronometric functions remained unchanged 
too. Muller et al. (2004) only studied linear motion. Linear motion is processed at a 
relatively low level in the visual system (in area MT, Albright, et al., 1984; Baker, 
et al., 1981; Maunsell and van Essen, 1983). We also included more complex spiral 
motion patterns, which are processed at higher stages of the visual system (in area 
MST, Duffy and Wurtz, 1991; Graziano, et al., 1994; Orban, et al., 1992). For spi-
raling stimuli, however, we found the same results as for simple linear translation: 
neither speed nor accuracy changed.
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The results from our first experiment thus seem to suggest that subjects base their 
decision on motion direction in noisy random dot patterns purely on the information 
provided by the monocular images. Clearly this result does not exclude the possibil-
ity that the brain still uses the information from both eyes. A simple race between 
two independent decision units each relying on temporal integration of monocular 
motion information could account for the psychometric and chronometric curves 
found in Experiment 1. However, it could not explain the increase in reaction time 
observed in Experiment 2, where we presented stimuli that moved in opposite direc-
tions in the left and the right eye. In Experiment 3, we showed that this decrease in 
reaction time could not be explained by a transparent motion percept in the ambigu-
ous conditions. The slowing down of the decision process therefore should be ac-
counted for by the subconscious presence of the rivaling stimulus.
Andrews and Blakemore (2002) have reported that motion signals from perceptually 
suppressed gratings indeed continue to influence the perception of motion. Subcon-
scious processing of visual images has also been demonstrated by investigating the 
buildup of afterimages by stimuli that were suppressed part of the time by binocular 
rivalry. Linear motion patterns and spirals are still effective in building up a motion 
aftereffect, even during suppression (Lehmkuhle and Fox, 1975; Wiesenfelder and 
Blake, 1990) albeit that the buildup is reduced for spirals (Wiesenfelder and Blake, 
1990). Despite these quantitative differences in producing motion aftereffects, the 
results from our experiments with translating and spiraling stimuli were very similar 
in both our experiments.
Recently, Takei and Nishida (2010) found that subjects also react slower for ambigu-
ous motion-defined rotating cylinders , but the differences (15 ms, 4.3%) were much 
smaller than some of the differences we found in Experiments 2 and 3 (up to ~200 
ms, corresponding with ~20%), and absent for Rubin’s vase/face illusions. This dif-
ference could arise from the fact that we studied competition between two signals 
presented to different eyes (binocular rivalry) whereas Takei and Nishida investi-
gated the competition between two interpretations of the same visual stimulus (per-
ceptual rivalry). It should be noted, however, that the latency changes we found also 
depended strongly on stimulus uncertainty (i.e., coherence level). Takei and Nishida 
(2010) used stimuli with a fixed, very low uncertainty and manipulated the amount 
of ambiguity using a different visual feature. The rotating cylinder, for example, was 
defined by motion, but they controlled the amount of ambiguity through binocular 
disparity. Indeed, when they used a four-dot apparent motion stimulus, in which both 
the signal strength and the degree of ambiguity were defined by a rotation angle, the 
increase in reaction time was about two times larger (i.e., nearly 10%) than for the 
rotating cylinders.
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Model simulations
The diffusion-to-bound model (Methods) could describe reaction times and psycho-
metric curves in situations without binocular motion conflict (Experiment 1) but not 
in ambiguous, rivalry situations (Experiment 2). In order to explain both the psycho-
metric and chronometric curves under both conditions a different type of model is 
required. A parsimonious extension to the diffusion model would be to assume that 
the motion discrimination process relies on an independent race between two mo-
nocular discrimination processes, each relying on temporal integration of monocular 
motion information (Figure 2.4B). However, such an idea cannot account for the 
observed increases in latencies in the rivalry conditions. These latter observations 
instead suggest competitive interactions. 
Several quantitative models have been proposed for describing competitive interac-
tions in binocular rivalry (e.g. Klink, et al., 2008; Laing and Chow, 2002; Lankheet, 
2006; Lehky, 1988; Noest, et al., 2007; Shpiro, et al., 2007; Wilson, 2003). These 
models feature two main characteristics: mutual inhibition between the two eyes to 
ensure that only one image is visible at the same time and self-adaptation that de-
creases the dominance of one eye over time so that the other eye can take over. The 
model by Noest et al. (2007) can describe bistable percept choices at stimulus onset 
during intermittent stimulus presentation as well as percept switches during sus-
tained stimulus viewing (Klink, et al., 2008; Noest, et al., 2007). However, its inputs 
and subsequent rivalry resolving-stage do not incorporate the existence of opponent 
sensory channels from each eye, which means that it cannot accommodate differ-
ent stimulus strengths and different motion directions simultaneously. The latter is 
needed to cope with both rivalrous and non-rivalrous stimuli in different directions. 
In addition, it lacks a representation of sensory noise. In an attempt to resolve this 
problem, we extended the rivalry model of Noest et al. to accommodate opponent 
motion channels in each eye, and combined it with elements of the diffusion model 
for motion discrimination to accommodate sensory noise. 
Figure 2.9 illustrates the modifications we implemented. For each eye, the pooled 
activity of two populations of motion sensitive neurons with opposite preferred di-
rections were simulated (Figure 2.9A). For each population, we assumed that the 
mean response for motion in its preferred direction was larger than for motion in the 
opposite (null) direction, and that the response variance is proportional to the mean. 
Such responses to random dot motion have been found, for example, in macaque ar-
eas V1 and MT (Snowden, et al., 1992). We also assumed that the sensory responses 
depend systematically on motion coherence. As in previous diffusion models, we 
modeled this relationship according to responses measured in area MT (Britten, et 
al., 1996; Shadlen, et al., 1996a; Shadlen, et al., 2007). More specifically, the out-
put of each population was described as a constant depending on motion coherence 
with additive white noise (see Appendix, for details). The two signals from each eye 
then undergo a subtraction, which results in two monocular evidence signals. One is 
signaling evidence for rightward and against leftward motion. The other is signaling 
evidence for leftward and against rightward motion in the same eye. 
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These monocular signals are then integrated over time by four nonlinear units, which 
adapt and compete for dominance through subtractive cross inhibition. As in the 
Noest et al. (2007) model, each unit integrates its visual input with a “shunting”-type 
gain control, which implements the adaption, and the level of adaptation interacts 
with a constant neural baseline (see Appendix, for details). We assumed that each 
unit is only driven by monocular inputs because the results of Experiment 1 sug-
gested that a binocular input stage may not be needed to account for our results. The 
rivalry stage of the model is therefore limited to two units for each eye that have 
opposite ‘on directions’. Note that, although driven by monocular input, the rivalry 
solving units in the model are in fact binocular (because of the cross-inhibition). In 
our scheme, these binocular units represent leftward and rightward directions of mo-
tion, but they may of course also represent other, more complex features. 
In one version of the model (Figure 2.9B), we assumed that the cross-inhibition sig-
nals are binocular signals produced by pooling the output from the left- and right-eye 
units with the same on direction, thus supporting competition between percepts. In a 
second version (Figure 2.9C), we assumed that the cross-inhibition signals remained 
monocular, thus supporting competition between eyes. In both cases, a response is 
made when the mean activity of the units competing for one motion direction ex-
ceeds the mean activity of the others by a criterion amount. Parameters of the rivalry 
stage and the level of the decision bound were adjusted manually to roughly fit the 
experimental data.
Interestingly, both version of the model produced very similar response patterns, 
and could adequately capture the key changes in percept choices and mean reaction 
times that we found between the rivalrous and non-rivalrous conditions. As shown 
in Figure 2.10, both models produced a sigmoid psychometric curve in the non-ri-
valry condition (triangles) which adequately describes the increasing accuracy with 
increasing coherence level (c.f., Figure 2.6). Simulations of the rivalry condition 
(squares) with the same model parameters produced a flat line at 50% rightward 
choices. In addition, we obtained a realistic bell-shaped pattern of reaction times. 
Reaction times decreased with increasing coherence level but less steeply in the am-
biguous than in the unambiguous condition, which is consistent with the results from 
Experiment 2. Increasing/decreasing the scaling factor g of the monocular inputs 
from one or the other eye could readily simulate the subject-specific eye preferenc-
es that were observed in previous onset rivalry experiments (Carter and Cavanagh, 
2007) and in the rivalry conditions of Experiment 2 and 3. Note that the simulated 
curves are smoother than the curves obtained by the experimental data because the 
simulations were run for 1000 trials per condition, as compared to ~20 trials per 
condition in the experimental data.
It is clearly oversimplified to assume that the rivalry resolving stage only receives 
purely monocular inputs. For example, the two schemes can, in their present form, 
not accommodate the results by Meng et al. (2004), who showed that subjects still 
perceive motion when presented with stimuli that contain binocular motion signals 
but no monocular motion signals.
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Figure 2.9
Schematic representation of our percept-choice model for visual motion discrimination under 
uncertainty and rivalry. The model consisted of an input stage, which calculates the sensory 
evidence for rightward and against leftward motion, and vice versa, from each of the two eyes, 
and a rivalry-resolving / decision stage. A choice is made when the difference between acti-
vation levels for leftward and rightward motion in this latter stage reaches the upper or lower 
bound, respectively. 
A: The input stage consisted of motion sensitive visual units. Their activity as a function of 
motion coherence and direction was modeled according to previously measured responses 
in macaque area MT (Britten, et al., 1993; Shadlen, et al., 1996a): For motion in the preferred 
direction, the mean activity increased linearly (slope ap) with increasing coherence level with 
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respect to the baseline (b) at 0% motion coherence. For motion in the null direction, the mean 
activity decreased with increasing coherence but less steeply (slope an). The response vari-
ance, which was simulated by adding Gaussian noise, was assumed to be proportional to the 
mean activation level. 
B,C: The rivalry-resolving stage consisted of four nonlinear units which adapt and compete 
for dominance. 
Each unit received momentary evidence for rightward and against leftward motion, or vice ver-
sa, from one of the two eyes (black) as well as subtractive cross inhibition (blue). The two units 
for each eye had opposite on-directions (indicated by the arrows) due to their opponent visual 
inputs and the threshold imposed by the sigmoid ‘firing-rate’ function (which converts the ‘local 
field’, H, of each unit into momentary spike rates). In one version of the model (B), the cross-
inhibition was derived from the pooled outputs of its opposing units in both eyes. In the second 
version (C), each unit received only cross-inhibition from the opposing unit in the other eye. In 
both cases, the cross-inhibition and visual inputs were integrated with a “shunting”-type gain 
control that implements the adaption, and the level of adaptation interacted with a constant 
neural baseline as in the Noest et al. (2007) model. The dynamics of the model was given by 
a set of differential equations which specified the dynamics of the ‘local field’ variable Hi,j and 
adaptation state Ai,j of each unit (see Appendix A for details).
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Figure 2.10
Simulation results with two versions of the model. Same layout as Figure 2.6. The simulations 
consisted of 1000 trials per coherence level per condition with bounds at ±0.15. Left: Each 
adapting unit received cross-inhibition from the pooled outputs of its opposing units in both 
eyes. Right: Each adaptive unit received only cross-inhibition from the opposing unit in the 
other eye. Note the similarity between the two types of cross-inhibition.
42
Chapter 2
We believe, however, that this shortcoming could be ‘repaired’ by assuming that the 
two rightward, and the two leftward motion units in the rivalry resolving stages are 
partially driven by inputs from both eyes, because the net function of these units is 
that they resolve the conflict in motion direction, not eyes.
Conclusions
Our experiments demonstrate that binocular correlations between unambiguous di-
choptic motion stimuli do not facilitate visual motion discrimination. One would 
be tempted to conclude therefore that visual motion is primarily detected based on 
the monocular information from the two eyes. However, conflicting motion infor-
mation in the two eyes does slow down the motion discrimination process, which 
means that the process cannot be understood from an independent race between two 
monocular discrimination processes. Instead, competitive interactions are required. 
We investigated two parsimonious models which implement such competitions. One 
assumed competition between the opponent motion channels from the two eyes, and 
the other assumed competition between the opponent motion percepts. Both models 
could readily simulate the observed response patterns under non-rivalry and rivalry 
conditions. The model we propose combines key elements from existing diffusion 
and rivalry models into one, unified theoretical framework. 
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Appendix A: Model details
The model in Figure 2.9 was implemented in Simulink (Version 7.4; The Math-
Works, Inc). It consisted of an input stage, which modeled monocular sensory re-
sponses, and a rivalry-resolving / decision stage. 
The input stage simulated for each eye the activity of two populations of motion 
sensitive neurons with opposite preferred directions. As in previous diffusion mod-
els, we assumed that each population 1) responds vigorously for motion in the pre-
ferred direction and only weakly for motion in the opposite direction, 2) the mean 
response increases (decreases) systematically as a function of motion coherence in 
the preferred (null) direction, and 3) the response variance is proportional to the 
mean. More specifically, for motion in the preferred direction we assumed that the 
mean response, R, of each unit increased linearly (slope ap= 0.256) with increasing 
coherence level with respect to the baseline (b=23.32) at 0% motion coherence. For 
motion in the null direction, we assumed that the mean responses decreased with in-
creasing coherence but less steeply (slope an= 0.072). The response variance within 
each population was simulated by adding Gaussian noise with mean μ = 0 and vari-
ance σ2dt to the mean, where σ2= r·φ1R(C) with φ1 ≈ 1.5 spk
2 the variability of an in-
dividual neuron and r ≈ 0.15 the correlation between neurons in the same population. 
The values for response parameters ap, an, b, r, and φ1 were adopted from Britten, et 
al. (1993) and Shadlen, et al. (1996b).  
The rivalry-resolving stage consisted of four nonlinear units which adapt and com-
pete for dominance. As shown in Figure 2.9, each unit was driven by monocular 
inputs and had either a leftward or rightward on-direction as determined by its input 
connections. The dynamics of each unit in this stage was given by a set of differential 
equations which specified the ‘local field’ dynamics and the ‘shunting-type’ adapta-
tion component of each unit (after Noest, et al., 2007):
     τ∂Hi,j= Xi,j− (1+Ai,j)Hi,j+ βAi,j − γIi,j ,             (2.A1)
     τad ∂Ai,j= −Ai,j+αS[Hi,j]; i,j    {1,2},           (2.A2)
where the indices i and j refer to eye-of-origin and motion on-direction, respectively. 
The local field activity of each unit (H) was converted into a spike-rate output via a 
sigmoid function (S), and depended on the visual input (X), the adaptation dynamics 
(A), the amount of cross inhibition (I), and an adaptation-dependent bias (for details, 
see Noest, et al., 2007). 
The inputs to the rivalry-resolving stage were calculated from the responses of the 
sensory units by subtracting and scaling their outputs:  
     Xi,j=g(Ri,p − Ri,q); p,q    {1,2},p = j, q ≠ p            (2.A3)
where g = 0.1 was the fixed gain factor that we adopted for scaling the inputs.
In one version of the model (Figure 2.9B), each adapting unit received cross-inhibi-
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tion from the pooled outputs of its opposing units in both eyes: 
     Ii,j=0.5∑kS[Hk,l]; k,l    {1,2}; l ≠ j            (2.A4)
In the second version (Figure 2.9C), each adaptive unit received only cross-inhibi-
tion from the opposing unit in the other eye: 
     Ii,j=S[Hk,l]; k,l    {1,2}; k ≠ i, l ≠ j            (2.A5)
In both versions of the model, the gain (γ) of the cross inhibition feedback was kept 
the same.
To account for the low temporal resolution and long temporal integration times in 
motion coherence detection, the integration time constant was set to τ=0.5 s. The 
time constant for the adaptation was set to τad=1.0 s. Values of the remaining pa-
rameters were set to: α=3; β=0.27; γ=3.3. The sigmoid “firing rate” function which 
converted the ‘local fields’ Hi,j into momentary spike-rate outputs consisted of a non-
linear, Naka-Rushton function: 
     S[z>0]=z2/(z2+1); S[z≤0]=0.             (2.A6)
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100% correspondence
 Supplementary Figure 1 : Psychometric (top) and chronometric (bottom) functions obtained 
for spiraling  stimuli. Trials were matched for monocular (A) and combined (B) coherence 
levels. Figure layout as in Figure 2.  
Supplementary Figure 2.1
Psychometric (top) and Chronometric (bottom) functions obtained for spiraling stimuli. Tri-
als were matches for monocular (A) and combined (B) coherence levels. Figure layout as in 
Figure 2.2.
Appendix B: Supplementary Figures
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Supplementary Figure 2: Psychometric (top) and chronometric (bottom) curves for spiraling 
stimuli in the alternative version of experiment 1 with 0% coherence noise. Figure layout as 
in Figure 3.  
Supplementary Figure 2.2
Psychometric (top and chronometric (bottom) curves for spiraling stimuli in the alternative ver-
sion of Experiment 1 with 0% coherence noise. Figure layout as in Figure 2.3.
47
Motion discrimination under uncertainty and ambiguity
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
cl
oc
kw
is
e
S1
−50 0 50
0.5
1
1.5
Coherence (%)
Re
ac
tio
n 
tim
e 
(s
)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
S2
−50 0 50
0.5
1
1.5
Coherence (%)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
S3
−50 0 50
0.5
1
1.5
Coherence (%)
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
S4
−50 0 50
0.5
1
1.5
Coherence (%)
 
 
Unambiguous
Ambiguous
    L      R              L        R     L      R              L      R     L      R              L      R     L      R              L      R 
Supplementary Figure 2.3
Psychometric and chronometric response functions for ambiguous and unambiguous spiral-
ing stimuli. Motion pattern in the left and the right eye in the ambiguous condition is indicated 
by the arrows under the horizontal axes in the top panels. Figure layout as in Figure 2.5.
48
Chapter 2
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Unpaired dots (%)
Pr
op
or
tio
n 
m
or
e 
tr
an
sp
ar
en
t
th
an
 5
0%
 u
np
ai
re
d 
do
ts
 
 
S2
S7
S8
S9
Unpaired dot pattern  Paired dot pattern  
 A B
Supplementary Figure 4: Two-alternative forced c hoice experiment with transparent 
motion stimuli containing a dierent percentage of paired and unpaired dots. Paradigm 
modied after Qian et al. (1994). A : Schematic illustration of paired and unpaired dot 
patterns that were presented to both eyes simultaneously. The dots in each pair (only 
8 are shown) moved across each other over a certain distance and then disappeared 
and reappeared at new and randomly cho sen location. The disappearances and 
reappearances of dot pairs were asynchronized with respect to each other.  The 
unpaired dots were simply positioned independently  and randomly over the stimulus 
aperture.  Noise dots (not shown) were always paired , but lived only 1 frame . B : 
Psychometric response curves from the four subjects that participated in Experiment 
3. In each trial, two transparent motion stimuli  (each lasting 2 s) were presented 
sequentially with a delay  of 0.5 s . Subjects had to indicate  whether the rst or the 
second stimul us looked more transparent, guessing if necessary. In the standard 
stimulus (shown either as the 1 st or 2 nd stimulus) half of the signal dots were paired 
while the other  signal dots were drawn at random positions. In the te st stimulus  the 
fraction of paired dots was randomly chosen from 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 1. Coheren ce 
level was kept constant at 50%. Each condition was tested 20 times.  All subjects 
perceived the paired motion pattern as ickering noise, but the percept became more 
transparent compared with the standard stimulus as the proportion unpaired dots 
increased.  
Supplementary Figure 2.4
Two-alternative forced choice experiment with transparent motion stimuli containing a differ-
ent percentage of paired and unpaired dots. Paradigm modified after Qian et al. (1994). A: 
Schematic illustration of paired and unpaired dot patterns that were presented to both eyes 
simultaneously. The dots in each pair (only 8 are shown) moved across each other over a 
certain distance and then disappeared and reappeared at new and randomly chosen location. 
The disappearances and reappearances of dot pairs were asynchronized with respect to each 
other. The unpaired dots were simply positioned independently and randomly over the stimu-
lus aperture. Noise dots (not sho n) were always paired, but lived only 1 frame. B: Psycho-
metric response curves from the four subjects that participated in Experiment 3. In each trial, 
two transparent moti n stimuli ( ach lasting 2 s) were presented sequentially  with a delay of 
0.5 s. Subjects had to indicate whether the first or the second stimulus looked more transpar-
ent, gue sing if necessary. In the stand rd stim lu  (shown ither as the 1st or 2nd stimulus) 
half of the ignal dots were paired while the other signal dots were drawn at random positions. 
In th  test stimulus the fraction of paired dots was randomly chosen from 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 
and 1. C herence level was kept constant at 50%. Each condition was tested 20 times. All 
subjects perceived the paired motion pattern as flickering noise, but the percept became more 
transparen  compared with the s andard stimulus as the proportion unpaired dots increased.
Saccade target selection relies 
on feedback competitive signal 
integration
Joke Kalisvaart
André Noest
Bert van den Berg
Jeroen Goossens
Based on J.P. Kalisvaart, A.J. Noest, A.V. van den Berg and J. Goossens. Journal of Neuroscience. 33(29):12077-89
Chapter 3
50
Chapter 3
Introduction
During visual search, the brain must constantly decide when and where to look next. 
To explain how saccadic responses compete for selection and execution, current 
decision-making theories assume that sensory evidence is noisy and that it must be 
accumulated over time to reach a decision bound (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). Dif-
ferent types of models make different assumptions about how evidence is combined 
(Smith and Ratcliff, 2004): ‘Evidence-scores’ for two or more alternatives can race 
toward a threshold independently (race models,(Cousineau, 2004), compete with 
feed-forward inhibitory interaction (random-walk or diffusion models, (Laming, 
1966; Link and Heath, 1975; Nosofsky and Palmeri, 1997; Palmeri, 1997) or com-
pete via feedback inhibition (Usher and McClelland, 2001; Wang, 2002; Wong and 
Wang, 2006). So far it has been impossible to single out one among the many types 
of visual decision-making models; despite different architectures they predict simi-
larly optimal choice behavior (Bogacz, et al., 2006; van Zandt and Ratcliff, 1995). 
Indeed, no two-alternatives forced-choice task with static targets has allowed for a 
resolution of the model-mimicry: all models predict a choice for the strongest target 
and latencies that decrease with task difficulty.
To distinguish between feed-forward and feedback cross-inhibition we introduce a 
new manipulation: balanced synchronous changes of target intensity during stimulus 
presentation. We therefore studied saccadic choices between pairs of briefly-flashed 
targets whose intensities were swapped during presentation (Figure 3.1A,B). Under 
such conditions, circuits with feedback competition that exceeds a certain critical 
strength are sensitive to the initial stimulus bias but relatively resistant to the later 
bias-reversal. This characteristic behavior (hysteresis) occurs because the initial 
‘winner’ maintains its advantage by recurrent inhibition of the input of the compet-
ing channel (Furman and Wang, 2008; Noest, et al., 2007). Models with sufficiently-
strong feedback competition thus predict that subjects typically choose the target 
with highest initial strength, provided that the initial differences outlast the time-
constant of the feedback creating the hysteresis (Figure 3.1C). By contrast, feed-
forward integration models predict that, for balanced durations of the two stimulus 
epochs, early and late biases are equally effective (because the total evidence for 
both targets is the same), while leaky-integrator models even predict that later biases 
dominate the final evidence-scores. This implies that subjects should either show 
no preference at all, or a preference for the target that is strongest at the end, unless 
they make an irreversible choice for the initially-strongest target before the stimulus 
ends (premature choice commitment). Indeed, all accumulator models can produce 
primacy (i.e., a choice-preference for the initially-strongest target) if they include 
some thresholding-mechanism which induces choice commitment. We probed the 
contribution of such thresholding-mechanisms by appending strong intensity-biases 
towards the initially-weakest target.  
We found robust preferences for the target with the highest initial strength, which re-
versed only if the first stimulus epoch was sufficiently short, and the second one out-
lasted the first one by a sufficient amount. The basic primacy effect was attenuated 
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at larger stimulus biases, and could even be inverted completely if the stimuli were 
immediately followed by a strong intensity-bias toward the initially-weakest target. 
This near-complete transition from primacy to recency shows that the observed pri-
macy cannot be attributed to premature commitment to the initially-strongest target. 
Simulations showed that all these results were best described by a feedback cross-
inhibition model. Reaction times were independent of the changes in choice prob-
ability. They depended on the initial intensity of the selected target. 
Methods
Subjects
Ten adult human subjects (5 male, 5 female) participated in the experiments. All 
had normal or corrected to normal visual acuity. Subjects were informed about the 
experimental procedures and gave informed consent before the start of the experi-
ments. Procedures were approved by the Radboud University Medical Centre. Sub-
jects JR, VG, JG and JK were experimenters. All other subjects were kept unaware 
of the aim of the study. 
Setup
Subjects were seated in a darkened room at 80 cm of a projection screen on which 
stimuli were back projected.  In the first three experiments we used a Liquid Cristal 
Display projector (JVC, model DLA-S10E, Leiden, The Netherlands) with a refresh 
rate of 75 Hz and a maximum luminance level of ~45 cd/m2. In order to present tar-
gets at higher contrast and luminance levels in Experiment 4, we used a Digital Light 
Processing projector with a maximum luminance level of ~300 cd/m2 and a refresh 
rate of 60 Hz (Acer, P1265 model DNX0702). Luminance levels were measured 
with a Minolta LS-100 Luminance meter.
A chinrest was used to minimize head movements. Eye movements were measured 
with the scleral search coil technique (Remmel Labs, Parfair Ct, Texas, USA). Coils 
were inserted after one drop of topical anesthetic (Oxybuprocaine hydochloride 
0.4%, Thea, Belgium). Once the coil was in place, a drop of artificial tear (Meth-
ylcellulose 0.5%, Thea, Belgium) and a bandage lens (a large contact lens with a 
strength of zero diopters) were applied to minimize ocular discomfort. Use of the 
bandage lens doubled the measuring time with the coil to approximately one hour 
per session (Sprenger, et al., 2008). Eye position signals were low-pass filtered, am-
plified, and sampled at 500 Hz per channel. The spatial resolution of the horizontal 
and vertical eye position signals was better than 0.1° (Root Mean Square measure). 
Paradigms
In the first three experiments, each trial consisted of four epochs (Figure 3.1). At the 
beginning of each trial, a fixation ring with diameter of 0.5° was presented at the 
centre of the screen. Then, after a random period of 400-1200 ms the fixation ring 
disappeared, and two filled, circular targets with a diameter of 0.5° were presented 
simultaneously at 10° to the left and right of the centre. After a variable delay (D1) 
of 40, 80 or 120 ms, this first set of targets was replaced by a second set of targets 
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Figure 3.1: Intensity reversal paradigm and model predictions. 
A: In each trial, a central fixation ring was presented for 400-1200 ms. Upon disappearance of 
the fixation ring, two peripheral targets with different intensities (ΔI) appeared.  After a delay of 
40-120 ms (D1), the intensities of the left and right target reversed (reversal trials) or remained 
unaltered (control trials, not shown). In either case, both targets remained present for another 
40-120 ms (D2) until they were extinguished simultaneously. Subjects were instructed to look 
at the fixation ring and make a saccade towards the most intense target as fast and as ac-
curately as possible. 
B: Time traces illustrating the intensity changes of the right target (TR), the left target (TL) and 
the fixation ring as well as the ensuing saccade. Depicted traces show an initial intensity bias 
towards the right target followed by an equally strong bias towards the left target. The intensity 
differences between the left and the right target, the timing of the intensity reversals, and the 
overall stimulus durations were systematically varied. In a modified version of this paradigm, 
the D1 and D2 epochs were followed by a 3
rd epoch (D3) in which there was a strong intensity 
bias towards the initially weakest target.  See Methods for details. 
C:  Response of competing decision units. Models with sufficiently strong feedback competi-
tion predict a choice preference for targets with highest initial strength. Feed-forward integra-
tion models predict equal choice probabilities because the early and late biases are equally 
effective.  Feed-forward models with leaky-integration predict that later biases dominate, re-
sulting in a choice preference for targets with highest final strength. Premature commitment 
induced by low decision-thresholds (dashed horizontal lines) predicts primacy for any of these 
architectures, but in such bounded accumulator models, primacy cannot be undone by later 
stimuli.
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at the same locations. In control trials, the intensity of both the left and right target 
remained unaltered. In reversal trials, however, the intensities of the left and right 
target were reversed compared with the first target epoch. In both cases, targets were 
then displayed for another 40, 80 or 120 ms (D2) until the screen turned black. For 
each reversal condition, we presented control stimuli with the same total duration 
(i.e., D1+D2).  
Subjects were always instructed to first look at the fixation ring and then make a 
saccade to the most intense target as fast and accurate as possible. They received no 
feedback about their performance. Target intensities as well as durations of the first 
and second target presentation epoch were manipulated systematically across trials 
and experimental sessions. 
Target intensities in Experiments 1-3 ranged between 4.5 and 36.6 cd/m2. Back-
ground luminance was 0.273 cd/m2. The intensity difference (ΔI) between the left 
and the right target on any given trial could be large (4.5 versus 36.6 cd/m2), medium 
(7.8 versus 29.1 cd/m2), small (12.3 versus 22.4 cd/m2) or zero (both targets 16.7 cd/
m2). Thus, in control trials, target luminance could be unambiguous or ambiguous. In 
reversal trials, the mean intensity of the left and right target was the same only when 
the durations of the first and second epoch were the same. High-to-low and low-to-
high intensity changes were achieved with a time constant of ~10 ms, limiting the 
shortest practical presentation time to 40 ms. 
Experiments 1-3 established the conditions under which primacy arises, but could 
not discriminate between two very different mechanisms that can generate primacy, 
i.e., hysteresis due to strong feedback competition, or premature commitment due to 
an absorbing bound (see Introduction). Testing whether primacy can still be reverted 
does discriminate between these different model types: Primacy due to absorbing 
bounds is by definition irreversible and should increase monotonically with increas-
ing ΔI. Primacy due to hysteretic integration dynamics, on the other hand, should be 
reversible by a sufficiently strong stimulus. In Experiment 4 we therefore presented 
reversal stimuli across an extended range of target contrasts (i.e., from 22.5 versus 
33.6 cd/m2 up to 1.5 versus 77.5 cd/m2). The durations D1 and D2 were kept fixed 
at 50 ms. Targets in the 100 ms ambiguous condition had an intensity 27.8 cd/m2. 
Control stimuli lasted 50 ms and target contrasts ranged from 7.2 versus 49.5 cd/m2 
to 26.0 versus 29.7 cd/m2. Background luminance was 0.18 cd/m2.
To further probe the extent to which primacy can be undone by later stimulus evi-
dence, Experiment 4 also included two forced reversal conditions in which the stim-
ulus presentation ended with an extremely bright pulse at the location of the initially 
weakest target. More specifically, in the 50-50-67 ms forced reversal condition, a 
50-50 ms reversal stimulus was immediately followed by a third, 67 ms epoch in 
which there was an extreme bias toward the initially weakest target. In the 83-67 
ms forced reversal condition, 83 ms of initial bias was immediately followed by 67 
ms of reversed extreme bias. In both cases the initial bias was 49.5 versus 7.2 cd/
m2 and the final, reversed bias was 7.2 versus 283 cd/m2. For subjects JK and JG 
we also tested forced reversal conditions with an initial bias of 13.7 versus 40.0 cd/
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m2 and 3.6 versus 62.7 cd/m2, respectively, because those intensity differences bet-
ter matched the intensity differences that evoked the strongest primacy effect in the 
unforced condition. As in Experiments 1-3, we kept the stimulus durations short, to 
ensure that the subjects would not consciously perceive the intensity manipulations. 
Data were collected in blocks of 120-138 trials in which all experimental condi-
tions were presented 5 or 6 times in pseudo-random order. Subjects completed 10-
12 blocks across different sessions until each unique condition was tested 60 times 
(Experiment 1-3) or at least 100 times (Experiment 4). This typically required 3 or 4 
sessions per subject per experiment. 
Data analysis
Saccades were detected on the basis of calibrated eye position signals with custom 
software. Detection of saccade onsets and offsets was based on velocity and ac-
celeration criteria. All saccade markers were examined by the experimenters and, 
if necessary, corrected. Further analysis was done with Matlab (version 7.9, The 
MathWorks Inc), using custom software. 
To determine the subject’s choice regarding the most intense target, we only con-
sidered the direction of his/her first saccadic eye movement after stimulus offset 
that exceeded the detection criteria of 0.5° amplitude and 30°/s velocity. Subsequent 
correction saccades in the opposite direction where discarded. Such corrections oc-
curred only in ~1.5% of trials with equal probability across all stimulus conditions. 
Thus, excluding trials in which corrections occurred did not change any of our con-
clusions. 
Psychometric response functions
A generalized linear model with a logit link function was used to fit psychometric 
curves through the data points from Experiment 1-3 using the following logistic 
equation:
     PR =
1
1+e−Q   with Q=a·ΔI+b               (3.1)
were PR is the probability of a rightward saccade and ΔI the intensity difference (in 
cd/m2) between the right and the left target at stimulus onset. Positive values of ΔI 
indicate that the (initial) intensity of the right target is larger than that of the left tar-
get. The parameters a and b represent the subject’s sensitivity and bias, respectively. 
Student’s t-tests were used to test whether the fit parameters significantly differed 
from zero and whether the slopes (a) of the psychometric curves differed between 
experimental conditions.
The simple logistic model from Equation 3.1 was no longer adequate to describe 
the non-monotonic psychometric curves obtained in Experiment 4. We therefore ex-
tended the model in the following way:
     PR =
1
1+e−Q  with Q = d + a·(ΔI-b) + c·(ΔI-b)
3              (3.2)
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Note that Q is now a third-order polynomial where the additional parameter c rep-
resents the strength of the hysteresis reductions at higher ΔIs (see Results). The pa-
rameters b and d capture the subject-specific response biases. The horizontal shift b 
reflects an offset in the input to the choice-stage. The vertical shift d reflects some 
bias at the output of that stage. Experiment 4 brings out the distinction between these 
two types of biases. In Experiment 1-3, they are confounded into one net bias param-
eter (i.e., b in Equation 3.1) because the applied range of target contrasts appeared to 
be too small in these experiments.
Absorbing bounds inequality test
To quantify how strongly the data from Experiment 4 challenge mechanisms that at-
tribute our primacy-effects to premature commitment caused by absorbing bounds, 
we consider the class of accumulator models that have absorbing bounds but no hys-
teresis in their evidence accumulation. This whole class of models can then be tested 
by comparing the forced reversal conditions with their unforced counterparts. Key 
in this analysis the notion that at the end of D2 (which is either the end of the whole 
stimulus or the start of forcing D3 phase) a fraction of the accumulated-evidence 
trajectories already reached the boundary of the initially-strongest target (unknown 
fraction Ai), or the boundary for the other target (unknown fraction Af), leaving only 
a limited fraction (1−Ai−Af ) of formally ‘undecided’ trajectories that can still be 
influenced by a later forcing stimulus (see also Figure 3.5A, for illustration). If we 
knew for sure that the bright D3 forcing pulse were strong enough to drive all ‘sur-
viving’ trajectories to (or closest to) the boundary of the initially-weakest target, the 
probability of still choosing the initially-strongest target in the forced reversal con-
dition would provide a direct measure of Ai. Unfortunately, we cannot be sure that 
the forcing stimulus is indeed sufficiently strong to achieve this. We can, however, 
show that the paired probabilities from the two experimental conditions must satisfy 
an inequality that – if violated by our data – allows us to reject this whole class of 
bounded accumulator models:
Let Fi denote the probability of still choosing the initially-strongest target in the 
forced reversal condition. This observed probability then sets the upper limit for 
the unknown fraction of trials, Ai, in which the accumulated-evidence trajectories 
reached the absorbing bound of the initially strongest target before the end of D2. 
Note that we can only conclude that Fi ≥ Ai, because, as we noted above, we cannot 
be sure that the D3 forcing stimulus is strong enough. But, from the time- and polar-
ity-anti-symmetric nature of the reversal stimulus and from the observed behavior in 
the (unforced) reversal condition, we can now derive further constraints on Ai. 
For simplicity, we first assume absence of response biases. This assumption is even-
tually lifted, as it can be shown to only make our test more conservative. Now let 
Ri denote the observed probability of choosing the initially-dominant target in the 
(unforced) reversal condition. Next, keep in mind that Ri is the sum of Ai and the 
probability that an ‘undecided’ trajectory ends up being closer to the bound of the in-
itially-strongest target (see also Fig. 5A, for illustration). Next, we know that Ai ≥Af. 
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This holds because at the end of D1 the trajectories tend to be closer to the boundary 
of the initially brightest target (as verified by the control condition). Thus, given that 
D2=D1 and given the same (but reversed) ΔI, a drift to the other boundary during 
D2 takes more time. This, in combination with the assumed lack of hysteresis and 
bias in this model class, implies that at most one half of the `undecided’ trajectories 
can eventually contribute to choosing the initially-strongest target. That gives us the 
starting point for some algebra which relates Ri to Fi :
     Ri ≤ Ai + ½(1−Ai−Af )  =  ½(1+Ai−Af )  ≤  ½(1 + Fi )             (3.3)
Or:
     Fi  ≥ 2 Ri−1                    (3.4)
Thus, we can test whether the measured Ri and Fi combinations violate this inequal-
ity. 
The only remaining step required for the inequality test of Equation 3.4 is to account 
for the effect of choice biases that were clearly present in our data. We can do this 
by averaging the ‘raw’ Ri and Fi values plotted in Figure 3.4 for the two mirror-sym-
metric stimulus conditions per subject. This results in more bias-resistant measures 
of Ri and Fi :
         
     Ri = ½(Ri + 1 − Ri )  and  Fi = ½(Fi + 1 − Fi )+ +− −     (3.5) 
where the + and − superscripts refer to initial stimulus biases of +ΔI and −ΔI, re-
spectively. Using the modified Ri and Fi variables in this test not only reduces the 
effect of subject-dependent biases (which are difficult to estimate precisely) but the 
remaining ` second-order’ bias effects only makes our test more conservative (at least 
in a wide regime of practical interest, Fi < ½, because of convexity properties of the 
psychometric functions).
Standard errors for Ri  and Fi were obtained from error-propagation rules:
     
SE(Ri) =
Ri (1−Ri ) Ri (1−Ri )
4NR 4NR
+
+
+
+ − −
− and   SE(Fi) =
Fi (1−Fi ) Fi (1−Fi )
4NF 4NF
+
+
+
+ − −
−
  
      (3.6) 
where the Ns  denote the total numbers of trials per test condition, with the sub-
scripts R and F referring to the Reversal conditions and Forced reversal conditions, 
respectively, and with the + and − superscripts referring to the two different intensity 
biases as before. Using normal-approximation we then tested the null-hypothesis 
from Equation 3.4 against the alternative hypothesis (i.e., Fi < 2 Ri −1) by applying 
the following one-sided z-test:
     z = 2Ri − 1 − FiSE
with SE =   4·SE(Ri)
2 + SE (Fi)
2             (3.7)
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Chronometric response functions: 
Saccade latencies were also analyzed as function of ΔI. For each subject we first 
subtracted the average reaction time measured in the ambiguous control condition, 
pooled across rightward and leftward saccades. This was done because the average 
latency relative to target onset differed greatly among subjects (range: 250-600 ms). 
The resulting chronometric response functions were quantified by fitting linear re-
gression lines to the data: 
     ΔRT = α·ΔI+β                    (3.8)
One-way analysis of covariance, with ΔI as the predictor, ΔRT (in ms) as the response 
and condition as the grouping variable, was used to test for differences between the 
chronometric curves. Correction for multiple testing was achieved by using a Tukey-
Kramer test for multiple comparisons.
Results
Balanced durations
In the first experiment, two targets were presented simultaneously for 80 or 160 
ms, and the initial intensity bias reversed halfway during stimulus presentation (i.e., 
D1=D2=40 ms or D1=D2=80 ms). In control trials the intensities remained the same 
across D1 and D2. Figure 3.2 shows the probability of rightward saccades as function 
of the initial rightward intensity bias (ΔI, positive if the right target was brightest at 
stimulus onset). In both control conditions (Figures 2A,C) subjects discriminated 
target intensities easily; the psychometric curves had steep, positive slopes and sac-
cades were almost always directed towards the brightest target at the largest inten-
sity differences (ΔI=±36 cd/m2). For purely ambiguous control stimuli (ΔI=0 cd/m2), 
choice probabilities scattered around 50%. The psychometric curves obtained in the 
80-80 ms reversal condition (Figure 3.2B) also had steep, positive slopes, indicat-
ing a significant preference for the initially strongest target in all subjects (t-tests, 
p<0.0001). Subjects even maintained a clear preference for the initially brightest 
target in the 40-40 ms reversal condition (Figure 3.2D; slopes>0; t-tests, p<0.001 for 
all subjects). Compared with the control conditions, the slopes were somewhat re-
duced (80-80 ms condition: t-tests, p<0.05 for all subjects), or reduced considerably 
(40-40 ms reversal condition: t-tests, p<0.01 for all subjects except VG), indicating 
that target selection was not exclusively based on the initial intensity differences; 
subsequent stimulus information also had a significant influence on the eventual de-
cision, even though the changes in target luminance were not consciously perceived.
Unbalanced durations
To probe further the contributions of initial and later stimulus epochs, we performed 
two additional experiments in which durations D1 and D2 were manipulated. In 
Experiment 2 we first kept the total stimulus duration fixed at D1+D2=160 ms and 
swapped the targets’ intensities at D1=40, 80 or 120 ms after stimulus onset. Choices 
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in the control condition (Figure 3.3A) and 80-80 ms reversal condition (Figure 3.3C) 
replicated the primacy effects of Experiment 1 with more subjects. In the new 120-
40 ms reversal condition (Figure 3.3B), i.e., if D1 lasted three times longer than D2, 
choice behavior became almost undistinguishable from the control condition in all 
subjects. By contrast, if D1 lasted three times shorter than D2 in the 40-120 ms revers-
al condition, the subjects’ choice behaviors diverged considerably (Figure 3.3D). 
Three subjects (IB, AM and JK) still showed a significant, albeit weaker primacy 
effect (slopes>0; t-tests, p<0.05), but the other four subjects (JR, VG, DB and DA) 
now showed a significant preference for the target that was most intense at the end 
(slopes<0; t-tests, p<0.01). Yet, even in these four subjects the choice probabilities 
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Figure 3.2: Initially brightest target preferred despite balanced target durations. 
Probability of rightward saccades as function of the (initial) intensity difference between the 
right and left target in Experiment 1. A: 160 ms control trials. B: 80-80 ms reversal trials. C: 80 
ms control trials. D: 40-40 ms reversal trials. 
Each data point consists of 60 trials. Solid lines show psychometric functions fitted to the data. 
Colors identify the different subjects. Insets illustrate the intensities of the two targets over the 
course of a trial. 
The positive slopes of the psychometric curves indicate a consistent preference for the initially 
strongest target (as compared with the ambiguous control condition). Negative slopes would 
have been obtained if there had been a preference for the target that had the highest final 
intensity. Horizontal lines would have been obtained if there had been no preference (other 
than a constant bias).
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Figure 3.3: Choice behavior under unbalanced duration conditions. 
Experiment 2 (A-E) varied D1 and D2, keeping D1+D2 constant at 160 ms. A: 160 ms control 
condition.  B: 80-80 ms reversal condition. C: 120-40 ms reversal condition. D: 40-120 ms 
reversal condition. E: Slopes of the psychometric curves for the three different reversal condi-
tions and the 160 ms control condition as function of ΔD (i.e., D1 – D2), averaged over subjects. 
Experiment 3 (F-H) varied D2, keeping D1 constant at 40 ms. F,G: Psychometric response 
functions of subjects JK and DA, respectively. Black, open circles: control data were pooled 
over the three target durations (80 ms, 120 ms and 160 ms) because stimulus durations in 
control trials had no significant influence. Dark gray, circles: 40-40 ms reversal condition. Mid-
dle gray, squares: 40-80 ms reversal condition. Light gray, triangles: 40-120 ms reversal con-
dition. H: Slopes of the psychometric curves fitted to the three reversal conditions as function 
of ΔD. Values of D2 are indicated below the horizontal axes as well, for convenience. 
Positive (negative) slope indicates a preference for the initial (final) brightest target. Colors 
represent different subjects; error bars denote standard errors of the slopes. Note breakdown 
of the primacy effect if long D2 (≥80 ms) epochs were preceded by a short (40 ms) D1 epoch.
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were not completely inverted compared with the 120-40 ms condition. To summarize 
these changes, Figure 3.3E shows the averaged slopes of the psychometric curves as 
function of ΔD=D1−D2. Note the systematic increase in slopes with increasing ΔD. 
The asymmetric effect of intensity difference in D1 versus D2 is reflected in the fact 
that the trend line does not pass through the origin. 
Because Experiment 2 kept the total duration constant, one cannot conclude that 
ΔD is the only or even the mechanistically relevant variable controlling the choice 
process. Indeed, strong hysteresis is only expected if D1 exceeds the (probably sub-
ject-dependent) feedback time-constant. To test this, Experiment 3 used the small-
est practical D1 (40 ms) and varied D2 between 40, 80 and 120 ms to quantify the 
potential breakdown of the primacy that we found at larger D1. Figures 3F and 3G 
illustrate the behavior of two different subjects in this experiment. Note that their 
choices were consistently influenced by D2 with a clear breakdown of primacy at D2 
≥ 80 ms in one of them (Figure 3.3G). This behavior is quantified in Figure 3.3H for 
all four subjects. Note the systematic decrease in slope of the psychometric curves 
with increasing D2: the longer D2, the weaker the preference for the initially most 
intense target. For two subjects the sign of the slopes even flipped from positive to 
negative if D2 exceeded D1, indicating a preference for the target with the highest 
final intensity. 
Thus, a brief (40-80 ms) initial bias consistently dominated the responses if D1 lasted 
an equal amount of time or longer than D2. However, stimulus information in D2 
was not simply ignored. In Experiment 2, the longer D2 exceeded D1, the more often 
subjects responded to the target with the highest final intensity. And, for the short 
D1 durations in Experiment 3, some but not all subjects showed a transition from 
primacy to recency. 
Strong target imbalance
As noted in the introduction, observing primacy does not necessarily imply that the 
dynamics of evidence accumulation produces hysteresis. In fact, any decision pro-
cess that can commit to a particular choice before the stimulus ends can produce 
primacy, independent of its dynamic properties (see Fig. 1C). The capability for 
such premature commitment is common to a wide range of decision-models, which 
share the crucial assumption of becoming committed to a particular choice as soon 
as the evidence (accumulated via some model-dependent process) for that particular 
alternative hits a fixed bound or threshold. However, a crucial distinction is that dy-
namic hysteresis due to feedback cross-inhibition creates primacy without irrevers-
ible commitment: sufficiently strong input should be able to ‘override’ hysteresis, 
even when such input arrives well after the internal dynamics has settled into one of 
its hysteretic states. We therefore decided to present equal-duration reversal stimuli 
across an extended range of target imbalances. This yields two clearly different pre-
dictions for models with or without strong feedback competition. In the absence of 
feedback competition, or if the feedback is not strong enough to create hysteresis, 
primacy due to absorbing bounds should increase systematically with target imbal-
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ance, so the psychometric curves should increase monotonically from saturation at 
P=0 to saturation at P=1. Primacy due to hysteresis, however, should produce non-
monotonic curves because primacy will eventually decrease if the target imbalance 
becomes sufficiently large. This prediction holds because the input during D2 will 
start to exceed the strength of the hysteresis induced during D1, and absence of com-
mitment (absorbing boundaries) will allow the decision process to evolve for at least 
the full duration of the stimulus. Some of the psychometric curves from Experiments 
1-3 may already hint towards such non-monotonic choice behavior, but testing this 
prediction over a wider range of target imbalances is clearly called for. For this pur-
pose, we switched to a different projector capable of producing higher contrasts and 
luminances (Methods).
Figure 3.4 shows the results from all six subjects that participated in this fourth 
experiment. Dashed curves are the psychometric curve fitted to the control data (cir-
cles, Equation 3.1). For these brief, 50 ms stimuli, all subjects correctly chose the 
most intense target in the condition with the highest intensity, and correct respons-
es decreased to ~50% for very small contrast. In the 50-50 ms reversal condition 
(squares), subjects showed a consistent primacy effect which increased with target 
imbalance up to about 40 cd/m2. This regime corresponds to the behavior measured 
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Figure 3.4: Breakdown of primacy 
by strong target imbalance and late 
forcing pulses.
Probability of rightward saccades 
(±SEM) as function of (initial) in-
tensity difference between the left 
and the right target in Experiment 
4. Each panel shows the results 
from one subject. Circles and dotted 
lines: 50ms control condition with 
fitted psychometric curve (Equa-
tion 3.1). Squares and solid lines: 
50-50 ms reversal trials (n≥100 for 
each ΔI) with fitted curves following 
Equation 3.2. Note the non-monot-
onic nature of these psychometric 
response functions. Arrows indi-
cate a significant decrease in the 
primacy effect (Fischer’s exact test, 
p<0.05). Forced reversal stimuli in-
duced a near-complete inversion of 
the primacy effect. Diamonds: 50-
50-67 ms forced reversal condition. 
Triangles: 83-67 forced reversal 
condition.
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in the 40-40 ms reversal conditions of Experiments 1 and 3. At higher intensity bi-
ases, however, the choice probabilities clearly showed a reversed trend, i.e., the pri-
macy effect started to decline. To test if this decline was statistically significant, we 
first compared the probabilities of the outmost two points on either side of the curve. 
We found a significant (Fischer’s exact test, p<0.05) decrease in primacy on one side 
of the range of target contrasts for all subjects except JG and a significant decrease 
on both sides for subject JE. To further quantify the strength of this trend reversal, 
we fitted a minimally-extended generalized psychometric function model to the en-
tire dataset (solid lines; Equation 3.2, Methods). For all subjects, the coefficient of 
the 3rd order polynomial term was significantly negative (mean±SD across subjects: 
c= (-2.73±0.72)·10-6; t-test, p<0.05, for all individual subjects), indicating that the 
data indeed showed a significant decline of the basic primacy effect at higher target 
contrasts. These tests thus demonstrate that the observed primacy effects cannot be 
attributed purely to early choice-commitment because, without sufficiently-strong 
feedback competition, the latter would predict a monotonic increase in primacy. 
Forced reversal
Although the basic primacy effect could indeed be reduced by stronger target con-
trasts (roughy) for |ΔI| > 40 cd/m2), these findings could not provide a strict upper 
limit on the possible contribution of premature choice-commitment or a strict lower 
limit on the contribution of dynamic hysteresis. To obtain those limits, we tested to 
what extent the primacy effect breaks down when later-arriving stimulus evidence 
in favor of the opposite target location is very strong. Experiment 4 therefore in-
cluded “forced reversal” trials in which D2 was immediately followed by a D3 epoch 
in which the reversed target imbalance was made even stronger than the reversed 
imbalance during D2. As explained in the methods, and illustrated in Fig. 5A, any 
residual probability of choosing the initially brightest target in this forced reversal 
condition then sets an upper limit on how much of the primacy seen without the forc-
ing D3 phase is caused by premature choice commitment. Conversely, the amount 
of primacy in the unforced condition that can be attributed to hysteresis is at least as 
large as the reduction in primacy that occurs when appending the forcing D3 phase 
to the stimulus. 
For efficiency, and to ensure that forced reversal trials were rare occurrences in any 
given block of trials (17%), we only used a target contrast which produced a strong 
primacy effect, as measured in pilot experiments. The duration of the forcing D3 
phase was set at 67 ms. Note that if D3 would be too short to reach maximal choice-
forcing, it would merely reduce the test’s power to reject the hypothesis of absorbing 
bounds being responsible for primacy-effects. As shown in Figure 3.4 (isolated dia-
monds near P=0 and P=1), adding the D3 forcing phase to the stimulus completely 
abolished primacy, and drove all subjects to choose  almost exclusively the target 
with final dominance. The same result was obtained with the 83-67 ms forcing con-
dition (triangles; Methods). These findings strongly suggest that the contribution of 
premature choice commitment was extremely small. 
63
Saccade target selection relies on feedback competitive signal integration
As outlined in the Methods, the simplest approach to quantify how strong this data 
challenge mechanisms that attribute primacy-effects to premature commitment, is 
to focus on a slightly more specific class of models with absorbing bounds, namely 
those without hysteresis in their evidence accumulation. This restriction still in-
cludes all ‘standard’ decision models, such as “bounded drift-diffusion” (Gold and 
Shadlen, 2007) and all models we are aware of that use bounded integration, leaky 
or not, and independent of their mutual interactions as long as they are too weak to 
cause hysteresis. This whole class of models can then be tested quantitatively by 
comparing the probability Fi of still choosing the initially-strongest target in forced 
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Figure 3.5: Breakdown of primacy under forced reversal conditions excludes absorbing-bound 
models.
A: Evidence trajectories in the bounded drift diffusion model (Gold and Shadlen, 2007) for the 
reversal stimuli applied in Experiment 4. The bounded drift diffusion model is an example of 
a much broader class of decision-making models which all share the common property that 
the choice for a particular alternative becomes irreversible once the accumulated evidence for 
that alternative reaches its critical bound (here at either E=1 or E=-1). 
Three variables are defined: Ai, Ri and Fi. Ai is the fraction of trajectories that – according to 
the model – hit the bound for the initially-strongest target in the red-labeled time window. Ri 
is the observed probability of choosing the initially-strongest target in the (unforced) reversal 
condition. Ri equals the sum of Ai and the fraction of trajectories that crossed the vertical blue 
line segment. Fi is the probability of still choosing the initially-strongest target in the forced 
reversal condition. Fi equals the sum of Ai and the fraction of trajectories that hit or crossed 
the green line segments. Only those trajectories that did not yet hit a bound by the end of D2 
(i.e., the ‘surviving’ trajectories) can still be influenced by the D3 forcing stimulus. Fi thus sets 
the upper limit for Ai. Together with the anti-symmetric nature of the reversal stimulus, this 
leads to the prediction that for absorbing bound models the inequality Fi ≥ 2Ri −1 must hold 
(Equation 3.4, Methods). 
B,C. Choice probabilities for the initially-strongest target in the 50-50-67 ms (B) and the 83-67 
ms (C) forced reversal conditions (Fi) as function of the probability of making that same choice 
in the 50-50 ms (unforced) reversal condition (Ri). Only the gray area, which satisfies the 
inequality Fi ≥ 2Ri −1 (Equation 3.4, Methods), can be reached by absorbing bound models. 
Colored symbols show mean data points per subject, with an initial bias of 7.2 versus 49.5 cd/
m2 (filled symbols), or 13.7 versus 40.0 cd/m2 (JK, blue open symbol) and 3.6 versus 62.7 cd/
m2 (JG, cyan open symbol). Error bars indicate ±1 SEM (Methods).
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reversal conditions with the probability Ri, of choosing the initially-strongest target 
in the corresponding unforced reversal conditions. More specifically, we can test 
whether the measured Ri and Fi combinations violate the inequality (see Methods for 
details): Fi  ≥ 2Ri − 1. If so, our data would provide strong evidence against the very 
wide class of models with absorbing bounds and no hysteresis. One can in fact derive 
less conservative inequalities for the Ri, Fi combinations when focusing on specific 
models within this highly diverse class, but this is beyond the scope of our present 
paper, and proves unnecessary for our present purposes. 
To perform the inequality test, we plotted the averaged Ri and Fi data pairs from each 
subject (Methods) in the scatter plot of Figure 3.5 (error bars indicate ±1 SEM). Note 
that the data points would have to fall within the gray area delineated by the line Fi  = 
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Figure 3.6: Model properties
A,B: Diagram of the feed-forward (A) and feedback (B) cross-inhibition model together with 
simulations of the 80-80ms reversal condition from our experiments. Arrow-heads denote 
excitation, bullet-heads inhibition. Inputs represent the intensities of the left (L, green) and the 
right (R, red) target as a function of time. The inputs pass through a leaky integrator and a non-
linear Naka-Rushton compression stage (s=x2/(x2+c) for x>0, otherwise s=0; c=1). The differ-
ence between the two models is in the type of cross-inhibition only.  Choices were assigned 
by comparing the units’ response magnitude at stimulus offset. An additional integration step 
(shown transparently) in the feed-forward model can – for this reversal condition – ‘repair’ its 
failure to produce primacy without absorbing bounds. C: Output of the left (green) and right 
(red) decision units from the feedback model as function of time for leftward and rightward 
choices (columns) in the three different (D1, D2) timing conditions of Experiment 3 (rows). 
Model parameters for the simulations in A-C: Integration constant, Ti=80 ms; strength of the 
cross-inhibition, γ=3.33 for feedback cross-inhibition, λ=1.0 for feed-forward cross-inhibition; 
variance of the Gaussian white noise on the inputs was 20% of the mean.
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2Ri − 1 to satisfy the predictions of absorbing bound models without hysteresis. It is 
quite clear, however, that nearly all data from the 50-50-67 ms forcing condition fell 
well outside that region (Figure 3.5B). A one-sided z-test on each data pair (Meth-
ods) indeed showed a highly significant violation of Inequality 3.4 (p<0.00015) for 
all but one of our subjects. When we performed the test with the Fis derived from the 
83-67 ms forcing condition (Figure 3.5C), we also found highly significant viola-
tions of inequality 3.4 (p<0.00005), except for JE. As can be seen in Figure 3.4, the 
lack of statistical significance for JE in these tests stems from a single Ri outlier data-
point. If we would base the test for this subject on his full dataset (i.e. sampling from 
the fit-function based on all data-points), this test too would come out as strongly 
violating Inequality 3.4. 
Model simulations
The choice data from Experiment 4 provide strong evidence against the broad class 
of accumulator models with absorbing bounds. Here, we simulated feed-forward 
and feedback competition models without absorbing bounds and tested their per-
formance against our observations. Figure 3.6 shows a schematic drawing of the 
feed-forward (Figure 3.6A) and feedback (Figure 3.6B) architectures. The inputs, 
representing the intensities of the two targets, pass through a leaky-integrator and 
non-linear compression stage. Decisions are based on the units’ activity levels at 
target offset. The two models differ only in the type of cross-inhibition that mediates 
the competition. In the feed-forward model, each decision unit receives cross-inhi-
bition from the opposing input, whereas in the feedback model, each unit receives 
cross-inhibition from the output of the alternate decision unit. To show the effect of 
changes in stimulus intensity, we simulated reversal trials. For the feedback circuit, 
the nature of the response (degree of hysteresis) depends crucially on how D1 relates 
to the time-constant of the overall feedback dynamics. For our first demonstration 
(Figure 3.6B), we simulated the 80-80 ms reversal condition. The time-constant of 
the decision units was chosen as just sufficient to allow the network to settle on a 
choice determined by the initially strongest target before the beginning of D2 (i.e., 
Ti=80 ms). This prevents the decision unit of the initially weaker target from re-
sponding significantly, despite the fact that the target intensities have reversed (insets 
Figure 3.6B). The output of the feed-forward model, on the other hand, more or less 
follows the sequence of input events (insets Figure 3.6A). Figure 3.6C illustrates 
how the behavior of the feedback model changes if D1 is shorter than the feedback 
time-constant. Increasing D2 then results in a transition from a preference for the ini-
tial brightest target if D2 is short (top row) to a preference for the most intense target 
at the end if D2 becomes large (bottom rows).
Figure 3.7 shows the choice behavior of the two models. (Same format as Figures 
2-3). Five different conditions were simulated. The first three panels in each row 
show simulations of the reversal conditions from Experiment 2 (from left to right, 
40-120 ms, 80-80 ms and 120-40 ms, respectively). The fourth panel shows the 40-
40 ms reversal condition from Experiment 1. The last panel on the right shows the 
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50-50 ms reversal condition that was tested over a larger contrast range in Experi-
ment 4. The two curves in each graph show the results obtained with two different 
parameter sets, representing two subjects that showed distinctly different choice be-
havior in the 40-120 ms reversal condition of Experiment 2 (gray: DA-like subject; 
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Figure 3.7: Model simulations of the different reversal conditions. 
A: Choice behavior of the feed-back model. B,C: Choice behavior of the feed-forward model 
in the competition stage (B) and the accumulator stage (C) presented in the same format. 
Each panel shows the probability of choosing the right target as function of rightward bias at 
stimulus onset (ΔI, here in arbitrary units) for different timing conditions, as indicated in the 
top right corner. Note the larger range of ΔI values on the abscissa of the rightmost panels, 
corresponding to the larger contrast-range that was tested in Experiment 4. Black and gray 
symbols represent simulation results obtained with two different sets of parameters. Values in 
each set were chosen to either mimic the behavior of subject DA (gray) or JK (black), as these 
two subjects clearly showed opposite choice behavior in the 40-120 ms reversal condition of 
Experiment 2 and 3. 
Model parameters were obtained by manual adjustment: Ti=50 ms and Ti=25 ms (gray and 
black curves, respectively); γ=3.25 and γ=7.00 for feedback cross-inhibition (gray and black 
curves, respectively), λ=1 for feed-forward cross-inhibition; Variance of the Gaussian white 
noise on the inputs was 60% of the mean. Each data point consists of 500 simulated trials.
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black: JK-like subject). 
The feedback model (Figure 3.7A) generally prefers the initially most intense target. 
But, in the 40-120 ms reversal condition (leftmost panel), the presence of hysteresis 
depends critically on the integration constant (Ti) and the cross-inhibition strength 
(γ). With a longer Ti and a weaker γ, the hysteresis disappears (N.B., the absolute val-
ues of Ti should not be taken literally as they scale with the shape parameter c of the 
sigmoid function). For high target contrasts (rightmost panel), the model shows the 
observed decline of the primacy effect as such strong stimuli are able to `override’ 
the hysteresis. Response biases as observed in the experiments could be induced, 
e.g., by asymmetries in input gains for the left and right decision units (not shown).
For the feed-forward model, a direct readout of the competition stage at stimulus 
offset (Figure 3.7B) always predicts a preference for the target that is most intense at 
the end. Note, however, that this failure to replicate the basic primacy effect can be 
‘repaired’ by adding an accumulator stages which integrates the output of the compe-
tition stage without any further interactions or absorbing bounds (see Figure 3.6A). 
Indeed, when the choices are based on the total time integral of its competition-stage 
output (Figure 3.7C), primacy occurs when the two stimulus epochs are equal or the 
first epoch is longer. Still, with this augmented version of the feed-forward model 
it remains impossible (due to the absence of absorbing bounds and hysteresis in 
the evidence accumulation) to produce primacy in the 40-120 ms reversal condition 
(as seen in some of our subjects in Experiment 2 and 3). This is due to the absence 
of absorbing bounds and absence of hysteresis in the evidence accumulation. Both 
versions of the feed-forward model also fail  to account for the observed decline in 
primacy at large target contrasts (Experiment 4) regardless of its parameter settings. 
Thus, in short, neither the competition stage, nor the added accumulator stage of the 
feed-forward model were able to fully capture all key features of the saccadic choice 
behavior that were revealed across our different reversal conditions.
Reaction time
The choice patterns in Experiment 2 and 3 showed remarkably different dependen-
cies on the same stimulus set between our subjects. This offers a unique opportunity 
to investigate whether reaction times for the alternatives follow similarly different 
patterns in the same subjects or whether reaction times are dissociated from choice 
probabilities altogether. We wondered, for example, if the relation between reaction 
time and choice probability followed some simple constraints such as: (1) the mean 
latencies of saccades towards the most frequently chosen target are systematically 
shorter than the mean latencies of saccades towards the competing target, and (2) in-
creases in choice preference are associated with increases in this latency difference.
The data from Experiment 1-3 showed, however, that there was no significant cor-
relation between choice preference and mean latency difference of leftward versus 
rightward saccades in the control conditions (Figure 3.8A; r=0.11; t-test, p=0.28 
over all subjects and conditions). For most data from the reversal conditions (Figure 
3.8B) we did find a significant correlation between choice preference and latency 
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difference (r=0.65; t-test, p<<0.0001), but only for timing conditions that produced 
a preference for the initially brightest target (small symbols; thin regression line). 
For timing conditions that produced a preference for the target with the highest final 
intensity (i.e., negative slopes of psychometric curves; ~20% of the data), we actu-
ally found an opposite relationship between latency and choice. Under these latter 
conditions (large symbols; thick regression line), the mean latencies of rightward 
−40 −20 0 20 40
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
P
(R
ig
ht
w
ar
d 
sa
cc
ad
e)
−60
−40
−20
0
0
20
40
60
−60
−40
−20
0
20
40
60
R
ea
ct
io
n 
tim
e 
ch
an
ge
 (m
s)
R
ea
ct
io
n 
tim
e 
ch
an
ge
 (m
s)
Initial rightward bias (cd/m2)
Rightward
Leftward
C
D
E
80-80 ms
40-120 ms
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
150
Left                  Choice preference                  Right 
La
te
nc
y 
di
ffe
re
nc
e
(m
s)
R
ig
ht
fa
st
er
Le
ft
fa
st
er
A
−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
−150
−100
−50
0
50
100
150
 Left                  Choice preference                  Right
La
te
nc
y 
di
ffe
re
nc
e
(m
s)
R
ig
ht
fa
st
er
Le
ft
fa
st
er
B
Figure 3.8: Decoupling of choice probability and reaction times. 
A: Mean latency difference between rightward and leftward saccades as function of choice 
preference pooled across all control conditions of Experiment 1-3. B: Data from reversal con-
ditions in the same experiments, separated into two categories based on the slopes of the 
psychometric curves as shown in Figures 2 and 3. Small symbols, thin line: slopes>0, indicat-
ing a preference for the initially brightest target. Large symbols, thick line: slopes<0, indicating 
a preference for the target that is brightest at the end. Colors represent different subjects. 
C-E: Psychometric (C) and chronometric (D and E, rightward and leftward saccades, respec-
tively) response functions obtained in Experiment 2 averaged over the four subjects whose 
choice behavior reversed between the 80-80 ms (black) and 40-120 ms (gray) test conditions. 
Error bars show the mean±1SEM over subjects. For each subject, the average reaction time 
measured in the ambiguous condition was subtracted before averaging to correct for large 
inter-subject variation in average reaction time.
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Figure 3.9: Reaction time as function of initial intensity of the selected target. 
A,B: Average reaction times relative to stimulus onset as function of the initial rightward bias 
in the 160 ms control condition (A) and the 80-80 ms reversal condition (B) of Experiment 1. 
Averages (±1 SEM) were calculated from a minimum of 6 responses per intensity condition 
(i.e., for choice probabilities P≥0.01). For each subject, the average reaction time measured 
in the ambiguous condition was subtracted before averaging to correct for large inter-subject 
variation in average reaction time and the results were shown separately for saccades to the 
right (top) and the left (bottom) target. As a result, offsets of the regression lines (gray) were 
practically zero. Colored lines and symbols are results from individual subjects. Thick regres-
sion lines (gray) are based on the pooled data from all subjects. Average reaction times (± 
SD) in the ambiguous condition for the different subjects ranged between 395±15 ms and 573 
±11 ms.
C-F: Slopes of the chronometric functions (i.e., gray lines in A and B) for the different experi-
mental conditions of Experiments 1-4, respectively. Colored symbols represent slopes from 
individual subjects. To allow for pooling of the data from leftward (open symbols) and right-
ward saccades (filled symbols), slopes obtained for rightward responses were multiplied by 
−1. The resulting slopes were typically positive, indicating that reaction times decreased with 
increasing initial intensity of the selected target. Bars with error bars show the mean ± 1 SEM 
across subjects. 
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saccades increased significantly compared with the mean latencies of leftward sac-
cades as the preference for the right target increased, and vice versa if preference for 
the left target increased (r=−0.68; t-test, p<<0.0001). 
This remarkable dissociation between choice probability and saccade latency is fur-
ther illustrated in Figures 8C-E for the four subjects that showed nearly inverted 
choice preferences in the 80-80 ms (black) versus 40-120 ms (gray) reversal condi-
tion (c.f., Figure 3.3). Note that for each saccade direction, the changes in reaction 
time as a function of initial target contrast were the same under both timing con-
ditions (Figure 3.8D,E, analysis of covariance, F=0.24, p>0.8 and F=1.88, p>0.1, 
respectively) while the changes in choice probability were opposite (Figure 3.8C, 
t-test, p<0.0001). This shows that the reaction times depended strongly on the initial 
target contrast and on the direction of the ensuing saccade, but not on the probability 
of choosing either target. Saccade latency was short compared with the ambiguous 
control condition if the initially stronger target was chosen (i.e., ΔRT<0) but long if 
the initially weaker target was chosen (i.e., ΔRT>0), and these latency differences 
increased as function of the initial intensity difference, irrespective of the choice 
probability.
This relation between reaction time and the initial intensity of the selected target (or 
its initial intensity difference with the other target) was found across all experiments 
and all conditions (Figure 3.9). In Experiment 1-3, the chronometric response func-
tions obtained in reversal conditions (Figure 3.9B) were actually quite similar to the 
ones obtained in control conditions (Figure 3.9A). This is quantified in Figure 3.9C 
for all test conditions applied in Experiment 1 using the slopes of the chronometric 
response functions (Equation 3.8). Because the chronometric functions for rightward 
and leftward saccades were practically mirror images, we pooled these responses 
by inverting the slope of the rightward responses. Neither the 80-80 ms nor the 40-
40 ms reversal condition produced significantly different latency effects compared 
with the control conditions (analysis of covariance, F=1.18, p>0.2 and F=0.5, p>0.4, 
respectively). Similar results were obtained in Experiment 2 and 3 (Figures 9D, 9E, 
respectively). In both experiments, changes in D1 and D2 had very little influence on 
the saccade latencies. This contrasts markedly with the robust influences on choice 
behavior (c.f., Figure 3.3). In fact, the chronometric functions remained invariant to 
both the presence and timing of the reversals (analysis of covariance: no significant 
differences in Experiment 2, F=0.28, p>0.8 and Experiment 3, F=1.25, p>0.2). This 
similarity between control and reversal data in Experiment 1-3 shows that a revision 
of the initial decision by later evidence did not lead to an extra delay in saccade reac-
tion time. In fact, in Experiment 4, when we forced saccades in the opposite direction 
of the initially-strongest target, thus breaking down the hysteresis built up during 
the initial part of the stimulus, the latencies were significantly shorter than the ones 
in the corresponding unforced condition (mean±SEM latency difference for move-
ments to the same location: 26±4 ms, paired t-test, p<0.0001; and for movements to 
the opposite location: 17±5 ms, p<0.01; data not shown). This latency reduction by 
late stimulus evidence also refutes the notion initial information alone might have 
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been the determining factor in reactions times. The latter is further corroborated by 
the significant differences in slopes of the chronometric function for the control ver-
sus reversal conditions  (analysis of covariance: F=47.53, p<0.0001) of Experiment 
4, for which the mean target intensity level were larger than in Experiments 1-3 (i.e., 
27.8 cd/m2 versus 16.7 cd/m2, respectively; Methods). 
Discussion
We followed a novel approach in investigating saccadic decision-making, using 
two simultaneously (≤160 ms) presented targets with intensity reversals occurring 
at different moments in time. Using this approach, we found a robust primacy ef-
fect: subjects always preferred the target that was brightest during the early part of 
each stimulus, even if longer-lasting opposite differences were present in the sec-
ond part of the stimulus. This primacy effect collapsed when (1) the duration of the 
early stimulus phase was reduced to about 40 ms, (2) the target intensity differences 
were large, and (3) the reversal stimulus was followed by a very strong stimulus 
bias towards the initially weakest target. The latter two findings show that the basic 
primacy effect did not result from premature commitment to the initially-dominant 
target. A decision model which assumes feedback cross-inhibition, however, fully 
described the observed choice behavior. 
There is some prior evidence that decision-making is biased towards early visual in-
formation. In a motion discrimination task, Ludwig et al. (2005) found that subjects 
rely mostly on information provided in the beginning, a finding which they later 
explained with a time-varying decision threshold (Ludwig, 2009). Disturbing mo-
tion pulses also have more effect when they occur early in a trial (Huk and Shadlen, 
2005; Kiani, et al., 2008; Tsetsos, et al., 2012). Furthermore, using a search task in 
which target intensities jittered, Tsetsos et al. (2011) found a preference for the ini-
tially strongest target, and concluded that this could be due to feedback competition. 
One might argue that feed-forward models do predict a preference for the initially 
strongest target if subjects adopted a low decision threshold reached shortly after 
stimulus onset (Ludwig, 2009), or if the integration of evidence were bounded (Kiani, 
et al., 2008). However, the results from our fourth experiment, in which we showed 
that the primacy effect decreases at higher target contrasts and that the preference for 
the initially brightest target can be completely undone by a late strong bias towards 
the other target (Figure 3.4) cannot be explained by any feed-forward model with 
irreversible decision thresholds. Moreover, the very low probabilities of still choos-
ing the initially-strongest target in the forced reversal condition (Figure 5) show 
that even for feedback models that do allow dynamic hysteresis absorbing bounds 
play no significant role in controlling the well-defined saccadic choice behavior that 
occurred in Experiment 4. These robust findings are corroborated by some of the 
results obtained by Tsetsos et al. (2012) who found that motion-direction discrimina-
tion in one of their subjects showed a primacy-to-recency transition for short versus 
long-duration stimuli. Given the evidence against choice commitment, dominance 
of the initial stimulus also contradicts many other model types: high-leakage (Kiani, 
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et al., 2008) and most “urgency” models (Cisek, et al., 2009; Ditterich, 2006a) give 
more weight to the final stimulus (unless the urgency-signal would rise faster than 
our 40 ms minimal duration, see Standage, et al., 2011). Likewise, recent gating 
models (Purcell, et al., 2010; Schall, et al., 2011) prevent accumulation of the initial, 
low-amplitude part of the sensory input. 
In theory, it is possible that a different mechanism triggered a saccade to the bright 
forcing target, even though the original mechanism had already committed to the 
other target. In particular, one might worry that, due to subsiding fixation activity, 
the late forcing pulses were able to elicit so-called express saccades (Dorris et al., 
1997; Bell et al., 2006). There was, however, no evidence for this; the latencies of 
individual saccades were always >150 ms relative to the onset of the forcing pulse, 
which rules out any specific involvement of the express pathways. We also examined 
the actual eye movement traces. Prior commitment to the intially-strongest target in 
a parallel pathway would predict that saccades towards the forcing target are sub-
stantially influenced by (preparatory) activity related to the other impending sac-
cade. However, as shown in Figure 3.10, the metrics and kinematics of saccades in 
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Figure 3.10: Saccade trajectories. 
Position and velocity traces of all sac-
cades to the left target in the control 
(A), reversal (B) and forced reversal 
(C) condition made by two naïve sub-
jects (DA and JW) in Experiment 4 
(black). Averaged traces are super-
imposed (gray). Both the metrics and 
kinematics of the saccades were com-
parable. This supports our assumption 
that they resulted from the same sac-
cade mechanism. 
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the forced condition were actually very similar to those in the control and unforced 
condition. This supports our assumption that they resulted from the same saccade 
mechanism. 
Interestingly, we found that reaction times depended on the initial stimulus contrast 
and on the direction of the ensuing saccade (Figure 3.9) but not on the probability of 
choosing either target (Figure 3.8). In fact, by manipulating the timing of the inten-
sity swaps in Experiment 2 and 3, we could nearly invert the relation between reac-
tion time and choice probability from faster to slower reactions for the more likely 
outcome in some of our subjects. Such a remarkable dissociation between reaction 
time and choice behavior has, to our knowledge, never been reported. Instead, it is 
typically found that changes in choice probability go hand in hand with opposite 
changes in reaction time (Chittka, et al., 2009; Palmer, et al., 2005), although Niwa 
and Ditterich, (2008) found another example of a dissociation: reaction times that 
varied across conditions without changes in choice probability and vice versa). Cur-
rent decision-making theories explain these findings from the first-to-threshold prin-
ciple, but as we have shown here, this principle cannot account for the decoupling 
of choices and reaction times revealed by our reversal paradigm (Figure 3.8) or the 
remarkable invariance of the chronometric functions to both the presence and timing 
of the reversals observed in Experiment 1-3 (Figures 3.9,A-E). We thus conclude 
that reaction time and choice are determined by separate mechanism, rather than by a 
single-stage competition process. This fits in previous conceptual schemes (Findlay 
and Walker, 1999), which propose that ‘when’ and ‘where’ are determined by paral-
lel, but hierarchically organized pathways.
Physiological studies clearly support the notion that target selection and movement 
initiation are distinct phenomena. In monkeys performing visual search, visually-
responsive cells in frontal eye fields (FEF), lateral intraparietal sulcus (LIP), and 
superior colliculus (SC) discriminate between target and distracters (FEF: Schall 
and Hanes, 1993; LIP: Ipata, et al., 2006; Schall and Hanes, 1993; Thomas and Paré, 
2007; SC: Basso and Wurtz, 1997; McPeek and Keller, 2002), but the latency with 
which these cells discriminate the target from distractors is unrelated to the timing of 
the ensuing movement. In fact, the selection takes place independent of movement 
execution (Juan, et al., 2004; Murthy, et al., 2009; Murthy, et al., 2001; Sato and 
Schall, 2003; Schall, et al., 1995; Thompson, et al., 1997; Thompson, et al., 1996).
The chronometric functions from all our experiments indicated that reaction times 
decreased systematically with increasing initial intensity of the selected target (Fig-
ures 3.8 and 3.9). One might speculate, therefore, that reaction times in our experi-
ments might have been determined by the target contrasts at stimulus onset. Such a 
theory would be consistent, e.g, with the contrast-dependent spike timing recently 
observed in the primary visual cortex (Lee, et al., 2010), and is further supported by 
our findings in Experiments 1-3, which showed that that neither the presence nor 
the timing of the intensity reversals had a significant influence on the chronometric 
response curves (Figures 3.9, C-E), However, in Experiment 4 we found that the 
chronometric functions for the control and reversal condition were clearly differ-
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ent (Figure 9F), and that the later forcing-stimulus actually shortened the saccade 
latencies, indicating that later stimulus information did impact the reaction times. A 
possible interpretation of these effects is that increases in stimulus intensity decrease 
the delays in visual processing (Bell et al., 2006). 
The present literature leaves some uncertainty about how the target-selection stage 
is read out. In our simulations, we tested two different approaches. Either the inte-
grated output of the decision units was compared, choosing the channel with the 
highest value as the current winner, or the output levels of the decision units at stimu-
lus offset were compared. The latter could rely, e.g., on the activity levels of cells 
that keep the latest choice in working memory (Chafee and Goldman-Rakic, 1998; 
Kojima and Goldman-Rakic, 1982). For the feed-forward model, the type of readout 
heavily influenced its choice behavior, but due to the absence of hysteresis in the 
evidence accumulation, neither type could be reconciled with the experimental data 
(Figure 3.7B and 3.7C). For the feedback model, only a readout at stimulus offset 
produced predictions that were qualitatively consistent with the observed behavior 
(Figure 3.7A). Results from the integrated output (not shown) failed to account for 
the non-monotonic nature of the psychometric curves in the 50-50 ms reversal con-
ditions of Experiment 4. 
Bollimunta and Ditterich (2012) obtained physiological evidence from monkey LIP 
for the presence of a feed-forward inhibition component in the random-dot motion 
direction discrimination task. At the same time, the presence of feedback inhibition 
could not be ruled out. Here, we did not simulate hybrid models. It is possible, and 
perhaps even likely, that feed-forward inhibition also contributes to the visual tar-
get-selection process we have studied here. However, having ruled out a significant 
contribution of premature choice commitment in Experiment 4, the essence of our 
findings is that the observed primacy effects can only be accounted for by a model 
which includes sufficiently strong feedback cross-inhibition. 
We thus conclude that saccadic responses to competing visual targets are best de-
scribed by a model featuring a competitive choice mechanism based on feedback 
cross-inhibition that exerts executive control (possibly mediated by the substantia 
nigra, (Hikosaka and Wurtz, 1983) over the initiation of the upcoming saccade. 
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Introduction
When both eyes are presented with distinctly different images, a phenomenon called 
binocular rivalry arises. Instead of merging the images of both eyes into a single 
binocular percept, the two images are perceived alternately in a quasi-regular fashion 
(for reviews, see Blake, 2001; Blake, 2005; Blake and Logothetis, 2002; Tong, et al., 
2006). This bistable behavior has attracted considerable attention, partly because it 
provides a clear dissociation between stimulus and visual awareness. Thus far, how-
ever, the neural mechanisms underlying binocular rivalry remain poorly understood.
Several studies have used brief or intermittent stimulus presentation with varying in-
terstimulus intervals (Chen and He, 2004; Kanai, et al., 2007; Leopold, et al., 2002; 
Maier, et al., 2003; Noest, et al., 2007; Pearson and Clifford, 2004). These studies 
revealed that perception becomes remarkably stable when short stimulus presenta-
tions (0.5-1.2 sec) are combined with relatively long interstimulus intervals (>1s), 
whereas short interstimulus intervals (<0.5s) promote percept alternations with eve-
ry new stimulus presentation. The observed perceptual stabilization was assumed to 
reflect temporary suppression or slowing of the physiological processes underlying 
binocular rivalry. Recent findings suggest, however, that rivalry at the beginning 
of a trial, so called onset rivalry, may be different from sustained rivalry (Carter 
and Cavanagh, 2007; Chong and Blake, 2006; Klink, et al., 2008; Mamassian and 
Goutcher, 2005). For example, Mamassian & Goutcher (Mamassian and Goutcher, 
2005) found that contrast differences between the two stimuli cause a strong eye bias 
at stimulus onset that wears off during the course of the trial toward a more equal 
dominance of the two eyes.  Furthermore, Carter & Cavanagh (Carter and Cavanagh, 
2007) showed that this onset bias also occurs with equiluminant stimuli but that it is 
highly specific to certain locations in the visual field and that these locations differ 
between subjects. These findings raise the interesting question whether there is a re-
lation between onset rivalry and rivalry in the presence of eye movements. Because 
eye movements interrupt stimulus viewing for the duration of the saccade and in ad-
dition cause the retinal images to change, the implications of saccades for models of 
binocular rivalry are far from trivial.
In current models, binocular rivalry typically revolves around two mechanisms. Mu-
tual inhibition between monocular cell populations, which induces suppression of 
one percept while the other is dominant, and slow self-adaptation of cells within each 
population, which causes the dominant percept to be replaced by the other percept 
after a certain period. In line with these models, rivalry has been found to slow down 
if the stimulus is moving, preventing adaptation (Blake, et al., 2003). It is implicitly 
assumed, however, that these mechanisms act locally, affecting only populations of 
cells in retinotopic visual areas that have their receptive fields at the location of the 
stimulus. In agreement with this assumption, adaptation studies found that, at least 
for lower order stimuli such as gratings, adaptation only occurs in retinotopically 
matched locations (Melcher, 2005; van Boxtel, et al., 2008) although the strength of 
the aftereffect is found to be gaze-dependent (Nishida, et al., 2003).
When a saccade causes a displacement of the visual stimulus across the retina, how-
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ever, e.g., from one hemifield to the other, a new population of cells will be stimu-
lated. Clearly, the cells in this new population will have a different adaptation state 
than the ones stimulated before the movement because they have experienced a dif-
ferent visual history. These models therefore predict that a rivaling stimulus that 
has been shifted to a new retinal location is processed as a new stimulus and that 
it should make no difference whether the retinal image shift is caused by a physi-
cal displacement of the stimulus or by a saccadic eye movement. Alternatively, the 
balance between excitation and inhibition could be under more direct, active neural 
control. For example, saccades might help maintaining perceptual continuity, as sug-
gested by Ross & Ma-Wyatt (2004), and cause less perceptual switches than passive 
stimulus jumps.
To test these different possibilities, we first characterized onset rivalry and rivalry 
during sustained viewing in two separate control experiments (Experiment 1 and 2). 
We then studied state changes in binocular rivalry when retinal image shifts were 
produced actively by saccades or passively by displacements of the stimulus on the 
projection screen (Experiment 3), and we compared rivalry after such retinal dis-
placements to the behavior observed at stimulus onset and during sustained viewing. 
Apart from the commonly used grating stimulus, we also used a face/house stimulus 
and a motion stimulus because these different stimulus types involve at least partly 
different (dorsal and ventral) visual pathways in the brain.
We report that both active and passive retinal displacements produced subject-spe-
cific eye/hemifield preferences that were very similar to those seen at stimulus onset. 
Our data thus suggests that these retinal image shifts trigger onset rivalry. Interest-
ingly, however, the behavior observed after saccades versus stimulus jumps was not 
the same; saccades produced a significant attenuation of the eye/hemifield prefer-
ences. We conclude therefore that non-visual, oculomotor signals have a significant 
impact on the rivalry process. This implies that state changes in binocular rivalry are 
not only determined by passive adaptation processes, but also involve active neural 
control components. 
Methods
Subjects
Eleven adult human subjects participated in the experiments. All subjects had nor-
mal, or corrected to normal, visual acuity. Subjects JK, SR and JG had previous 
experience with the tasks. The other subjects were inexperienced and naive as to the 
purpose of the investigation. 
The volunteers were informed about the experimental procedures and gave informed 
consent in writing before the start of the experiments. All procedures were in ac-
cordance with the Declaration of Helsinki, and approved by the Radboud University 
Medical Centre. Table 4.1 lists age and gender of each participant.
Setup 
Subjects were seated in a dark room at 52 cm from a projection screen on which 
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Subject Gender Age (years) Stimulus type
DB F 24 MFG
FW M 23 MF
JB F 25 MF
JG M 39 MG
JK F 25 MFG
JT M 24 MF
JV F 33 F
MV F 28 MF
RH M 26 F
SR F 23 MFG
TG M 30 MFG
Table 4.1. Subject characteristics.
The column labeled ‘stimulus type’ indi-
cates which stimulus types were tested 
in each subject: M(otion), F(ace/house) 
and/or G(ratings). 
Figure 4.1. Illustration of the different 
stimuli used in this study. Top: opponent 
motion stimulus, middle: face/house 
stimulus, bottom: oblique grating stimu-
lus. The arrows indicating movement di-
rection in the motion stimulus were not 
present in the real stimulus. Each panel 
shows the stimulus as it was presented 
to one eye. The stimulus was always 
positioned directly to the left (as shown 
for the motion and the grating stimuli) or 
to the right (as shown for the face/house 
stimulus) of the fixation point. 
Visual hemifield 
containing 
stimulus
Image 
presented to 
left eye
Image 
presented to 
right eye
1 Left Up Down
2 Left Down Up
3 Right Up Down
4 Right Down Up
Table 4.2. Four possible configuration of 
the motion stimulus.
For the face/house stimulus, up and 
down were replaced by face and house 
respectively. For the grating stimulus, 
up and down were replaced by left- and 
right-oblique, respectively.  
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visual stimuli were back projected with an LCD projector (Panasonic PT-AX100E) 
at 60 Hz. The total size of the projection area was 57x32 cm with a resolution of 
1280x720 pixels. The subject watched the screen through a front-mirror stereoscope 
(HyperView, Berezin, U.S.). Head movements were restricted with a chin support or 
with a bite board. Dichoptic stimuli (Figure 4.1) were generated with Matlab (The 
MathWorks, Inc.) using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; 
Pelli, 1997). It was either a 4x4° random dot kinematogram with dots moving coher-
ently in opposite directions, a 4x4° face/house stimulus (modified after Tong, et al., 
1998 ) or a circular sinusoidal grating with a diameter of 4°. The motion stimulus 
consisted of 500 dots (0.14° white squares) moving vertically with a speed of 2.75° 
per second (1 pixel/frame). Dots had asynchronous lifetimes of 0.33 s. When a dot 
died, it was redrawn at a random position within the stimulus area. The spatial fre-
quency of the grating was 1 cycle per degree. Stimulus contrast was the same for im-
ages presented to the left and right eye, with a maximal luminance of 98 cd/m2 and a 
background luminance of 1.3 cd/m2 (Minolta LS-100 Luminance meter).  
Each trial started with a 0.46° fixation cross, and after a fixed delay of 1 s, a rivalrous 
stimulus was presented. The stimuli were always presented directly left or right from 
the fixation point, such that the center of the stimulus was located at a retinal eccen-
tricity of 2°. Motion, face/house and grating stimuli were tested in separate sessions. 
When the left eye watched the upward motion, the face, or the left-oblique grating, 
the right eye watched the downward motion, the house, or the right-oblique grating 
and vice versa. The hemifield in which the stimulus was presented also varied be-
tween trials. This resulted in the four possible stimulus configurations listed in Table 
4.2 (for the motion stimulus), which were presented in pseudorandom order.
Subjects indicated their percept by pressing one of two mouse buttons. Button press-
es were recorded by the stimulus program with a temporal resolution of 60 Hz. 
In part of the experiments we measured eye movements in two dimensions with 
either an infrared eye tracker (Eyelink® II, Version 1.11, SR Reasearch, Canada; 
subjects DB, JG, JK and JT) or with the scleral search coil method (Collewijn, et al., 
1975) (subjects JG and DB). The spatial resolution of the eye tracker was in the order 
of 0.5 degrees (root mean square measure). The spatial resolution of the search coil 
system was better than 0.3 minutes of arc. The results of these control measurements 
indicated that gaze remained centered on the fixation point when required, with sac-
cade amplitudes during fixation <0.2°. 
Onset and sustained rivalry
We first characterized onset rivalry and rivalry during sustained viewing in two sepa-
rate experiments. In Experiment 1 we asked subjects to indicate their first domi-
nant percept (e.g., upward or downward motion) after stimulus onset.  The stimulus 
remained present until the subject responded (typically within 400-900 ms). Each 
subject completed 100 trials per stimulus type, 50 in each hemifield. In Experiment 
2, the peripheral stimuli were presented for 30 seconds, and subjects were asked to 
continuously indicate their dominant percept while fixating the straight-ahead fixa-
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tion point. Stimuli were presented to the left and to the right of the fixation point as 
in Experiment 1. Each subject completed 48 (JB, JV and RH) or 80 trials (all other 
subjects) per stimulus type, balanced between eyes and hemifields (c.f., Table 2) in 
a pseudorandom order.
Results
Experiment 1: Initial percept
Experiments by Carter and Cavanagh (2007) have indicated that rivalrous grating 
stimuli produce subject-specific onset biases. The aim of the first experiment was to 
quantify these biases for the observers that took part in the present study, and to test 
whether they exist also for other types of stimuli. Towards that end, we presented 
peripheral stimuli while subjects maintained straight-ahead fixation and we asked 
them to indicate their first dominant percept after stimulus onset (Methods).  
Figure 4.2A shows the responses from three representative subjects when (face/
house) stimuli were presented in either the left hemifield (left column) or right hemi-
field (right column). Red and green vertical lines identify onset dominance of the 
stimulus presented in the right and left eye, respectively. Note that these subjects 
showed one of three characteristic response patterns: FW almost always showed 
right eye dominance at stimulus onset, whereas subject JB showed an onset prefer-
ence for the left eye, regardless whether the stimulus was located in the left or the 
right hemifield. For subject TG, however, there was a bias that depended on the 
retinal location of the stimulus. This subject showed a strong preference for the left 
eye when the stimulus was located in the left visual hemifield and a strong prefer-
ence for the right eye when the stimulus was located in the right visual hemifield. 
The results thus indicate a significant preference iul this subject for perceiving the 
image in the nasal part of the retina over perceiving the image in the temporal part 
at stimulus onset. 
To quantify this behavior for each subject we calculated an index ILR that measured 
the preference for the left versus the right eye, and an index INT that measured the 
preference for nasal versus temporal retinal halves. The indices were defined in the 
following way: 
      ILR = PLH + PRH − 100              (4.1)
  
     I
NT
 = P
LH
 − P
RH
                 (4.2)
where PLH and PRH are the percentage of trials in which the right eye was dominant 
at the beginning of a trial while the stimulus was presented in the left or the right 
hemifield, respectively. The values thus range from -100 for complete left/nasal pref-
erence to +100 for complete right/temporal preference. Figure 4.2A lists the values 
of IRL and INT for the three example subjects.
The scatter plot in Figure 4.2B shows INT as a function of ILR for all eleven subjects 
(different symbols) for the three different stimulus types (different colors). Note that 
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the data from most subjects are located near the end of either the horizontal or verti-
cal axis, indicating a strong preference for one eye or one hemiretina, respectively. 
In our group of subjects, we found strong preferences for the right eye, the left eye 
and the nasal retina, but not for the temporal retina. This behavior was consistent 
across stimulus types in the sense that each subject showed a qualitatively similar 
onset bias for each stimulus type. Pearson’s correlations between the motion, the 
face/house stimulus, and the grating stimulus ranged between 0.84 and 0.86 for the 
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Figure 4.2. Subject-specific onset preference. 
A: Data from three typical subjects (face/house stimulus). Each colored vertical line shows 
the onset response in a single trial: right eye or left eye dominance is indicated in red and 
green, respectively. Trials in which the stimulus was presented in the left or the right hemifield 
are presented on the left-hand and right-hand side of the center, respectively. The first trial is 
shown in the center, trial number increases outwards. Values marked ILR and INT at the right 
hand side of the figure show preference indices (see text). B: Indices quantifying the left/right 
and nasal/temporal preference at trial onset. INT is plotted as a function of ILR for each subject. 
Colors indicate different stimulus types. Blue: motion stimulus (9 subjects), red: face/house 
stimulus (10 subjects), green: grating stimulus (5 subjects).
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IRL index and between 0.64 and 0.98 for the INT index. The magnitude of the onset 
biases, however, was not identical. Most individuals did show significantly different 
onset biases for face/house, grating and motion stimuli (Fisher exact tests, p<0.05), 
but these differences were typically small, and showed no consistent pattern across 
subjects. 
Experiment 2: Sustained rivalry
Previous studies have reported that the percept biases at stimulus onset do not persist 
during sustained viewing (Carter and Cavanagh, 2007; Mamassian and Goutcher, 
2005). The objective of the second experiment was to verify this behavior for our 
group of subjects and to estimate how fast the onset effect wears off for the different 
stimulus types that we have used. Towards that end, subjects were required to fix-
ate straight-ahead during 30 second trials, and continuously indicate their dominant 
percept of the peripheral stimulus by pressing one of two mouse buttons (Methods). 
Figure 4.3 shows for three subjects (FW, JB and TG) the probability of right and left 
eye dominance as function of time during motion trials. Data in the left- and right-
hand panels are averaged across all trials in the left and right hemifield, respectively. 
Note that, after the initial reaction time in which neither button was pressed, there 
was first a strong bias for images in either the left or the right eye. This bias was con-
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Figure 4.3. Average eye dominance as function of time in the sustained rivalry motion task. 
A: subject FW. B: subject JB. C: subject TG. Right- and left-hand panels show data from trials 
in which the stimulus was in the right or the left hemifield, respectively. Black line: right eye. 
Gray line: left eye. 
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sistent with the bias observed in Experiment 1 (c.f., Figure 4.2A): subjects FW and 
JB again showed an onset preference for images in the right (Figure 4.3A) and the 
left eye (Figure 4.3B), respectively, whereas subject TG again showed a right-eye 
preference if stimuli were presented in the right hemifield but a left-eye preference 
if stimuli were shown in the left hemifield (Figure 4.3C). Accordingly, the onset 
preferences as measured in Experiment 2 were strongly correlated with the onset 
preferences measured in Experiment 1 (Pearson’s correlation across subjects and 
stimulus types: r=0.85, p<0.001). After the strong initial bias for either left or right 
eye dominance, however, the instantaneous probabilities for left and right eye domi-
nance both converged on an average value of about 0.5. The data thus indicate that 
rivalry entered a steady state in which both eyes were dominant for approximately 
50% of the time. In all our subjects, this steady state was reached within the first 10 
seconds of the trials. 
Figure 4.4 compares the percentage of right eye dominance at stimulus onset as ob-
served in Experiment 2 with the right eye predominance during sustained viewing. 
The right eye predominance during sustained viewing was calculated as the total 
proportion of time that the right eye was dominant during all but the first two domi-
nance states in each trial (i.e., excluding the first dominant state for both the left and 
the right eye). This was done separately for stimuli in the left and right hemifield and 
for each stimulus type, resulting in 2, 4 or 6 data points per subject (depending on 
the number of stimulus types tested). For each of the nine subjects that completed the 
experiments with at least two different stimulus types (c.f., Table 1), we then calcu-
lated linear regression coefficients and plotted the resulting regression lines. If onset 
rivalry and sustained rivalry result from the same process, the slopes are expected to 
be around 1.0. However, in line with previous results by Carter & Cavanagh (2007) 
we found that for all nine subjects the slopes of the regression lines were small, and 
Figure 4.4. Eye predominance during 
sustained rivalry phase as function of 
eye dominance at stimulus onset. 
Right eye predominance in the sus-
tained rivalry phase (Experiment 2) is 
plotted as function of right eye domi-
nance probability at stimulus onset. 
Symbols identify the same subjects 
as in Figure 4.3. Blue: motion stimu-
lus (9 subjects), red: face/house (10 
subjects) stimulus, green: grating 
stimulus (5 subjects). Black lines: 
linear regression lines for 9 subjects 
that completed the experiment with 
more than one stimulus type.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Right eye dominance at stimulus onset
R
ig
ht
 e
ye
 p
re
do
m
in
an
ce
 in
 s
us
ta
in
ed
 p
ha
se
84
Chapter 4
significantly less than 1 (F-test, p<0.03). With a mean (±SD) slope of the linear re-
gression lines of 0.08±0.17 across subjects, our data strongly support the notion that 
sustained rivalry and onset rivalry are independent. Pearson correlation coefficients 
were indeed not statistically significant in eight of nine subjects (t-tests, p>0.05). 
Note, in Figure 4.4, that for the majority of our subjects, the average eye dominance 
in the sustained phase was close to 50% whereas their eye/hemifield preference at 
trial onset was typically biased. Only two subjects (DB and JV) showed a significant 
predominance of one eye over the other in the sustained phase (Wilcoxon rank sum 
test, p<0.05), but that difference in dominance was not as extreme as at stimulus 
onset. 
Experiment 3: Retinal image shifts
Methods
In Experiment 3, we quantified percept state changes at the time of a retinal image 
shift. In this paradigm, subjects watched the stimulus and during the sustained ri-
valry phase (c.f., Figure 4.3), they either made a saccade (active shift of the stimulus 
across the retina) or the stimulus jumped to another location (passive shift). Trial 
duration was 20 seconds and there were two different trial types. In the saccade trials 
(Figure 4.5A), the stimulus was presented at the center of the screen, and the subject 
watched the larger of two red fixation crosses (sized 0.46° and 0.23°) located at the 
edge of the stimulus. After a random period of 13–16 seconds (i.e., in the sustained 
rivalry phase), the fixation cross shrunk. This was the cue for the subject to make 
a saccade to the other fixation cross located at the opposite edge of the stimulus. In 
stimulus jump trials, the subject fixated a green fixation cross in the center of the 
screen and the stimulus was located either to the left or to the right of it (Figure 
4.5B). One second after a warning (shrinking of the fixation cross) the stimulus 
jumped to the other side of the fixation cross, while the subject maintained fixation. 
Because of the fixed delay between the warning and the actual stimulus jump, sub-
jects could anticipate the upcoming stimulus jump, just as they could anticipate their 
own saccadic eye movement. Subjects could identify the trial type from the location 
and color of the fixation cross. 
After the retinal image shift (either due to a saccade or a stimulus jump) the subject 
indicated state changes in his/her percept at the moment of retinal image shift by 
pressing two buttons in succession (see Figure 4.6, for illustration). The first but-
ton press indicated the percept dominance state immediately before the saccade or 
stimulus jump. The second button press indicated the percept dominance state im-
mediately after the saccade or stimulus jump. Saccade trials and stimulus jump tri-
als were alternated. Each subject completed a total of 200 trials per stimulus type. 
Saccades and stimulus jumps will together be referred to as retinal image shifts or 
shifts for short. 
From the button-press data we calculated the probabilities of left and right eye domi-
nance before and after the shifts, as well as the probability to switch between percep-
tual states or to maintain dominance at the moment of the shift. To compare the data 
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from subjects with different individual eye/hemifield preferences, all calculations 
were done separately for trials in which the stimulus was presented in the left and the 
right hemifield. In addition, we calculated separate values for trials in which either 
the right eye or the left eye was dominant before the shift. This resulted in four data 
points per subject per stimulus type.
The resulting data were analyzed using generalized linear model regression. Towards 
that end, the probabilities for right eye dominance, r=P(image in right eye perceived 
dominant), were log-transformed using the canonical link function for binomial data:
 
     
R = log r1−r( )               (4.3)
Note that this new variable R represents the log-odds of right eye dominance. 
The right eye dominance after a retinal image shift as a function of the right eye 
dominance at stimulus onset was quantified with the following regression equation:
     Rshift = α · Ronset + β                 (4.4)
The coefficients α and β as well as the corresponding t-statistics were estimated with 
a generalized linear model regression routine implemented in Matlab (version 7.9; 
glmfit). Using the same procedure, we quantified the right eye dominance after a sac-
Figure 4.5. Illustration of the two trial types in Experiment 3. 
White circles indicate the subject’s gaze position. Arrows denote a saccade or stimulus jump. 
Each panel shows the input for one eye only. A: Saccade trials. The subjects looked at the 
large, red cross until it shrunk. Then the subject made a saccade to the other cross, thus 
actively changing the retinal input. B: Stimulus jump trials. The subject looked at the green 
fixation cross at the center of the screen and kept fixation there during the whole trial. After a 
certain delay, the stimulus jumped to the opposite side, resulting in the same retinal displace-
ment as in A, but this time the displacement was passive.
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cade as a function of the right eye dominance after a stimulus jump: 
     Rsac = α · Rstim + β                (4.5)
Interpretation of the results, however, was easier when we plotted the difference be-
tween right eye dominance after a saccade and stimulus conditions as a function of 
right eye dominance after a stimulus jump. The regression lines quantifying this dif-
ference as function of right eye dominance at stimulus onset were therefore given by:
     Rsac − Rstim = (α − 1) · Rstim + β               (4.6)
Note that Rsac – Rstim in Equation 4.6 represents the log-odds ratio of right eye domi-
nance in the saccade versus stimulus jump condition, i.e.:
     Rsac − Rstim = log
rsac /(1−rsac)
rstim /(1−rstim)[ ]               (4.7)
Results 
Figure 4.6 illustrates the typical pattern of eye movements as observed in a sac-
cade trial (4.6A) and in a stimulus jump trial (4.6B). These control measurements 
indicated that subjects maintained fixation on the fixation cross for the duration of 
the trial and that they made saccades of the required amplitude and direction. Sac-
cades and stimulus jumps thus produced nearly identical retinal image shifts. Mean 
(±SD) reaction time of the saccades with respect to the shrinking of the fixation 
point (which cued the subject to make a saccade to the opposite side of the stimulus) 
ranged between 0.57 (±0.18) and 1.05 (±0.53) seconds.
As we will demonstrate below, retinal image shifts in the saccade versus stimu-
lus jump conditions resulted in systematic differences. It appeared, however, that 
these differences could not be expressed as a simple increase or decrease in switch 
probability. Under both shift conditions, the probability to switch between percepts 
varied widely among subjects, and in addition depended strongly on the subjects’ 
initial dominance state (i.e., just before the retinal image shift) and on the direction 
of the retinal image shift. Interestingly, however, we found that this seemingly idi-
osyncratic behavior of our subjects was systematically related to their eye/hemifield 
preference at stimulus onset. To illustrate this finding, Figure 4.7 shows the response 
patterns of three different subjects in the stimulus jump condition (face/house stim-
uli). As inferred from the response patterns in Experiment 1, one of the subjects 
had a systematic onset preference for stimuli in the right eye (Figure 4.7A, subject 
FW), one for stimuli in the left eye (Figure 4.7B, subject JV), and one for stimuli in 
the nasal hemifield (Figure 4.7C, subject TG). Note that the subject with a right eye 
preference at stimulus onset (Figure 4.7A) showed a high probability to switch to the 
right eye dominance state when the left eye was dominant before the jump (as shown 
by the upper bar pointing far rightward, P(switch) close to one), but when the right 
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eye was dominant before the jump the probability to switch to the left eye dominance 
state was low (as shown by the bottom bar pointing leftward, P(no switch) close to 
one). This behavior was observed regardless of the direction of the stimulus jump. 
Choice probabilities in subject JV were also qualitatively similar for the two jump 
directions, but for this ‘left eye subject’ there was a high probability to switch to the 
left eye dominance state when the right eye was dominant before the shift, and vice 
versa (Figure 4.7B). In the ‘nasal subject’, however, the response patterns for the two 
jump directions were almost opposite (Figure 4.7C). 
Inspection of the raw data thus suggested that percept dominance states after a reti-
nal image shift are systematically related to the subjects’ eye/hemifield preferences. 
To quantify this relationship we subdivided the datasets from each subject into four 
subsets according to initial state and direction of the image shift, and for each subset 
we quantified the proportion of trials in which the right eye was dominant after the 
shift. We then plotted for all subjects the resulting proportions against the proportion 
of trials in which their first percept corresponded with the right eye (data from Ex-
periment 1). We used logit axes for ordinate and abscissa because this is appropriate 
for binomial variables. Figure 4.8A shows the results for stimulus jump trials and 
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Figure 4.6: Example of eye movements
A: Saccade trial, B: stimulus jump trial. Horizontal (black) and vertical (gray) eye movements 
(here measured with a search coil) are shown as function of time. The gray bar indicates the 
horizontal position of the stimulus. The black dashed lines show the moment of the cue for 
the saccade or the stimulus jump, respectively. Note that the saccade and the stimulus jump 
result in the same retinal displacement. The double black line shows the moment the subject 
responded with two button presses indicating the dominance state before and after the shift, 
respectively. After this response, fixation was no longer required. Data from subject JG.
88
Chapter 4
Figure 4.8B for saccade trials. Blue, red and green symbols denote the results for 
the motion, face/house and grating stimuli, respectively. Note that there was a robust 
correlation between the probability of right eye dominance at stimulus onset and the 
probability of right eye dominance after a retinal image shift. Pearson’s correlation 
coefficients for the different stimulus types ranged from 0.82 to 0.91 for the stimulus 
jump condition and from 0.62 to 0.83 for the saccade condition (t-tests, p<0.01). By 
contrast, dominance probabilities just before the shift were completely unrelated to 
the subjects’ onset preferences. Instead they maintained a roughly-constant level of 
about 0.5, indicating that the shifts indeed occurred in the sustained rivalry phase. 
This is shown for the saccade and stimulus jump condition in the insets of Figure 
4.8A and 4.8B, respectively.
Solid lines in Figure 4.8 are generalized linear model fits to the pooled data from 
all subjects (Equation 4.4). Note that the slopes of these regression lines are sys-
tematically different for the two shift conditions; they are lower in the saccade con-
dition for each stimulus type. This latter observation indicates that the differences 
between the saccade and stimulus jump conditions also depend systematically on 
the subjects’ eye/hemifield preferences. A direct comparison between the saccade 
and stimulus jump conditions thus required an analysis procedure which accounted 
for these preferences. We therefore split our datasets into four subsets according to 
initial dominance state and direction of the image shift (as in Figure 4.8), and we 
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Figure 4.7: Three examples of the switch probability after stimulus jumps
Data is displayed separately for trials with left and right dominance before the shift, respec-
tively. Left-hand panels show jumps from the right to the left hemifield and right-hand panels 
show jumps from the left to the right hemifield. Bars show the probability of a percept switch, 
P(switch) or no percept switch, P(no switch) by their position relative to zero, separately for 
trials in which the left eye (upper bars) or the right eye (lower bars) was dominant before the 
shift. Data from the face/house stimulus. A: subject FW. B: subject JV. C: subject TG.
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plotted the difference in right eye dominance after saccades and stimulus jumps as 
a function of the right eye dominance after the stimulus jumps. The difference be-
tween right eye dominance after saccades and stimulus jumps was expressed as the 
odds ratio for right eye dominance under the two shift conditions, and plotted on a 
logarithmic axis.
Figures 4.9A-C illustrate this comparison for three individual subjects (FW, JB and 
TG) by plotting the odds ratio of right eye dominance after saccades and stimulus 
jumps as function of the probability of right eye dominance after stimulus jumps. 
Open symbols represent data for shifts from the right to the left hemifield; filled 
symbols represent the data for shifts from the left to the right hemifield. Solid lines 
are generalized linear model fits (Equation 4.6) to the pooled data from the three 
stimulus types. 
If binocular rivalry would be the same in the saccade and stimulus jump condition, 
the odds ratio for right eye dominance in the saccade versus stimulus jump condition 
would be 1 regardless of the probability of right eye dominance after stimulus jumps. 
In other words, all data points would lie on a horizontal line having an ordinate value 
of 1.0. This is clearly not observed. For the subject in Figure 4.9A, for example, 
one can see that the data points tend to fall in the bottom-right corner of the graph, 
which means that the subject’s percepts after stimulus jumps tend to be biased to-
wards images in the right eye (independent of the jump direction), and that the odds 
ratios for this subject (FW) are typically less than 1. The latter implies that, in this 
subject, right eye dominance after saccades is less likely than right eye dominance 
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Figure 4.8. Right eye dominance after a retinal image shift versus right eye dominance at 
stimulus onset. 
A: stimulus jump trials, B: saccade trials. Blue: motion (9 subjects), red: face/house (10 sub-
jects), green: grating (5 subjects). Data are shown on a logit scale. Note that four data points 
have been drawn for each subject to account for the effects of prior state and shift direction 
as shown in Figure 4.7. Insets in A and B show that before the retinal image shifts, the right 
eye was dominant in about 50% of the trials, regardless of the subjects’ eye/hemifield prefer-
ences at stimulus onset. 
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after stimulus jumps. For the subject in Figure 4.9B, on the other hand, one can see 
that the data points tend to fall in the top-left corner of the graph, indicating that in 
this subject the odds for left and right eye dominance are reversed. I.e., it appears that 
for this subject (JB) images in the left eye tend to dominate after stimulus jumps, and 
that the subject’s left eye becomes less frequently dominant after saccades then after 
stimulus jumps. The latter follows from the fact that in this subject the odds ratios are 
typically larger than 1. Figure 4.9C illustrates the behavior of a subject with a nasal 
hemifield preference. Note that this subject (TG) responded as a ‘right eye subject’ 
for shifts to the right hemifield (filled circles) and as a ‘left eye subject’ for shift to 
the left hemifield (open circles). 
The data thus show that the non-preferred eye/hemifield was more likely to become 
dominant after a saccade than after a stimulus jump. In fact, it appeared for all sub-
jects that the odds ratios were systematically related to the eye dominance observed 
after stimulus jumps. More specifically, we found that if stimulus jumps resulted in a 
percept bias towards images in either the left or the right eye, this bias was typically 
reduced in the corresponding saccade condition. In our analysis, this attenuation is 
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Figure 4.9. Odds ratio of eye dominance after saccades and stimulus jumps as function of on-
set dominance. A-C: Odds ratio of right eye dominance after saccades and stimulus jumps as 
function of right eye dominance after stimulus jumps, shown on a logit scale. Filled symbols: 
shift from left to right hemifield. Open symbols: shift from right to left hemifield. Data are from 
subjects FW (A) JB (B) and TG (C). D: Histogram of the regression slopes for all subjects that 
completed the experiment with two or three stimulus types (n=9). 
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indexed by the negative slope of the regression lines (solid lines in Figures 4.9A-
C). Figure 4.9D shows a histogram of the slopes for all subjects that completed the 
experiment with at least two stimulus types. For 8 out of 9 subjects, the slope was 
significantly below zero (t-tests, p<0.05). Offsets of the regression lines (not shown) 
were not significantly different from zero (t-tests, p>0.05).
Figure 4.10 shows the same analysis as Figure 4.9, but now separately for the three 
stimulus types and pooled over all subjects. The regression lines fitted to these data 
had a negative slope that was significantly different from zero for all three stimulus 
types (t-tests, p<0.01). Slopes (mean±SE) were -0.28±0.05 for motion (9 subjects), 
-0.13±0.06 for face/house (10 subjects) and -0.58±0.05 for gratings (5 subjects). 
The differences between the face/house and the motion stimuli were not statistically 
significant (t-test, p>0.2). However, the effect of saccades on the rivalry bias was 
significantly stronger for the grating stimulus than for the motion and the face/house 
stimulus (t-tests, p<0.001).
Figure 4.10. Eye dominance after 
retinal shift as function of onset domi-
nance for different stimulus types. 
Odds ratio of right eye dominance 
after saccades and stimulus jumps 
as function of probability of right eye 
dominance after stimulus jumps, 
shown on a logit scale. A: Motion (9 
subjects). B: Face/house (10 sub-
jects). C: Gratings (5 subjects).
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Discussion
We have examined binocular onset rivalry and the effect of saccades and stimulus 
jumps on perceptual state changes in 11 subjects using 3 different binocular rivalry 
paradigms: motion rivalry, face/house rivalry and grating rivalry. We found that the 
vast majority of subjects show a significant onset bias. These onset preferences are 
consistent across different stimulus types and experimental task conditions, but they 
are highly idiosyncratic across observers. Moreover, we observed a large degree 
of independence between rivalry at stimulus onset and that seen during sustained 
viewing. Our results thus corroborate and extend recent experimental findings sug-
gesting that onset rivalry and sustained rivalry are distinct phenomena that rely on 
at least partly different neural mechanisms (Carter and Cavanagh, 2007; Klink, et 
al., 2008; Long and Toppino, 2004; Noest, et al., 2007). In addition, we found that 
stimuli presented in the preferred eye/hemifield are also the most likely ones to be-
come dominant after a passive displacement of the image on the retina. In case of 
an active displacement (a saccade), however, this bias towards the preferred eye is 
significantly reduced. As we will argue below, these latter findings suggest that reti-
nal image shifts trigger onset rivalry, and that onset rivalry depends at least partly on 
extra-retinal eye movement signals.
Onset rivalry versus sustained rivalry
Previous studies have reported eye and hemifield asymmetries in switch rates and 
dominance durations during sustained viewing (Chen and He, 2003; Handa, et al., 
2004; Ooi and He, 2001; Robboy, et al., 1990). In our experiment, we found the big-
gest asymmetries in eye preferences at stimulus onset and after retinal image shifts. 
Three subjects did not show a clear eye preference but instead had a preference for 
images falling on the nasal part of the retina. Fahle (Fahle, 1987) argued that the 
longer dominance durations he observed for stimuli presented in the temporal hemi-
field (projecting onto the nasal retina) could be explained by the finding that visual 
hyperacuity (Fahle and Schmid, 1988), cone density (Curcio, et al., 1987) and corti-
cal magnification factor (Rovamo and Virsu, 1979) are higher for the nasal retina 
than for the temporal retina. However, all these statistics cannot readily account 
for the asymmetries we observed in onset rivalry, since they apply mostly to the far 
periphery (eccentricities >20°) while our stimuli were presented within 4° from the 
fovea. Ooi and He (Ooi and He, 2006) suggested that a nasal hemifield preference 
could be useful in binocular stereovision. The mechanism they suggest might also 
explain the nasal preferences we found for our stimuli with small eccentricities.
Although we have tested only two locations, our results do corroborate the findings 
from Carter and Cavanagh (Carter and Cavanagh, 2007) that strong idiosyncratic 
biases localized to a certain retinal location can be found at the onset of rivalry. They 
also support the conclusion that the onset biases disappear over time to yield a more 
balanced situation during sustained rivalry.
Effect of saccades
The observation that onset rivalry differs from sustained rivalry has significant im-
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plications for rivalry in the presence of eye movements. Previous studies have shown 
that eye movements by themselves are not necessary to induce percept switches (e.g. 
Scotto, et al., 1990a; Toppino, 2003), but for binocular rivalry, there appears to be a 
marked positive temporal correlation between saccades and perceptual state changes 
(van Dam and van Ee, 2006b). Van Dam and Van Ee (van Dam and van Ee, 2006a) 
concluded that retinal image shifts, rather than eye movements per se cause state 
changes in binocular rivalry. Our current experiments shed new light on these latter 
results. More specifically, our finding that dominance biases at stimulus onset and 
after retinal image shifts are tightly correlated, strongly suggests that retinal image 
shifts trigger onset rivalry, and not percept switches as such.
Caution is warranted though because experiments by Kanai et al. (2005) suggest 
that changes in the fixation point, and accompanying change in attention, may elicit 
perceptual transitions. Thus one may wonder whether the shrinking of the fixation 
cross (Methods), rather than the subsequent image shifts per se, might have triggered 
the onset rivalry in Experiment 3. We believe, however, that this alternative inter-
pretation is not tenable because our data show that the eye dominance states after 
presentation of this cue (but before the image shifts) were completely uncorrelated 
with the rivalry observed at stimulus onset. This was true in both the saccade and 
stimulus jump condition (Figure 4.8, insets). Another possible concern might be that 
dominance durations prior to the image shifts were systematically different between 
the saccade and stimulus jump conditions. This could be the case, for example, if 
subjects typically postponed their saccade until after a percept switch. To further 
test whether the saccade and stimulus jumps might have occurred in a systemati-
cally different phase of the (sustained) rivalry process, we therefore performed an 
additional set of control experiments (subjects DB, JG, JK and JT). This experiment 
was identical to Experiment 3 except that subjects indicated their percepts continu-
ously by pressing one of two mouse buttons, and we measured their eye movements 
with an infra red eye tracker (Methods). This way, we could determine for each trial 
the dominance duration from the last perceptual switch until the saccade or stimulus 
jump. Figure 4.11 compares for each subject and each stimulus type the mean (±SE) 
duration of the dominance state prior to the saccade and stimulus jump. Note that 
no significant differences were found between the saccade and the stimulus condi-
tion. Taken together, we think the difference between the saccade and stimulus jump 
condition that we found in Experiment 3 is indeed due to the saccade itself and not 
to any systematic difference in prior state.
Note that the behavior that we observed after retinal image shifts is clearly different 
from the behavior that has been obtained in experiments with intermittent stimulus 
presentations at the same location. In the latter experiments (e.g., Klink, et al., 2008; 
Leopold, et al., 2002), short removal periods of the stimulus (<0.5s) resulted in a 
high switch probability, independent of the prior state. With retinal image shifts, on 
the other hand, the switch probabilities strongly depend on the prior state, and on the 
new stimulus location. The observation that rivalry behavior after retinal shifts is 
strongly correlated with onset rivalry supports the notion that newly stimulated cells 
94
Chapter 4
after a retinal shift have a different adaptation state than the cells stimulated before 
the switch (Introduction). 
Interestingly, however, the perceptual consequence of passive, stimulus-induced im-
age shifts was not the same as that of active, saccade-induced shifts. Indeed, saccadic 
eye movements not only shift the image on the retina. They also produce transient 
visual suppression (Burr, et al., 1994), dynamic shifts of attention (Deubel and Sch-
neider, 1996; Kowler, et al., 1995) and visual receptive fields (Duhamel, et al., 1992; 
Nakamura and Colby, 2002; Umeno and Goldberg, 1997). In view of these phenom-
ena there are at least two possible reasons why passive versus active shifts might be 
different: first, during normal vision, the visuomotor system ensures that we have a 
stable perception of visual space despite intervening saccades (See, e.g., Ross, et al., 
2001, for a review). Ross & Ma-Wyatt (Ross and Ma-Wyatt, 2004) suggested that 
saccades play an important role in actively maintaining perceptual continuity.
One could argue therefore that the system tries to maintain the same percept af-
ter saccades as this supports perceptual stability. If true, this would predict reduced 
switch probabilities in the saccade condition compared with the stimulus jump con-
dition. On the other hand, saccades are a normal part of visual search behavior (e.g., 
Davis and Palmer, 2004; Viviani, 1990) so one could also argue that redirecting the 
eyes to a new location in the visual field should emphasize on the gathering of new 
information, optimally using the inputs from both eyes. This latter notion would in-
stead predict enhanced switch probabilities in the saccade condition.
Clearly, neither of these two interpretations can account for our results; compared 
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with stimulus jumps, saccades produced both increases and decreases in switch prob-
abilities depending on the preceding eye dominance state, the direction of the image 
shifts, and last but not least, on subject-specific biases. Even so, we did find very 
systematic differences between the saccade and stimulus jump conditions except that 
these differences were not reflected in the transition probabilities. What we found 
instead is that saccades consistently attenuated the subject-specific eye dominance 
biases after the image shifts.  
It is unlikely that this attenuation is merely due to differences in attentional expec-
tation because the retinal image shifts could be anticipated under both conditions 
(Methods). In fact, our data show that the influence of saccades is strongly correlated 
with the magnitude of the subjects’ onset rivalry biases. The latter is shown in Figure 
4.12 where we plot the odds ratios of right eye dominance after saccades and stimu-
lus jumps (data from Experiment 3) as a function of right eye dominance at stimulus 
onset (data from Experiment 1). Correlation coefficients were -0.64, -0.52 and -0.76 
for the motion, face/house and grating stimuli, respectively. We thus conclude that 
the influence of saccades can be understood from a systematic attenuation of the 
subjects’ onset rivalry biases.
Different stimulus types
The three different stimulus types that we have used in our experiments are thought 
to trigger at least partly different pathways in the brain. In line with this notion, we 
observed that for most subjects the dominance duration distributions recorded in Ex-
periment 2 were significantly different for the three stimulus types (data not shown). 
In Experiment 1, quantitative differences were observed as well, albeit not system-
atic among subjects. Nevertheless, for all three stimulus types we observed the same 
remarkable dissociation between onset and sustained rivalry (Experiment 2), and a 
very similar influence of saccades on rivalry biases (Experiment 3).  
Figure 4.10 suggests that the effect of saccades on the rivalry bias was significantly 
stronger for grating stimuli than for motion and face/house stimuli, but this differ-
ence may have resulted from pooling the data across different (numbers of) subjects, 
0.01 0.05  0.2  0.5  0.8 0.95 0.99
0.0625
0.125
0.2
0.5
1
2
4
8
16
RE dominance stimulus onset
O
dd
s 
ra
tio
 a
fte
r s
hi
ft
Figure 4.12. Right eye domi-
nance after shifts as function of 
right eye dominance at stimu-
lus onset. Data are shown on a 
logit scale with logistic regression 
lines. Blue: motion stimulus. Red: 
face/house stimulus. Green: grat-
ing stimulus.
96
Chapter 4
each having different onset preferences. The analysis in Figure 4.12 indeed dem-
onstrates that the effect of saccades becomes indistinguishable between the three 
stimulus types if one accounts for the subjects’ onset rivalry biases.
In a recent theoretical study, Klink et al.  have suggested that top-down control over 
bistable stimuli could interact with low-level mechanisms of adaptation at the early 
stages of sensory processing before perceptual conflicts are resolved and perceptual 
choices about bistable stimuli are made. Such an active neural control mechanism 
acting at lower levels could account for the fact that our results were very similar 
across stimuli that engage different pathways in the brain.
Conclusions 
Our results indicate that there is a large degree of independence between rivalry at 
stimulus onset and that seen during sustained viewing. This corroborates the hypoth-
esis that onset rivalry and sustained rivalry are distinct phenomena that rely on at 
least partly different neural mechanisms. Conversely, rivalry at stimulus onset and 
rivalry after retinal image shifts are tightly correlated, suggesting that retinal image 
shifts such as those induced by saccades trigger onset rivalry. However, comparing 
rivalry during passive versus active retinal shifts revealed that saccades do counter-
act a purely retinally-driven onset rivalry in favor of perception of the image in the 
non-dominant eye. Our results thus indicate that non-visual signals have a significant 
impact on the (onset) rivalry process. Existing models of binocular rivalry need to be 
revised to account for these phenomena.
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Introduction
When the left and the right eye are presented with different images that cannot be 
fused into a single three-dimensional scene, binocular rivalry can arise: the images 
are not merged into a single percept, but instead seen alternately. This phenomenon 
is studied extensively because it can dissociate the visual input from the perceptual 
output, which might give us insight in the origin of visual awareness. Thus far, how-
ever, the exact mechanisms underlying binocular rivalry are not fully understood. 
Models of binocular rivalry typically assume that rivalry arises from competition 
between retinotopically-organised cell populations (Freeman, 2005; Noest, et al., 
2007; Wilson, 2003). In these models, mutual inhibition between cell-populations 
that code for the different percepts prevent simultaneous perception of both stimuli, 
while self-adaptation of the active cell-population causes the dominant percept to 
fade after a certain period and to be replaced by the other percept (but see also Sun-
dareswara and Schrater, 2008, for a different perspective). However, none of these 
models consider the effect of saccades. 
Although there is convincing evidence that perceptual alternations can occur with-
out eye movements (Blake, et al., 1971; Lack, 1971; McDougall, 1903), several 
studies have reported correlations between saccades and perceptual switches (e.g., 
Einhäuser, et al., 2004; van Dam and van Ee, 2005). Van Dam and van Ee (2006b) 
found a marked increase in saccade occurrence just before subjects reported a per-
ceptual switch in binocular rivalry conditions, suggesting that saccadic eye move-
ments cause perceptual switches. A later study indicated, however, that a saccade 
only causes a perceptual switch if the eye movement leads to a retinal image change 
on the fovea (van Dam and van Ee, 2006a). Indeed, a saccade moves the stimulus 
across the retina in such a way that after the eye movement different retinotopic 
groups of cells will be stimulated. These neurons will have a different visual history 
and will therefore be in a different adaptation state. Adaptation studies indicate that, 
at least for lower-order stimuli such as the gratings applied by van Dam and van Ee 
(2006a), adaption only occurs at retinotopically matched locations (Melcher, 2005; 
van Boxtel, et al., 2008) and rivalry has been found to slow down if the stimulus is 
moving, preventing adaptation (Blake, et al., 2003).
A series of recent studies (Carter and Cavanagh, 2007; Chong and Blake, 2006; 
Klink, et al., 2008; Mamassian and Goutcher, 2005) have shown, however, that ri-
valry during sustained viewing and rivalry at stimulus onset are at least partly differ-
ent. For example, Mamassian and Goutcher (2005) found that contrast differences 
between the two stimuli cause a strong eye bias at stimulus onset that wears off 
during the course of the trial toward a more equal dominance of the two eyes. In 
addition, we have recently shown that retinal image shifts produced by a saccade 
elicit a form of onset rivalry, rather than percept switches per se (Kalisvaart, et al., 
2011b, Chapter 4 in this thesis); when subjects made a 4° saccade after prolonged 
viewing of a rivalrous stimulus, eye dominance after the saccade was biased in the 
same subject-specific direction as the eye dominance at stimulus onset. These find-
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ings raise the interesting question whether there is a relation between onset rivalry 
and the previously reported positive correlations between saccades and perceptual 
switches in binocular rivalry. 
In the present study we therefore investigate the consequences of multiple saccades 
made during sustained viewing. We asked subjects to make saccades within a bin-
ocular rivalry stimulus and we studied the timing of the saccades in relation to per-
ceptual switches. We compared active and passive retinal image shifts (together also 
called shifts throughout this article). Active shifts were caused by saccades, passive 
shifts by moving the stimulus across the screen in a saccade like fashion (‘replay’ 
condition). The notion that saccades may elicit onset rivalry rather than percept 
switches per se, predicts that saccades will occur more frequently before switches 
towards the subject’s preferred eye than before switches to the non-preferred eye. 
Moreover, if the positive correlations between saccades and perceptual switches 
arise solely from the consequences of retinal image shifts, the effects in saccade and 
replay conditions should be the same.
In previous studies, using intermittent stimulus presentations, a short (<0.5 s) stimu-
lus interruption strongly increased the probability of percept alternations (Klink, et 
al., 2008; Leopold, et al., 2002).We therefore also studied the effect of eye blinks. 
Blinks cause a short interruption of the stimulus on the retina but, unlike saccades, 
do not move the stimulus to a different location on the retina (Goossens and Van 
Opstal, 2000; Goossens and Van Opstal, 2010). 
We report significant correlations between retinal image shifts and perceptual switch-
es for saccades and stimulus jumps, but positive correlations were only observed for 
switches towards the subjects’ preferred eye at stimulus onset. A similar asymmetry 
was observed for blinks. Our findings thus support the conclusion that retinal image 
shifts and brief image blanking elicit onset rivalry. We also observed a remarkable 
difference between small versus large image shifts. For large shifts (>1°), we found 
a comparable increase in the probability of saccades and stimulus jumps just before a 
perceptual switch. This increase was also present for small (<1°) stimulus jumps, but 
virtually absent for small saccades. The latter results further support the notion that 
extra-retinal eye movement signals are involved in binocular (onset) rivalry.
Methods
Subjects and ethics statement
Four adult human subjects with normal or corrected to normal visual acuity partici-
pated in the experiments. All subjects were informed about the experimental proce-
dures and gave written informed consent before the experiments. Procedures were 
approved by the Radboud University Medical Centre.
Setup 
Subjects were seated in a dark room at 52 cm from a projection screen on which 
visual stimuli were back projected with an LCD projector (Panasonic PT-AX100E). 
The subject watched the screen through a front-mirror stereoscope (HyperView, Be-
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rezin, U.S.). The head rested on a chin support to restrict head movements. 
Eye movements were recorded with the scleral search coil technique (Collewijn, et 
al., 1975). Coils were inserted after one drop of topical anesthetic (Oxybuprocaine 
hydrochloride 0.4%, Thea, Belgium). Once the coil was in place, a drop of artificial 
tear (Methylcellulose 0.5%, Thea, Belgium) was applied to minimize ocular dis-
comfort and to avoid reduction of visual acuity. To record blinks, a tiny coil (3 mm 
diameter) was attached to the upper eyelid with a small piece of skin tape (Leukopor, 
Beiersdorff AG). Eye and eyelid position signals were low-pass filtered, amplified, 
and sampled at 500 Hz per channel using a CED-1401 data acquisition system. The 
resolution of the horizontal and vertical eye position signals was better than 0.3 min-
utes of arc (root mean square measure). 
Stimuli 
The dichoptic stimuli consisted of 4x4° squares filled with 500 random dots moving 
coherently in opposite directions against a black background (Figure 5.1A). They 
were generated with Matlab (The MathWorks) using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
extensions (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). The dots were 0.14° white squares moving 
vertically with a speed of 2.75° per second (1 pixel/frame) and had asynchronous 
lifetimes of 0.33 s. Motion direction was pseudo-randomly alternated between the 
eyes from trial to trial. Screen refresh rate was 60 Hz. Stimulus contrast was the same 
for images presented to the left and the right eye (luminance of dots and background 
were 98 cd/m2 and 1.3 cd/m2, respectively; Minolta LS-100 Luminance meter). We 
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tion direction in the left and right eye 
were not present in the real stimulus. 
B: Time course of a saccade trial and 
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als, where they served as a warning 
for upcoming large stimulus jumps. 
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used dense random-dot motion stimuli, rather than e.g. (moving) gratings or face/
house stimuli, because for these stimuli the foveal motion signal is hardly altered by 
eye movements within the aperture. 
Task
Subjects continuously indicated their dominant percept by pressing one of two 
mouse buttons while watching the stimulus. Button presses were recorded by the 
stimulus program. Subjects were instructed to indicate the most dominant percept if 
the suppression was not complete. Piecemeal percepts – if present – occurred mainly 
during the brief perceptual transitions. There were two different conditions, a sac-
cade condition and a ‘replay’ condition, illustrated in Figure 5.1B. In each condition, 
trials lasted 30 seconds.
In the saccade condition, the subject was instructed to make a few large saccades to 
random location within the stimulus. From pilot experiments, it appeared that sub-
jects found it very hard to simultaneously indicate their percept and plan saccades 
independent of their percept alternations. Saccades were often postponed to just after 
a button press, when the rivaling percept was most stable. To avoid this biased timing 
of saccades, and to ease the task for the subject, we provided auditory saccade cues 
(1 kHz tone lasting 0.25 s) at four pseudo-random moments during each trial. Sub-
jects were instructed to make a saccade immediately after the cue and then maintain 
fixation at that location until the next cue. The central fixation cross was only present 
at the beginning of saccade trials.
In the replay condition, subjects were instructed to fixate the central fixation cross 
that remained visible throughout these trials, while the stimulus jumped around in a 
way that resembled the eye movements in the saccade trials. The sequence of stimu-
lus jumps was programmed according to the eye displacements recorded in a pre-
vious saccade trial, including small saccades that subjects inadvertently made, but 
excluding slow-velocity eye drifts. Auditory cues were replayed as well, providing 
the subjects with a warning cue for upcoming large stimulus jumps. 
Saccade trials and replay trials were alternated within blocks of 8 trials. Each subject 
completed a minimum of 160 trials, across several sessions. 
Control experiments
Prior to the main experiment, we measured the dominance duration distributions of 
our subjects under static viewing conditions. In these control experiments, subjects 
were required to fixate a fixation cross either at the centre or on the edge of the stimu-
lus for the duration of the trial. 
We also measured the subjects’ reaction times to physical flips in the direction of 
motion. In this experiment, the dot patterns in both eyes moved in the same direc-
tion, and subjects kept fixating the central fixation cross. The motion direction was 
changed at random moments in time and the subjects indicated their percept in the 
same way as they did during the binocular rivalry trials. The reaction time obtained 
from this experiment served as an estimate of how long before a button press the 
perceptual switch occurred. 
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Data analysis
Saccades were detected offline on the basis of calibrated eye position signals with 
custom software. Detection of saccade onsets and offsets was based on velocity 
and acceleration criteria. All saccade markers were examined by the experimenters 
and, if necessary, corrected. Saccades smaller than 0.2° were considered micro sac-
cades and were excluded from the analysis. Eye movements caused by blinks could 
be readily dissociated from saccade-related movements of the eyes based on their 
double-peaked velocity profile (Goossens and Van Opstal, 2010) and were removed 
manually. Blinks were detected separately, based on the amplitude of the eyelid sig-
nal. Further analysis was done with Matlab using custom software.
To examine the relation between saccades/stimulus jumps and percept switches, 
cross-correlation histograms were made in which the occurrences of saccades and 
stimulus jumps were plotted relative to the moments of a button press. It is impor-
tant to realize, however, that the saccade and switch rates need not be constant over 
time (Figure 5.2A), and that saccade events and percept switches are both, in a way, 
driven by the stimulus. In principle, this co-stimulation of the visual system and the 
saccadic system could cause a peak in the correlation histogram all by itself; the 
common input might introduce a relation between saccades and percept switches 
even if no physical relation exists.
To account for this potential pitfall, we applied cross correlation methods that are 
often used in the analysis of pairs of neuronal firing (Aertsen, et al., 1989; Gerstein 
and Kiang, 1960). In short, we first computed the raw cross correlogram and sub-
tracted from this the so-called shift predictor. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 
5.2B and 5.2C. The raw cross-correlogram was obtained by cross-correlating the 
sequence of percept switches in one trial with the sequence of saccades occurrences 
Figure 5.2: Illustration of the applied cross correlation analysis. A: Peristimulus time histo-
grams (PSTH) showing the average saccade (top) and switch (bottom) rates as a function of 
time relative to stimulus onset together with PSTHs of the auditory cues (center, gray line). 
B: Raw cross correlation between saccades and perceptual switches (gray) together with 
the shift-predictor (black). Data were normalized according to the total number of percept 
switches such that the vertical axis represents the conditional saccade rate (in saccades per 
second) as a function of time relative to the button press. C: Covariogram. Corrected cross-
correlation histogram obtained by subtracting the shift-predictor from the raw cross correlo-
gram. Data from subject DB. Large saccades (>1°), percept switches from left to right eye.
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in that same trial, and averaging the results across all trials. The shift predictor, on 
the other hand, was obtained by cross-correlating the sequence of percept switches in 
one trial with the sequence of saccades occurring in a different trial (which destroys 
the physiological relation between the two events), and averaging the results across 
all possible trial combinations. The shift predictor thus predicts the shape of the cross 
correlation histogram given the null-hypothesis that there is no physical relationship 
between the two different events (Aertsen, et al., 1989; Perkel, et al., 1967).  For 
computational efficiency, this calculation of the shift predictor was done by tak-
ing the cross product of the saccade and switch peristimulus time histogram, which 
yields the same result. All histograms were smoothed with a Gaussian smoothing 
kernel (width σ=0.05s). Previous studies have based their analyses on raw cross cor-
relograms (cf. Figure 5.2B), and have applied a somewhat arbitrary normalization 
of these uncorrected correlograms (e.g. van Dam and van Ee, 2005; van Dam and 
van Ee, 2006b). Here we ensure that the resulting covariograms reflect the condi-
tional saccade rate above or below that predicted in the absence of any relation. This 
method also allowed us to directly compare the size of the effects found in different 
conditions. To test whether covariations were statistically significant, we applied a 
bootstrap excursion test (BE-test for short) as described by Ventura et al. (2005). Dif-
ferences between covariograms were also evaluated with this test. 
To further address the question how passive versus active retinal image shifts af-
fected the durations of dominance states, we also calculated the mean dominance 
duration of the left and right eye percepts for each trial. In addition, we quantified 
the mean delay between retinal image shifts and the first ensuing percept switch. We 
dubbed this variable mean dominance survival time since it indicates how long the 
current percept survives after saccades or stimulus jumps. 
Mean dominance durations and mean survival times from each trial were then sort-
ed according to conditions, and averaged per condition. Standard errors for these 
measures were computed from the variance of the mean values across trials.  Mean 
dominance durations in the different conditions were compared using Student’s t-
test. Two-way ANOVAs were used to test for differences between the mean survival 
times in the saccade and the replay condition. Independent variables in the ANOVA 
analysis were condition and subject.
Results
Figure 5.3 illustrates the time course (Figure 5.3A) and the 2D-trajectories (Figure 
5.3B) of the eye and stimulus displacements as well as the percept alternations dur-
ing a saccade (top) and replay (bottom) trial. Apart from the four saccades that we 
asked for during each saccade trial (by means of the auditory cues), subjects inad-
vertently made many extra saccades, almost always relatively small ones.
Figure 5.4 shows the distribution of saccade amplitude and direction in the sac-
cade condition for each subject. Note that the amplitude distributions were highly 
skewed, with most saccades being <1°. Saccade directions were also not uniformly 
distributed, but there was no systematic bias towards the up/down directions of the 
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motion stimuli (except for subject SR). Because the stimulus jumps in replay trials 
were programmed after the eye movements in saccade trials, the same distribution 
of stimulus jumps resulted. In our analysis, we divided the retinal image shifts pro-
duced by saccades and stimulus jumps into two groups: small shifts with amplitudes 
less than 1°, and large shifts with amplitudes equal to or larger than 1°. We decided 
on a 1° amplitude threshold because the amplitude distributions contained a sharp 
peak at amplitudes <1° which was followed by a long, more or less flat tail starting 
at an amplitude of about 1°. The exact boundary value that we used to discriminate 
between large and small saccades was, within limits of about 0.5-1.5°, not crucial for 
the results presented below.
From analyzing the first button presses at the start of each trial, we inferred that 
subjects had an eye preference bias at stimulus onset. Subjects DB, JK and SR had 
right eye preferences at stimulus onset of 77%, 71% and 56%, respectively, whereas 
TG had a left eye onset preference of 58%. These onset biases disappeared quickly 
during the course of the trial, resulting in a much more balanced dominance of the 
two eyes during sustained rivalry. To account for these eye biases, we analyzed per-
ceptual switches from the preferred to the non-preferred eye and perceptual switches 
from the non-preferred to the preferred eye separately.
Temporal cross-correlation
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show smoothed covariograms (Methods) obtained for all four 
subjects as well as the mean across subjects for the time interval -4 to +3 seconds 
relative to the button press. Red curves show data from saccade trials. Blue curves 
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show data from replay trials. Epochs with statistically significant increases from the 
shift-predictor baseline (Methods; BE-test, p<0.05) are indicated with horizontal red 
and blue lines above the covariograms for the saccade and replay condition, respec-
tively. Horizontal lines underneath the covariograms indicate significant decreases 
from the baseline. The vertical gray bar indicates the reaction time (mean±SD) of 
each subject to a physical flip in the direction of motion. This reaction time, meas-
ured in a separate control experiment, serves as an estimate of when the actual per-
cept switch occurred relative to the moment of the button press. Bottom panels in 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 show the covariograms averaged (±SE) across all four subjects.
Figure 5.5 shows the results obtained for large (>1°) shifts. Note that there were 
increases in saccade (red) and stimulus jump (blue) occurrence approximately 1 s 
before the button press, and just prior to the estimated moment of the perceptual 
switch. Except for saccade trials in subject TG, these increases were statistically 
significant in the time window from approximately -1.5 to -0.6 s for switches to-
wards the preferred eye in all subjects (Figure 5.5A). For switches towards the non-
preferred eye (Figure 5.5B), however, the increases in shift rate were considerably 
lower (0.1 versus 0.2 shifts per second, on average). A significant difference between 
the occurrence of large saccades and large stimulus jumps before the button press 
was observed only for subject JK for percept switches in both directions (BE-tests, 
p<0.05, not shown). 
Both large saccades and large stimulus jumps were typically preceded by a beep 
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which cued the subjects to make a saccade or warned them about an upcoming 
stimulus jump (Methods). It is possible therefore that the percept transitions syn-
chronized with the beeps rather than with the subsequent image shifts. It appeared, 
however, that the effect was strongly reduced when we cross-correlated the beep oc-
currences with percept switches (see Supplementary Figure 5.1), indicating that the 
percept switches tended to synchronize with the image shifts themselves rather than 
with the preceding beeps. 
Figure 5.6 shows the results obtained for small (<1°) shifts. In the replay condition 
(blue), the shift rate for individual subjects increased to ~0.3 s-1 above the base-
line starting approximately 1.5-1 s before the button press (mean±SD of individual 
peaks: 0.31±0.06 s-1). This increase was statistically significant for switches toward 
the preferred eye in all subjects (Figure 5.6A), and reached a peak value that was on 
average nearly two times larger than the one observed for large image shifts (c.f., 
Figure 5.5A; note scaling differences). Due to individual differences in timing, how-
ever, this peak is no longer clearly visible when averaged over subjects. For percept 
switches towards the non-preferred eye, shift rates were also increased significantly 
in all subjects (Figure 5.6B) but all peaks were considerably lower. In the saccade 
condition (red), however, there were no significant increases in shift rate prior to the 
button press regardless of the switch direction. The resulting differences between 
the saccade and replay condition were statistically significant (BE-tests, p<0.05) in 
all subjects except DB. Thus, for small retinal image shifts, there was a remark-
able difference as to how these shifts were brought about. When it was a passive 
shift, brought about by moving the stimulus on the screen, the probability that this 
shift was followed by a perceptual switch increased, but when it was an active shift, 
brought about by a saccadic eye movement, the percept tended to remain stable. 
Apart from the above-described peaks at ~1 s before the button press, all subjects 
also showed significant decreases in saccade and stimulus jump occurrence approx-
imately 0.5 s before the button press (BE-tests, p<0.05). This transient decrease, 
which was greatest for the small shifts (~0.2 and 0.1 shifts per second for small ver-
sus large shifts, respectively), cannot simply reflect some sort of refractory period, 
because it also occurred in cases where there was no preceding peak (e.g. small sac-
cades, Figure 5.6A). Interestingly, this effect had a shorter lead time than the posi-
tive effect of stimulus jumps and large saccades on the switching probability (as the 
observed troughs lie closer to zero than the peaks) but still well within the estimated 
reaction time (gray bars). No consistent increases or decreases were found more than 
1.5 s before or 0.5 s after the button press, neither for large nor for small shifts. 
We considered the possibility that the correlations between percept switches and im-
age shifts depended not only on the prior dominance state, but also on the direction 
of the image shifts. This was tested by splitting the datasets from Figures 5.5 and 
5.6 into four different direction categories (left, right, up, down).  This additional 
analysis indicated that neither saccade direction nor jump direction had a significant 
effect (data not shown).
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Figure 5.7 shows the cross-correlation analysis for blinks and perceptual switches. 
Data from saccade and replay trials were pooled in this analysis. The occurrence of 
blinks increased significantly (BE-test, p<0.05) approximately 1 s before percept 
switches towards the preferred eye in all subjects. For percept switches towards the 
non-preferred eye, this increase was statistically significant in only one subject (JK). 
Just prior to the button press, there was a decrease in blink occurrences for percep-
tual switches in both directions. This decrease was statistically significant (BE-test, 
p<0.05) for all four subjects. Note, however, that the influence of blinks was small 
compared with the effects of saccades and stimulus jumps. For example, the peak 
and trough values in Figure 5.7A are, on average, about two times lower than the 
ones in Figure 5.5A. We considered the possibility that the observed changes in blink 
rate resulted indirectly from a synchronization of the blinks with large image shifts 
or the preceding beeps, but we found no significant temporal correlation between 
blinks and large shifts or blinks and beeps (see Supplementary Figure 5.2; BE-test, 
p>0.05).
Relation with onset rivalry
The observed asymmetry between transitions to the eye which is preferred at stimu-
lus onset and transitions to the other eye suggests that the positive correlation be-
tween the occurrence of percept switches and the occurrence of saccades, stimulus 
jumps and blinks is related to onset rivalry. To explore this possibility further, we ex-
amined the strength of these cross-correlations in relation to the strength of the sub-
jects’ eye preferences at stimulus onset. This analysis is shown in Figure 5.8, where 
we plotted for each subject and each transition the peak value of the covariogram 
against the probability that the eye to which that percept transition occurred was the 
dominant one at stimulus onset. This was done for saccades and stimulus jumps >1° 
(Figure 5.8A), for saccades and stimulus jumps <1° (Figure 5.8B), and for blinks 
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(Figure 5.8C). Note that the strength of the correlations increased systematically 
with onset preference. This effect was quite strong and remarkably similar for large 
saccades in the saccade task and large stimulus jumps in the replay condition (Figure 
5.8A). In fact, both the slopes (α) and offsets (β) of two regression lines fitted to 
these data were not significantly different (mean±SD: α=0.37±0.11; β=0.01±0.06). 
For small saccades and small stimulus jumps, on the other hand, only the slopes of 
the regression lines were comparable (α=0.24±0.09). Their offsets differed greatly 
(β=-0.004±0.05 versus β=0.15±0.05, respectively), reflecting the fact that the posi-
tive correlations between small retinal image shifts and percept switches were much 
smaller in the saccade condition compared with the replay condition (c.f., Figure 
5.6). For blinks, the increase in peak correlation values with onset preference (Figure 
5.8C) was at the border of significance (t-test, p=0.05).
A similar analysis was performed on the troughs of the covariograms. This analysis 
indicated that trough depth was not systematically related to onset rivalry (t-tests, 
p>0.5; data not shown). The negative findings for trough depth illustrate that it would 
be a mistake to think that peak heights of the covariograms should be correlated with 
the strength of the onset biases simply because there is a reciprocal relation between 
the onset bias of a subject’s preferred and non-preferred eye. Nevertheless, given 
the basic observation from Figures 5.6 and 5.7 that the peak values were on average 
different for switches toward the preferred and non-preferred eye, one still might 
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suspect that this mean difference alone might fully account for the correlations in 
Figure 8. It appeared, however, that the adjusted R2 values of an alternative model 
which merely assumed different means (and thus had the same number of parameters 
as our linear regression model) were lower than the ones obtained for the regression 
lines shown in Figure 5.8, which indicates that these regression lines were indeed the 
better fits to our data. Moreover, for large shifts, the paired difference between peak 
height for switches towards the preferred and non-preferred eye was significantly 
correlated with the eye preference across the 4 observers (Pearson’s correlation coef-
ficient, r=0.72; t-test, p<0.05). 
Mean dominance durations
The above analyses demonstrate significant temporal correlations between percep-
tual switches and retinal images shifts, but not how these image shifts influenced 
the eye dominance durations. To address the latter question, we compared the mean 
dominance durations in the saccade and replay condition with the mean dominance 
durations observed under static viewing conditions. 
The mean dominance durations of both the non-preferred (Figure 5.9A) and the pre-
ferred (Figure 5.9B) eye percepts were significantly affected by the presence of the 
image shifts (t-tests, p<0.05, for all subjects), but the effects were mixed across sub-
jects. For both saccade and replay conditions and for both eyes, the mean dominance 
durations either decreased (subjects DB and JK) or increased (subjects SR and TG) 
compared with the control condition. While the decreases in mean dominance dura-
tion of the non-preferred (left) eye percept in subjects DB and JK may be reconciled 
with the notion that the image shifts occurring during non-preferred-eye dominance 
states tend to elicit perceptual switches to the preferred eye dominance, this interpre-
tation does not hold for the decrease in mean dominance durations of their preferred 
eye percept because the corresponding covariograms (Figures 5.5B and 5.6B) did 
not show similar increases in shift frequency before switches to the non-preferred 
eye dominance state. This suggest that the changes in rivalry dynamics compared 
with the static control condition resulted, at least to some extent, from non-specific 
factors (like task difficulty, perhaps), rather than from the images shifts per se.
Comparing the saccade and replay condition, it is observed that the mean dominance 
durations of both the left and the right eye percepts tend to be longer after saccades 
then after stimulus jumps in subjects DB, JK and SR and shorter for subject TG.
Mean survival time
To further address the question how large versus small retinal image shifts affected 
the durations of dominance states, we also analyzed the mean dominance survival 
time which quantifies how long the current percept survives after saccades or stimu-
lus jumps (Methods). Figure 5.10 shows the average dominance survival times of 
non-preferred (5.10A,C) and preferred (5.10B,D) eye percept after large (5.10A,B) 
and small-amplitude (5.10C,D) saccades and stimulus jumps. Note that the average 
survival times were typically larger in the saccade (red) versus replay (blue) condi-
tion. The black bars show the mean difference between the saccades and replay con-
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ditions across all four subjects. The observed increases were significantly different 
from zero for survival times after small shifts in both directions (ANOVA: F=7.44, 
p=0.0065; F=7.93 p=0.005 for survival times of the preferred and non-preferred per-
cept, respectively) and after large shifts for the non-preferred eye only (ANOVA: 
F=1.79, p=0.18; F=4.53, p=0.0337 for the preferred and the non-preferred percept, 
respectively). 
Discussion
In the present paper we analyzed the temporal correlations between perceptual al-
ternations and active versus passive retinal image shifts using a new cross-correla-
tion technique, adopted from the field of spike train analysis, which accounts for 
common input (Methods). Active shifts were produced by saccadic eye movements, 
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while passive shifts were produced by moving the stimulus across the screen in a 
saccade like fashion. In both experimental conditions, we found significant, posi-
tive correlations between retinal image shifts and perceptual switches, but only for 
switches towards the subjects’ preferred eye. For small image shifts (<1°), however, 
we observed a remarkable dissociation between active versus passive shifts; the 
probability of small saccades prior to switches showed no significant increase, while 
small stimulus jumps of the same amplitude and direction showed a robust positive 
correlation with switches towards the preferred eye. As we will argue below, these 
findings corroborate our tenet that retinal image shifts trigger onset rivalry, rather 
than perceptual switches per se, and that this onset rivalry depends at least partly on 
extra-retinal eye movement signals.
Onset rivalry
Consistent with previous studies (e.g., Einhäuser, et al., 2004; Ito, et al., 2003; 
Pheiffer, et al., 1956; van Dam and van Ee, 2005; van Dam and van Ee, 2006b) we 
found significant, positive correlations between retinal image shifts and perceptual 
switches for both saccades and stimulus jumps. These results are consistent with the 
notion that the image change resulting from a saccade, rather than the execution of 
the eye movement per se, is a key factor for switches in awareness (van Dam and 
van Ee, 2006a). Interestingly, however, we found these positive correlations primar-
ily for switches towards the subjects’ preferred eye at stimulus onset (Figures 5.5 
and 5.6). A similar asymmetry was observed for blinks (Figure 5.7). These find-
ings are nicely in line with our previous study (Kalisvaart, et al., 2011b, Chapter 4 
in this thesis) in which we found that eye dominance after a 4° retinal image shift 
was biased towards the subjects’ preferred eye at stimulus onset. Our present find-
ings thus support the conclusion that retinal image shifts and brief image blanking 
tend to elicit onset rivalry rather than precept switches per se. This conclusion is 
corroborated further by our observation that the amplitudes of the cross-correlation 
peaks increased significantly with increasing strength of the onset preferences of the 
individual observers (Figure 5.8).
There are at least two ways in which image shifts could influence rivalry during 
sustained viewing. First, the transient neural responses associated with a retinal im-
age shift (Gawne and Martin, 2002) might trigger a reset of the competition proc-
ess, perhaps because they provide a powerful influx of new information about the 
stimulus. It could also be that more gradual, fixation-contingent fluctuations in sen-
sitivity influence the ongoing competition. Earlier work on monocular rivalry has 
shown, for example, that interaction of the stimulus with post-saccadic afterimages 
leads to changes in perceptual dominance of one grating pattern over the other as 
well as fluctuations in perceived contrast of a single grating that depend systemati-
cally on the nature of the retinal image change produced by a saccade (Georgeson, 
1984). Thus, saccades can have a profound impact on the perception of static stimuli, 
depending on their endpoints within the stimulus. Indeed, using orthogonal grat-
ings, van Dam and van Ee (2006a) found that a saccade only causes a switch in eye 
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dominance if it leads to a retinal image change on the fovea. Note, however, that 
we circumvented these endpoint contingencies by using dense random-dot motion 
stimuli; the differences that encouraged binocular rivalry were directional motion 
signals, not discrepant spatial structures. Hence, even though each saccade and each 
stimulus jump produced a change in the retinal image, the resulting changes on the 
fovea were always very similar in nature (i.e., always a random pattern of moving 
dots) and not important for the competition between the two motion percepts. We 
speculate therefore that the observed asymmetries between transitions to the eye that 
is preferred at onset and transitions to the other eye resulted from visual transients 
that reinitiate the rivalry process rather than from fixation-contingent (asymmetric) 
fluctuations in sensitivity. Of course, even in a dynamic motion stimulus, after a reti-
nal image shift, new retinal tissue will be stimulated at the edge of the stimulus. We 
did not specifically test whether the probability of a perceptual switch depends sys-
tematically on the extent to which new retinal tissue is being stimulated, but in a way 
this is already given to some extent by the difference between large and small shifts. 
This comparison suggests that size matters, but that it is by no means the only factor 
that contributes; in the replay condition, peaks in the cross-correlograms had about 
the same magnitude for small and large stimulus jumps (see Figures 5.5 and 5.6).
Perceptual stability
Interestingly, this asymmetry between switches toward the preferred and the non-
preferred eye was observed for small (<1°) stimulus jumps, but not for small sponta-
neous saccades. This result confirms the notion that small saccades do not interfere 
with perceptual stability (van Dam and van Ee, 2005) or that saccades are even 
actively involved in maintaining perceptual continuity (Ross and Ma-Wyatt, 2004; 
van Dam and van Ee, 2006a). 
Visual stability during saccades is also observed under natural viewing conditions, 
when we perceive the world as stable in space despite the retinal image shifts in-
duced by saccades. In contrast, the same eye movements produced by an external 
cause destroy the stable percept. In agreement with this notion, our subjects reported 
that watching the stimulus jumping around in the replay condition was very annoy-
ing, even though the movement of the stimulus was a copy of their own eye move-
ments made in a previous trial. Visual stability during saccades has also been shown, 
for example, in oculomotor double-step tasks, in which subjects reach two sequen-
tially flashed targets quite accurately, despite the fact that the retinal information on 
the location of the second target did not match the eye displacement to reach that 
target after the first movement (Hallett and Lightstone, 1976). 
On the other hand, studies using stabilized images by compensation for eye move-
ments (Pritchard, 1958; Scotto, et al., 1990b) or using afterimages (Blake, et al., 
1971; Lack, 1971; McDougall, 1903) have found that dominance durations increase 
substantially in the absence of eye movements, (although perceptual switches still 
occur), suggesting that saccades are an important drive for alternations in binocular 
rivalry. Sabrin and Kertesz (Sabrin and Kertesz, 1983) found that if the image shown 
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to one eye is stabilized, the predominance of that image gets severely reduced, but 
that its predominance increases when microsaccades are simulated. This increase, 
however, was not up to the level of natural viewing. This implies that it is not only 
the retinal displacement that causes the effect, but also some higher level feature of 
saccades (e.g. the presence of an efference copy). Our findings that the probability 
of small saccades is not significantly increased just prior to perceptual switches, 
whereas the probability of small stimulus jumps is, corroborates the involvement of 
extra-retinal signals. 
Image stability
Our experiments also demonstrated remarkably robust decreases in the occurrence 
of saccades, stimulus jumps, and blinks just prior to perceptual switches. These 
decreases, which were seen in all conditions, are not simply a reaction to previ-
ous increases, since they also occurred in conditions in which no increase occurred 
(e.g. small saccades, Figure 5.6). Another possible explanation, namely that subjects 
withhold saccades between the perceptual flip and the button press (as suggested by 
Van Dam en Van Ee (2005; 2006b), is also not valid, because significant decreases 
were also observed in the replay condition, in which the subjects had no influence 
on the occurrence of the shifts. It thus appears that a short period of retinal image 
stabilization also increases the probability of a perceptual switch. This notion was 
further supported by the fact that the covariograms still showed deep troughs even 
if the percept switches were cross-correlated with all saccades, stimulus jumps and 
blinks combined (average depth > 0.6 s-1; data not shown). These findings are in line 
with the results of Sabrin and Kertesz (Sabrin and Kertesz, 1980), who found a de-
crease in the occurrence of microsaccades over the course of a dominance interval. 
We therefore speculate that the occurrence of troughs in the covariogram might be 
related to the so called Troxler effect. It has been found that fixational (micro)sac-
cades counteract visual fading (Martinez-Conde, et al., 2006), probably by providing 
new ‘pieces of evidence’ for the present stimulus and thus weakening the amount of 
adaptation to that stimulus. Fading of the current dominant percept due to image sta-
bilization might contribute to a switch in this way. Indeed, Alais et al. (2010) recently 
published evidence for the influence of adaptation on the rivalry process by showing 
that the sensitivity for changes in the dominant percept decreases over the course of 
a dominance state, while it increases for changes in the suppressed percept. 
Interestingly, the effect of image stabilization on perceptual switches had a shorter 
lead time than the positive effect of retinal image shifts and blinking, as the troughs 
always fell after the peaks in the covariograms (Figures 5.5-5.7). Moreover, unlike 
peak height (Figure 5.8), trough depth appeared unrelated to the strength of the sub-
jects’ individual onset preferences. Both features support the above notion that there 
are at least two ways in which image shifts could influence rivalry during sustained 
viewing: one which influences the ongoing rivalry through gradual changes in sen-
sitivity, and another one which reinitiates the competition through strong visually-
evoked transients (that are unexpected, unsuppressed or unaccounted for by extra 
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retinal signals).
Peak timing
Previous studies (Ito, et al., 2003; van Dam and van Ee, 2006b) found peaks in the 
cross-correlograms at ~500 ms before the button press. It was suggested that this 
lead time can be accounted for by delays in the subjects’ responses to the perceptual 
switch because it coincided with the subjects’ reaction time to physical stimulus 
flips (van Dam and van Ee, 2006b). In our experiments, however, the lead time of 
the peaks was typically larger than subjects’ mean reaction time to physical flips 
in motion direction. However, latencies for unambiguous stimulus flips and per-
ceptual switches induced by rivalrous stimuli need not be the same.  Indeed,  we 
recently found  that in a motion discrimination task reaction times to rivalrous mo-
tion stimuli are consistently increased compared with reaction times to unambiguous 
stimuli (Kalisvaart, et al., 2011a, Chapter 2 in this thesis). We thus speculate that the 
observed timing differences with Van Dam and Van Ee and others (Ito, et al., 2003; 
van Dam and van Ee, 2006b) are caused by differences between our dynamic versus 
their static stimuli. 
Dominance durations and survival times
It is tempting to assume that the increased probability of retinal image shifts before 
perceptual switches observed in the covariograms would lead to a decrease in mean 
dominance duration and survival times. However, the proportion of switches that is 
preceded by a shift, even in the condition with the highest peaks, is relatively low 
(area under the peak, approximately 5-10% on average), leaving many shifts that 
might possibly delay a switch rather than causing one. Because dominance durations 
already show quite some variation in the absence of saccades, elongation of part of 
these intervals would result in a very broad and low peak that is impossible to detect 
in the covariogram. Predictions on dominance duration from the covariogram are 
further complicated by the fact that there are not only peaks, but also troughs, mean-
ing that not only shifts, but also the absence of shifts might contribute to the occur-
rence of a perceptual switch.
Indeed, we found prolonged dominance durations in the shift conditions as com-
pared to the control conditions without saccades or stimulus jumps in two of our 
subjects and shortened durations in the other two subjects. Overall, both dominance 
durations and survival times were slightly longer in the saccade conditions than in 
the replay conditions, supporting the notion that the extra-retinal information that is 
available when saccades are made, helps to stabilize the percept. However, the dif-
ferences, although statistically significant, were minimal.
Blinks
In our experiments blinks occurred more frequently before the button press with 
which subjects indicated a switch than after it (Figure 5.7). These findings contrast 
with earlier studies (Ito, et al., 2003; van Dam and van Ee, 2005), which reported that 
blinks occur mainly after the switch. It should be noted, however, that these previous 
studies have relied on the occurrence of artifacts in their video-based eye movement 
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signals to identify putative blinks while we have recorded movements of the eyelids 
to measure them directly (Methods). Although in our experiments some subjects did 
show a significant increase in blink rate after the button press, a much larger increase 
was seen approximately 1 second before the button press. This suggests that, if any-
thing, blinks tended to elicit switches rather than just synchronize with them.
In this respect it is also interesting to consider the results of studies that have ap-
plied intermittent stimulus presentation (Klink, et al., 2008; Leopold, et al., 2002). 
In these studies it was found that short (<0.5 s) stimulus interruptions increase the 
switch probability to such a degree that both stimulus presentations are perceived 
alternately. If short stimulus interruptions produced by blinking would have had a 
similar effect, we would have expected a much larger increase in blink occurrence 
prior to the button press. Even so, our study shows that blinks do occur more fre-
quently before button presses, especially before switches to the subjects’ preferred 
eye (Figures 5.7 and 5.8). A parsimonious interpretation of these findings is therefore 
that blink-induced stimulus interruptions, like saccades, may trigger onset rivalry, 
rather than (interruption driven) percept switches per se.
Conclusion
We found a correlation between large (>1°) retinal image shifts and perceptual 
switches in binocular rivalry. These correlations were stronger for switches towards 
subjects’ preferred eye at stimulus onset, suggesting that, rather than causing percept 
switches, retinal image shifts trigger onset rivalry. A similar effect was found for 
blinks. 
Small saccades hardly affected binocular rivalry, whereas small stimulus jumps 
did, indicating that extra-retinal signals associated with saccades (such as efference 
copy) play a role in the effect of saccades on perceptual switches. This idea is further 
corroborated by the observation that mean dominance survival times are larger in the 
saccade condition as compared to the replay condition.
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Supplementary Figure 5.1: Effects of beeps. 
Both large saccades and large stimulus jumps were typically preceded by a beep which cued 
the subjects to make a saccade or warned them about an upcoming stimulus jump. It is pos-
sible therefore that the percept transitions synchronized with the beeps rather than with the 
subsequent image shifts. 
Given the variability in saccade (and jump) delay relative to the beep, a stronger effect in the 
case of beeps would suggest the beeps themselves are important, whereas a weaker effect 
would suggest it is really the image shift resulting from the saccade (or stimulus jump). To 
test this, we computed covariograms of button presses with which subjects indicated percept 
switches, and auditory cues (beeps). A: switches towards the preferred eye. B: switches to-
wards the non-preferred eye. Top panels show the results from individual subjects. Bottom 
panels plot the mean ± SEM across all four subjects (black lines and gray shaded areas). The 
vertical gray bar is an estimate (mean ± SD) of the moment that the actual percept switch 
occurred relative to the moment of the button press. The occurrence frequencies of large sac-
cades have been plotted in the bottom panel for comparison (red). 
The peaks in beep occurrences were lower and the troughs were not as deep as the ones for 
saccade occurrences, which means that there was a much larger temporal dispersion of the 
beeps relative to the percept switches. This indicates that percept switches tended to synchro-
nize with the image shifts themselves, rather than with the preceding beeps.
Appendix: Supplementary Figures
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Supplementary Figure 5.2: Covariograms of shifts and beeps with blinks
We considered the possibility that the observed changes in blink rate resulted indirectly from 
a synchronization of the blinks with large image shifts or the preceding beeps. Therefore we 
made covariograms of blinks and large retinal image shifts (A) and blinks and beeps (B). Top 
panels show the results from individual subjects. Bottom panels plot the mean ± SEM across 
all four subjects. No consistent relation was found between blinks and large shifts, or between 
blinks and beeps.
Chapter 6
Summary
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When looking around in daily life, we perceive the world around us as stable and 
unambiguous. Sometimes, however, we come across a situation in which what we 
see can be interpreted in different ways. When this happens, the brain has to choose 
a certain interpretation from the possible options. In this thesis, I describe 4 stud-
ies in which we investigated human behavior when presented with several types of 
ambiguous stimuli. 
Ambiguity can take different forms. Figures can be ambiguous in itself, for exam-
ple, the Neckercube or the face/vase shown in Figure 1.1. Ambiguity can also arise 
when the left and the right eye are presented with distinctly different images. Unable 
to fuse the two images into a single 3D percept, the brain then chooses one percept 
to perceive and suppresses the other and switches the dominant percept every few 
seconds; a phenomenon known as binocular rivalry. Ambiguity has much in com-
mon with visual decision making. When the targets for an eye movement are equally 
likely, ambiguity also arises. 
In this thesis, I describe four studies on visual ambiguity. In the first two studies, I 
investigated ambiguity in the relation to decision making. In the last two studies, I 
studied the effect of saccades on binocular rivalry process.
In the study described in Chapter 2, we investigated the effect of uncertainty and 
ambiguity in discriminating the direction of motion in random moving dot patterns. 
In this study, noisy motion stimuli were used that could be identical or different be-
tween the two eyes. Speed and accuracy of the motion discrimination in such stimuli 
is known to depend systematically on motion strength. This behavior is traditionally 
explained by diffusion models which assume accumulation of sensory evidence over 
time to a decision bound. But how does the brain decide when sensory evidence is 
ambiguous, such as in binocular rivalry? Theories on bistable vision propose that 
such a conflict is resolved through competitive interactions between adapting units 
encoding the alternative stimulus interpretations. Thus, distinctly different theoreti-
cal frameworks have been proposed for deciding under uncertainty and ambiguity; a 
discrepancy overlooked so far. 
Motion discrimination at stimulus onset was studied under both conditions. In the 
first experiment speed and accuracy were similar when observers viewed noisy, un-
ambiguous motion patterns in which signal dots were either at identical or at differ-
ent, uncorrelated locations for the two eyes. This result is compatible with a race 
between two monocular discrimination processes. However, Experiments 2 and 3 
showed that reaction times increased when the stimulus was ambiguous. This in-
crease could not be explained by motion transparency. The data thus reveal competi-
tive rivalry interactions. We discuss a model that can account for the accuracy and 
latencies observed under both ambiguous and unambiguous conditions, by combin-
ing key elements from diffusion and rivalry models.
Decision making in ambiguous situations is also the topic of the Chapter 3. Deci-
sion-making models that assume accumulating of perceptual evidence over time to a 
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threshold are used mostly in literature to explain visual decision making. It is often 
assumed that this involves neural competition (feed-forward or feedback inhibition) 
between the alternatives, but so far this has not been revealed by experiments. In the 
study described in this chapter, we presented two simultaneously-flashed targets that 
reversed their intensity difference during each presentation and instructed subjects 
to make a saccade towards the brightest target. All subjects responded more often to 
the target that was brightest during the first stimulus phase. This preference persisted 
even if the subsequent reversed-intensity phase lasted longer. These are the hall-
marks of hysteresis, predicted by models in which target-representations compete 
through feedback rather than feed-forward cross-inhibition. 
However, a similar primacy effect can also be achieved by many other models, if 
one assumes the presence of a rather low decision threshold. In an additional ex-
periment, I therefore showed that the primacy can be reduced by using larger target 
contrast and even completely turned into recency when an extra late bias is added in 
favor of the initially weakest target. These results strongly indicate that the observed 
primacy effect was caused by the hysteresis of a feedback system, rather than by a 
low threshold.
We also measured reaction times and found that those were independent of the 
choice-probability. This dissociation contradicts theories that propose a single-stage 
first-to-threshold decision rule. Instead, we suggest a feedback choice model, ex-
tended by a parallel system for determining the reaction time. 
In the other two studies, we investigated the effect of saccade on binocular rivalry. 
Previous studies have indicated that saccadic eye movements correlate positively 
with perceptual alternations in binocular rivalry, presumably because the foveal 
image changes resulting from saccades, rather than the eye movement themselves, 
cause switches in awareness.
In addition, recent studies suggest that binocular rivalry at stimulus onset, so called 
onset rivalry, differs from rivalry during sustained viewing. These observations raise 
the interesting question whether there is a relation between onset rivalry and rivalry 
in the presence of eye movements. In Chapters 4 and 5, we therefore studied the ef-
fects of saccades on binocular rivalry and compared these effects with movements of 
the stimulus on the screen that created the same retinal displacement.
In Chapter 4, we investigated the probability of a perceptual dominance switch when 
stimuli jumped from one visual hemifield to the other, either through a saccade or 
through a passive stimulus displacement, and compared rivalry after such displace-
ments with onset and sustained rivalry. Three different visual stimulus types were 
tested - opponent motion, orthogonal gratings and face/house stimuli. 
In control experiments, it was found that for all three stimulus types, subjects showed 
a strong preference for stimuli in one eye or one hemifield, and that these subject-
specific biases did not persist during sustained viewing. These results confirm and 
extend previous findings on onset rivalry obtained with gratings. 
The results from the main experiment, in which saccades were compared with stimu-
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lus jumps, showed that after a passive stimulus jump, switching probability was low 
when the preferred eye was dominant before a stimulus jump, but when the non-pre-
ferred eye was dominant beforehand, switching probability was comparatively high. 
The results thus showed that dominance after a stimulus jump was tightly related to 
eye dominance at stimulus onset. In the saccade condition, however, these subject-
specific biases were systematically reduced, indicating that the influence of saccades 
can be understood from a systematic attenuation of the subjects’ onset rivalry biases. 
Taken together, these findings demonstrate a relation between onset rivalry and ri-
valry after retinal shifts and involvement of extra-retinal signals in binocular rivalry.
After finding evidence, in the study described in Chapter 4, that retinal image shifts 
elicit so-called onset rivalry and not percept switches as such, we performed another 
study to address the question whether onset rivalry may account for correlations be-
tween saccades and percept switches that has been found during prolonged viewing 
of an ambiguous stimulus.
We therefore studied binocular rivalry while subjects made eye movements across 
a visual stimulus and compared it with the rivalry in a ‘replay’ condition in which 
subjects maintained fixation while the same retinal displacements were reproduced 
by stimulus displacements on the screen (Chapter 5). We used dichoptic random-dot 
motion stimuli viewed through a stereoscope, and measured eye and eyelid move-
ments with scleral search-coils. 
Positive correlations were found between retinal image shifts and perceptual switch-
es for both saccades and stimulus jumps, but only for switches towards the subjects’ 
preferred eye at stimulus onset. A similar asymmetry was observed for blink-induced 
stimulus interruptions. Moreover, for saccades, amplitude appeared crucial as the 
positive correlation persisted for small stimulus jumps, but not for small saccades 
(amplitudes < 1°). These findings corroborate the tenet from the previous chapter 
that saccades elicit a form of onset rivalry, and that rivalry is modulated by extra-
retinal eye movement signals.
Chapter 7
Nederlandse 
samenvatting
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Deze Nederlandse samenvatting is een combinatie van de Algemene inleiding 
(Hoofdstuk 1) en de Engelse samenvatting (Hoofdstuk 6). Voor figuren en referenties, 
zie Hoofdstuk 1.
Ambiguïteit
In het dagelijks leven beschouwen we wat we om ons heen zien meestal als stabiel 
en ondubbelzinnig. Soms is een beeld echter op meerder manieren te interpreteren. 
Als we zo’n situatie tegenkomen, moeten onze hersenen een keuze maken tussen de 
verschillende interpretaties die mogelijk zijn. In Figuur 1.1 zie je een aantal bekende 
voorbeelden van afbeeldingen die op verschillende manieren geïnterpreteerd 
kunnen worden. Figuur 1.1A toont de Necker-kubus. Deze afbeelding kan op twee 
manieren gezien worden als een tekening van een 3-dimensionale kubus; met de 
voorkant linksonder (Figuur 1.1B) of rechtsboven (Figuur 1.1C). Als je kijkt naar 
de ambigue (dubbelzinnige) versie van de Necker-kubus, moeten je hersenen dus 
een keuze maken. Het is niet mogelijk om beide interpretaties tegelijk te zien. 
Maar in plaats van dat het brein kiest voor een van de twee en bij die keuze blijft, 
wisselt wat je waarneemt tussen de twee mogelijkheden. Dit is een geval van 
zogenaamde perceptuele rivaliteit: de twee verschillende 3D-interpretaties van de 
kubus rivaliseren met elkaar om dominantie van de bewuste waarneming. Zodra 
je je bewust bent van de beide mogelijkheden, is het mogelijk om een van de twee 
interpretaties tot dominantie te dwingen. Maar het is onmogelijk om te voorkomen 
dat de andere mogelijkheid af en toe ook nog tevoorschijn komt.
Figuur 1.1D en 1.1E laten nog twee voorbeelden zien van perceptueel ambigue 
figuren. In Figuur 1.1D zie je een zwarte vaas op een witte achtergrond of twee 
naar elkaar kijkende witte gezichten op een zwarte achtergrond. In Figuur 1.1E kun 
je zowel een jonge vrouw als haar oude grootmoeder zien. Als je naar deze figuren 
kijkt, valt het weer op dat het moeilijk is om beide interpretaties tegelijkertijd te zien. 
Als je de vaas ziet, smelten de gezichten samen tot een witte achtergrond, terwijl als 
je de gezichten ziet, de vaas slechts achtergrond is. En hoewel het oor van de jonge 
vrouw ook het oog is van de oude vrouw, kan het niet allebei tegelijk zijn. 
Binoculaire rivaliteit
Een ander soort rivaliteit is de zogenoemde binoculaire rivaliteit. In binoculaire ri-
valiteit rivaliseren niet de twee mogelijke interpretaties van één afbeelding, maar de 
verschillende beelden die door het linker- en het rechteroog worden waargenomen.
Normaal gesproken gebruiken we de kleine verschillen tussen de beelden die op het 
linker- en het rechternetvlies vallen om een driedimensionaal beeld van de wereld 
om ons heen te reconstrueren. Als de twee beelden echter té verschillend worden, 
kunnen de hersenen ze niet meer combineren tot een betekenisvol 3D-beeld. In dat 
geval kan binoculaire rivaliteit optreden.
De 19e-eeuwse wetenschapper Charles Wheatstone was een van de eersten die, in 
een artikel over dieptezien, binoculaire rivaliteit beschreef. Nadat hij geobserveerd 
heeft dat de twee ogen dichtbije voorwerpen onder een iets andere hoek zien en 
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dat dit de bron moet zijn van ons driedimensionale percept, beschrijft hij wat hij 
waarneemt als hij ieder oog iets anders laat zien:
Als de afbeeldingen a en b [in dit geval de letters A en S, ieder in een cirkel, 
JK] tegelijkertijd ieder aan een oog worden getoond, blijft de rand eromheen, 
die bij beide hetzelfde is, intact, terwijl de letters erin afwisselend worden 
waargenomen. Nu eens wordt de letter waargenomen die aan het linkeroog 
wordt getoond en dan weer die, die aan het rechteroog wordt getoond. Op het 
moment dat het beeld verandert, breekt de zichtbare letter in stukjes, terwijl 
fragmenten van de letter die op het punt staat te verschijnen erdoorheen te 
zien zijn. Meteen daarna wordt de hele letter zichtbaar. Het lijkt niet mogelijk 
om de verschijning van een van de twee letters bewust te sturen […].
Wheatstone beschrijft hier duidelijk de belangrijkste eigenschappen van binoculaire 
rivaliteit: de afwisselende onderdrukking van de beelden in het linker- en het 
rechteroog, het onduidelijke percept rond het moment van de wisseling en de 
onmogelijkheid om het proces bewust te sturen.
Voorbeelden van stimuli die binoculaire rivaliteit opwekken als je ze bekijkt door 
een bril met één rood en één groen glas, zijn te zien in Figuur 1.2 en op de voorkant 
van dit proefschrift. In Figuur 1.2A is een huis afgebeeld in rood en een gezicht in 
groen. Als je deze afbeelding bekijkt door een rood/groen-bril, zie je afwisselend een 
rood huis en een groen gezicht. Soms, vooral net voordat het ene beeld verdwijnt 
en het andere verschijnt, zie je ook wel eens een gemengd beeld, bijvoorbeeld een 
gezicht met een dak. Er zijn echter ook periodes dat een van de twee afbeeldingen 
volledig is onderdrukt, hoewel er aan de stimulus zelf niets verandert. Op dezelfde 
manier kun je in Figuur 1.2B en op de omslag van dit boekje een afwisselend patroon 
zien van een rood streeppatroon naar links en een groen streeppatroon naar rechts.
Een deel van de experimenten in Hoofdstuk 2 is uitgevoerd met rood/groene stimuli, 
vergelijkbaar met die in Figuur 1.2. Het gebruik van rood/groen-brillen heeft echter 
een aantal praktische nadelen. Om een goede scheiding van en een goede balans 
tussen de twee beelden te krijgen, moeten de filters in de bril precies overeenkomen 
met de kleuren van de stimulus en moet de intensiteit van de rode en de groene 
kleur exact hetzelfde zijn. Dit is erg moeilijk te bereiken. Daarom hebben we in het 
laatste experiment van Hoofdstuk 2 en in de experimenten die staan beschreven in de 
Hoofdstukken 4 en 5 gebruik gemaakt van een spiegelstereoscoop om verschillende 
beelden te presenteren aan de verschillende ogen. Op die manier wisten we zeker 
dat de twee beelden perfect gescheiden waren en konden we beide beelden ook met 
dezelfde intensiteit aanbieden in elke gewenste kleur (meestal wit).
Eigenschappen van rivaliteit
Als je kijkt naar een ambigue stimulus is op ieder moment één van de twee ogen of 
percepten dominant, terwijl het andere wordt onderdrukt. Periodes van exclusieve 
126
Chapter 7
dominantie, die typisch een paar seconden duren, worden meestal afgewisseld met 
korte periodes waarin beide beelden voor een deel of door elkaar heen worden 
gezien. Rivaliteit kan worden gekwantificeerd door de lengte te meten van de 
dominantieperiodes.
De afwisseling van beelden die optreedt tijdens binoculaire rivaliteit is een 
stochastisch proces. Dat betekent dat je iedere keer dat je naar dezelfde ambigue 
stimulus kijkt, een ander patroon van afwisseling tussen de twee beelden ziet. Elke 
wisseling vindt plaats op een willekeurig moment, onafhankelijk van de duur van 
de vorige dominantiestaat. Maar als je langdurig naar zo’n stimulus kijkt en een 
histogram maakt van alle dominantieduren over die periode, zie je typisch een 
gamma-verdeling: een scheve verdeling met een piek rond de 2 á 3 seconde en een 
lange staart richting langere duren (Figuur 1.3). 
De parameters van deze verdeling kunnen veranderd worden door de eigenschappen 
van de stimulus te veranderen, zoals bijvoorbeeld de intensiteit, het contrast, de 
grootte, de locatie ten opzichte van het fixatiepunt of, bij bewegende beelden, de 
snelheid. Bovendien is de precieze vorm van de verdeling verschillend per persoon.
De dominantie van het linker- en het rechteroog hoeft niet eerlijk verdeeld te zijn. 
Verandering van de eigenschappen van de stimulus in het ene oog kan resulteren in 
een onbalans tussen de ogen. Veel mensen hebben ook een natuurlijke voorkeur voor 
een oog. 
Tot op zekere hoogte kun je de perceptwisselingen zelf controleren. Het is mogelijk 
om de switchfrequentie te verhogen of te verlagen of de gemiddelde dominantieduur 
van een van de twee beelden te verlengen. Maar deze controle is meestal vrij minimaal. 
Binoculaire rivaliteit is moeilijker te beïnvloeden dan perceptuele rivaliteit, wat 
suggereert dat het bij binoculaire rivaliteit gaat om een meer automatisch, door de 
stimulus gedreven proces van competitie dan bij perceptuele rivaliteit.
Waarom zou je binoculaire rivaliteit bestuderen?
Ik heb voor dit proefschrift onderzoek gedaan naar ambigue perceptie in het algemeen 
en binoculaire rivaliteit in het bijzonder. Vanaf het moment dat de stereoscoop werd 
uitgevonden, is binoculaire rivaliteit intensief bestudeerd door wetenschappers 
over de hele wereld. Binoculaire rivaliteit is een verschijnsel dat vooral optreedt in 
laboratoriumsituaties, maar het wordt zo uitgebreid bestudeerd omdat het inzicht 
geeft in het proces dat plaatsvindt in het visuele systeem tussen het moment dat licht 
op het netvlies valt en de daadwerkelijke waarneming. 
We denken misschien dat we alles om ons heen waarnemen, maar in werkelijkheid 
dringt maar een fractie van alle informatie die onze ogen binnenkomt door tot ons 
bewustzijn. Veel wordt gewoon genegeerd omdat het oninteressant en onveranderlijk 
is. Je neus bijvoorbeeld, zit voortdurend in je blikveld, maar daarvan zijn we ons 
maar zelden bewust. Bovendien is waarneming sterk contextafhankelijk. Wanneer 
je je aandacht richt op één ding, kan dat het bewustzijn van andere, toch behoorlijk 
opvallende dingen, ernstig verminderen.
De dagelijkse visuele omgeving is natuurlijk erg ingewikkeld om te bestuderen. 
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Binoculaire rivaliteit, aan de andere kant, biedt een duidelijk studieobject: het aantal 
mogelijke percepten is sterk verminderd (meestal zijn er maar twee mogelijkheden) 
en terwijl de stimulus op het scherm precies hetzelfde blijft, verandert de waarneming 
dramatisch. Daarom wordt het gezien als een belangrijk hulpmiddel bij het bestuderen 
van bewuste waarneming en de grenzen van de onbewuste verwerking van visuele 
input.
Modellen van binoculaire rivaliteit
In de loop van de tijd zijn er vele modellen ontwikkeld die (een deel van) de 
automatische en stochastische afwisseling van beelden zoals die optreden bij 
binoculaire rivaliteit kunnen simuleren. Hoewel de modellen soms erg van 
elkaar verschillen, delen de meeste een aantal basiselementen (Figuur 1.4): twee 
celgroepen, die ieder een van de twee mogelijke percepten representeren vormen 
de basis van zulke modellen. Om dominantie van het ene percept over het andere 
te bewerkstelligen zijn de twee celpopulaties met elkaar verbonden via wederzijdse 
remmende verbindingen. Op die manier wordt de ene groep onderdrukt als de 
andere actief is. Zonder verdere toevoegingen zou er echter vervolgens niets meer 
veranderen. Om perceptwisselingen te bereiken, ondergaan beide populaties zelf-
adaptatie: de activiteit vermindert in de loop van de tijd. Na een tijdje is de activiteit 
van de dominante celpopulatie te laag geworden om de andere nog voldoende te 
kunnen onderdrukken en treed een perceptwisseling op.
Een simpel model zoals dit, met één niveau waarop competitie plaatsvindt en waarin 
de twee celpopulaties ieder de input van één oog representeren, is, mits je er ook nog 
wat ruis aan toevoegt, in staat om de basale eigenschappen van traditionele binoculaire 
rivaliteit te simuleren: dominantie van het ene oog en onderdrukking van het andere, 
stochastische afwisseling tussen de twee percepten en een gammaverdeling van 
de dominantieduren. Het werkt echter alleen onder de aanname dat de rivaliteit 
plaatsvindt tussen de ogen of op een laag niveau in de hersenen, waar de informatie 
van het linker- en het rechteroog nog niet geïntegreerd is. Maar elektrofysiologisch 
onderzoek bij apen en fMRI-onderzoek bij mensen heeft aangetoond dat bij rivaliteit 
waarschijnlijk ook veel hogere delen van de hersenen betrokken zijn, waar cellen 
informatie krijgen uit beide ogen.
In overeenstemming met deze gemeten hersenactiviteit is er ook een aantal 
experimenten gedaan waarvan de resultaten niet compatibel zijn met dit simpele 
model. Als de stimulus bijvoorbeeld verdeeld wordt over de twee ogen, zodat ieder 
oog de helft ziet van een doorlopend patroon, rapporteren proefpersonen dat ze, in elk 
geval een deel van de tijd, rivaliteit zien tussen de gecombineerde patronen in plaats 
van tussen de monoculaire beelden; een sterk argument tegen pure rivaliteit tussen 
de ogen. Ook rivaliteit met ingewikkeldere stimuli zoals gezichten en gebouwen 
suggereert de betrokkenheid van hogere hersencentra. Om de resultaten van deze en 
soortgelijke experimenten te verklaren, zijn er intussen ook verschillende modellen 
ontworpen die uit meerdere competitieniveaus bestaan. 
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Onset rivaliteit
Lange tijd hebben onderzoekers zich gefocust op de beeldwisselingen die 
optreden als je langere tijd naar een ambigue stimulus kijkt en onderzocht hoe de 
dominantieduren beïnvloed kunnen worden door te sleutelen aan de eigenschappen 
van de stimulus. Deze benadering gaat uit van de aanname dat rivaliteit een constant 
proces is dat hetzelfde blijft zolang je naar de ambigue stimulus blijft kijken. In 
een aantal recente studies is echter aangetoond dat de keus voor een van de twee 
beelden op het moment dat de stimulus wordt gepresenteerd significant verschilt 
van de wisselingen die daarna optreden. Deze zogenaamde onset rivaliteit vertoont 
een hoge mate van voorspelbare bias, vergeleken met de willekeurigheid die gezien 
wordt tijdens langdurige binoculaire rivaliteit. Ook lijkt bewuste aandacht meer 
invloed te hebben op onset rivaliteit dan op latere perceptwisselingen.
De classificatie van sensorische informatie in categorieën en de probabilistische 
uitkomst van onset rivaliteit doen sterk denken aan andere perceptuele keuzes. 
Daarom hebben we ook onderzoek gedaan naar binoculaire rivaliteit in relatie tot het 
maken van keuzes in onzekere of ambigue situaties.
Beslissingen in ambigue situaties
Ons leven is een lange keten van keuzes en beslissingen. Sommige beslissingen 
zijn groot en opvallend en we zijn ons erg bewust van het feit dat we ze nemen. 
Voorbeelden van zulke beslissingen zijn de beslissing om een auto te kopen of om 
voor een bepaalde baan te solliciteren, of, een beetje kleiner, de keus wat je vanavond 
gaat eten. Andere beslissingen nemen we grotendeels ongemerkt en automatisch, 
bijvoorbeeld de beslissing om een oogbeweging te maken. Hersenprocessen 
die betrokken zijn bij beslissingen die leiden tot complex gedrag zijn moeilijk te 
onderzoeken. Simpele beslissingen daarentegen, zoals beslissingen die leiden tot 
eenvoudige acties zoals oogbewegingen kunnen makkelijker onderzocht worden.
Beslissingen over oogbewegingen worden vaak bestudeerd met behulp van ruizige 
bewegingsstimuli. Proefpersonen krijgen een vlak met bewegende stipjes te zien 
waarvan een deel in dezelfde richting beweegt (signaal) en de rest in willekeurige 
richting (ruis) en moeten dan een beslissing nemen over de richting waarin de 
meeste stipjes bewegen. Ze geven hun keus aan door een oogbeweging te maken 
in dezelfde richting als de overheersende bewegingsrichting van de signaalstipjes 
of door op een bepaalde knop te drukken. De nauwkeurigheid en de reactietijd van 
zulke beslissingen hangt systematisch af van de sterkte van de stimulus, in dit geval: 
van het percentage signaalstipjes. Dit soort twee-keuze-beslissingen wordt vaak 
gemodelleerd met een zogenaamd diffusiemodel (Figuur 1.5). In zo’n model wordt 
aangenomen dat informatie voor en tegen elke keuze wordt opgeteld en dat je een 
beslissing neemt zodra de aanwijzingen voor een van de twee keuzes sterk genoeg 
zijn om een bepaalde drempel te overschrijden. In de hersenen van apen zijn cellen 
gevonden die een activiteitenpatroon vertonen dat sterk overeenkomt met dit model: 
de activiteit van deze cellen stijgt terwijl de aap naar het stippenpatroon kijkt en 
bereikt een vast niveau (de drempelwaarde) net voordat de beslissing wordt genomen. 
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Verschillende soorten modellen maken echter verschillende aannames over hoe de 
informatie voor en tegen de alternatieven wordt gecombineerd (bijvoorbeeld via een 
onafhankelijke race, of met onderlinge competitie via feedback- of feed forward-
systemen). Maar ondanks deze verschillen voorspellen bijna alle modellen eigenlijk 
hetzelfde: correcte en snelle keuzes bij een makkelijke taak (dus bij weinig ruis) 
en meer fouten en langere reactietijden naarmate de taak moeilijker wordt. Het is 
met deze taak dus niet mogelijk om onderscheid te maken tussen de verschillende 
modellen.
Als onze hersenen worden geconfronteerd met een ambigue stimulus, moet er 
ook een beslissing genomen worden, namelijk welk van de twee beelden er wordt 
waargenomen. Dit maakt binoculaire rivaliteit en beslisprocessen deels vergelijkbaar. 
Het is daarom opvallend dat de twee processen over het algemeen worden beschreven 
met zulke verschillende modellen. De twee modellen zijn echter niet zomaar geschikt 
voor het simuleren van de taak waarvoor ze niet zijn ontworpen.
Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 gaan over rivaliteit en beslissingen. In Hoofdstuk 2 hebben we 
het effect bestudeerd van onzekerheid en ambiguïteit wanneer proefpersonen de 
bewegingsrichting moesten onderscheiden in een vlak vol bewegende stipjes. We 
gebruikten hiervoor ruizige bewegingsstimuli die soms precies hetzelfde waren 
voor de twee ogen en soms niet. Het is bekend dat de snelheid waarmee mensen 
een beslissing nemen over de bewegingsrichting afhangt van de hoeveelheid ruis. 
Traditioneel wordt dit gedrag uitgelegd met behulp van een diffusiemodel waarin 
een signaal stijgt tot een beslissingsdrempel wordt bereikt. Maar hoe wordt zo’n 
beslissing genomen als de stipjes in het ene oog naar links bewegen en in het andere 
oog naar rechts, dus in het geval van binoculaire rivaliteit? Dat wordt tot nu toe met 
een heel ander soort model beschreven. Er zijn dus twee heel verschillende modellen 
in omloop voor beslissingen in onzekere en ambigue situaties; een situatie waarvoor 
nog geen oplossing is gevonden. We hebben daarom bewegingsdiscriminatie 
onderzocht in beide situaties. 
In het eerste experiment vonden we dat de snelheid en de nauwkeurigheid niet 
veranderde wanneer we proefpersonen ruizige maar niet-ambigue stimuli lieten zien 
waarin de signaalstipjes soms op dezelfde plek stonden voor beide ogen en soms niet. 
Dit resultaat is in overeenstemming met een race tussen twee monoculaire processen. 
In Experiment 2 en 3 vonden we echter dat de reactietijden toenamen wanneer de 
bewegingsrichting in het het linker- en het rechteroog verschillend was. Dat betekent 
dus dat er rivaliserende interacties moeten zijn. We stellen daarom een model voor 
dat de nauwkeurigheid en de reactietijden in zowel ambigue als niet-ambigue 
condities kan verklaren door de belangrijkste elementen uit diffusiemodellen en 
rivaliteitsmodellen te combineren.
Ook Hoofdstuk 3 gaat over beslissingen in ambigue situaties. In de literatuur wordt 
er meestal vanuit gegaan dat visuele beslissingen worden genomen op basis van de 
verzameling van informatie tot een drempel wordt bereikt. Er wordt vaak aangenomen 
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dat hierbij een bepaalde vorm van competitie nodig is tussen de alternatieven, maar 
tot nu toe is dat nog niet aangetoond met experimenten.
In deze studie lieten we proefpersonen heel kort (160 ms of korter) twee stippen 
zien en vroegen ze te kijken naar de felste stip. Maar halverwege wisselden we de 
intensiteit van de twee stippen om, zodat het antwoord op de vraag ‘welke was het 
felst?’ aan het begin anders was dan aan het eind. Alle proefpersonen keken vaker naar 
het doel dat aan het begin het felst was, zelfs als de intensiteitswisseling al heel vroeg 
plaatsvond. Dit wijst op een verschijnsel dat hysterese heet en dat voorspeld wordt 
door modellen met feedbackcompetitie. Veel andere modellen kunnen echter ook 
een keuze maken voor het doel dat in het begin het felst is als ze uitgaan van een heel 
lage beslissingsdrempel. De beslissing wordt dan simpelweg al genomen voordat de 
intensiteit gewisseld wordt. In een extra experiment hebben we daarom laten zien dat 
deze voorkeur voor het begin teniet gedaan kan worden als het intensiteitsverschil 
groot genoeg is. Het kon zelfs volledig worden omgedraaid, zodat de proefpersonen 
kozen voor het doel dat aan het eind het felst was, wanneer het doel dat in het begin 
het zwakst was aan het eind extra fel was. Deze resultaten wijzen er sterk op dat 
de voorkeur voor het begin van de stimulus het gevolg is van de hysterese in een 
feedback systeem en niet van een lage drempel.
We hebben ook reactietijden gemeten en vonden dat deze onafhankelijk waren van 
de keuzekansen. Deze dissociatie is in tegenspraak met theorieën die uitgaan van een 
simpel ‘race-naar-drempel’-beslismodel. In plaats daarvan stellen we een feedback 
keuzemodel voor, uitgebreid met een parallel systeem dat de reactietijden bepaalt.
Binoculaire rivaliteit en saccades
Er is maar een klein plekje op het netvlies, de gele vlek, waarmee we echt scherp 
kunnen zien. Om alles om ons heen goed te kunnen zien, scannen we daarom 
voortdurend onze omgeving af met snelle oogbewegingen. Deze oogbewegingen, 
die we zo’n drie keer per seconde maken, worden saccades genoemd.
Een groot deel van het visuele systeem in de hersenen heeft een retinotope organisatie. 
Dat wil zeggen dat stukjes van het netvlies die naast elkaar liggen ook verbonden 
zijn met naast elkaar liggende stukjes van de hersenschors, zodat er in de hersenen 
een (vervormde) kaart ontstaat van het netvlies en dus ook van de buitenwereld.
Een saccade beweegt het beeld over het netvlies. Door de retinotope organisatie 
van het visuele systeem wordt er na een saccade een ander deel van de hersenen 
gestimuleerd als daarvoor. Deze andere cellen hebben natuurlijk ook een andere 
adaptatiegeschiedenis. Er is inderdaad veel onderzoek dat heeft aangetoond dat er 
interactie bestaat tussen oogbewegingen en de perceptwisselingen in binoculaire 
rivaliteit. Maar verschillende studies hebben ook laten zien dat oogbewegingen niet 
noodzakelijk zijn voor binoculaire rivaliteit.
De effecten van saccades op binoculaire rivaliteit zijn dus zeker interessant en door 
proefpersonen saccades te laten maken tijdens het kijken naar ambigue stimuli, is het 
mogelijk om iets te leren over de locatie in de hersenen waar rivaliserende stimuli 
worden verwerkt. Als rivaliteit puur en alleen een lokaal proces is, zien de nieuwe 
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cellen die geactiveerd worden na de saccade de stimulus na de saccade als een totaal 
nieuwe stimulus. Dit zou dan resulteren in onset rivaliteit en niet te onderscheiden 
zijn van de situatie waarin de stimulus bewoog in plaats van het oog. Aan de andere 
kant, als er hogere hersencentra betrokken zijn bij binoculaire rivaliteit, is het percept 
na een saccade misschien anders dan na een passieve beweging van de stimulus.
In Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 staan de resultaten van twee studies naar het effect van saccades 
op binoculaire rivaliteit. In Hoofdstuk 4 hebben we onderzocht wat de kans is 
op een perceptwisseling als de stimulus van de ene kant van het fixatiepunt naar 
de andere kant verschoof. Deze beweging kon ofwel actief gebeuren, door een 
saccade, of passief, doordat de stimulus bewoog op het scherm. De rivaliteit na zo’n 
stimulusverschuiving hebben we vervolgens vergeleken met onset rivaliteit. 
In controle-experimenten vonden we dat proefpersonen een sterke voorkeur hadden 
voor één oog of, bij sommigen, voor de stimulus die viel op de neuskant van het 
netvlies en dat deze individuele biases snel verdwenen als ze langer naar de stimulus 
keken. Deze resultaten komen overeen met eerder onderzoek. 
In het hoofdexperiment, waarin we saccades vergeleken met bewegingen van de 
stimulus op het scherm, vonden we dat de kans op een perceptwisseling na een 
passieve stimulusverschuiving laag was wanneer het voorkeursoog dominant 
was voor de verschuiving, maar veel hoger wanneer van tevoren het andere oog 
dominant was. Dit betekent dat de dominantie na een stimulusverschuiving grote 
overeenkomsten vertoonde met de onset dominantie. In de saccadeconditie was deze 
individuele bias echter systematisch minder sterk. Deze resultaten tonen dus aan dat 
rivaliteit na een saccade of stimulusverschuiving gerelateerd is aan onset rivaliteit, 
maar dat het effect op een hoger niveau ligt dan lokaal op het netvlies.
Nadat we in de studie van Hoofdstuk 4 aanwijzingen hadden gevonden dat 
bewegingen van het beeld over het netvlies onset rivaliteit uitlokken en niet per se 
perceptwisselingen, hebben we een andere studie uitgevoerd om te onderzoeken of 
deze relatie tussen onset rivaliteit en saccades ook opgaat bij meerdere saccades 
tijdens langdurig kijken naar een ambigue stimulus.
We hebben daarom proefpersonen gevraagd om af en toe een oogbeweging te maken 
terwijl ze naar een ambigue stimulus keken en intussen voortdurend aan te geven 
welk beeld dominant was. Als controleconditie gebruikten we de oogbewegingen die 
in deze trials werden gemaakt om de stimulus op dezelfde manier te laten bewegen 
terwijl de proefpersoon op één punt bleef fixeren.
We vonden positieve correlaties tussen zowel actieve (saccades) en passieve 
(bewegende stimulus) bewegingen en perceptwisselingen. Maar voor saccades 
maakte de grootte van de saccade uit: de positieve correlatie werd alleen gevonden 
voor grote saccades (groter dan 1°), niet voor kleintjes. Deze bevindingen bevestigen 
de conclusies van het vorige onderzoek dat saccades onset rivaliteit uitlokken maar 
dat er ook extra-retinale signalen betrokken moeten zijn bij het rivaliteitsproces.
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was je meer op de achtergrond bij de afdeling betrokken. Ik wil je bedanken voor 
het vertrouwen dat je in me gesteld hebt door me aan te nemen en voor de prettige 
manier waarop je jarenlang de afdeling hebt geleid.
John, jouw aanwezigheid, lange tijd in de kamer naast de onze, was soms moeilijk te 
negeren. Als je ergens een mening over had, stak je die niet onder stoelen of banken. 
Ik ben blij dat je nu van mening bent dat ik een proefschrift heb geschreven dat het 
waard is om op te promoveren en dat je als mijn promotor wilt optreden, al was je 
niet rechtstreeks betrokken bij mijn werk.
André en Bert, jullie inbreng in het ontwerp en de analyse van mijn laatste experiment 
(Hoofdstuk 3 van dit boekje) was erg waardevol. Bedankt voor het geduld waarmee 
jullie de wiskunde ook keer op keer weer aan mij wilden uitleggen. Het heeft heel 
wat e-mails en overleguurtjes gekost, maar onze inspanningen zijn uiteindelijk 
beloond met een mooie publicatie.
In de loop van de jaren hebben ook een aantal studenten bijgedragen aan mijn project.
Sumientra, toen jij hier je masterstage kwam lopen was ik zelf pas twee maanden bezig. 
We hebben daarom meer samengewerkt dan dat ik jou begeleidde. Samen hebben 
we de opstelling opgebouwd, stimuli ontworpen en een hele reeks experimenten 
gedaan. Ik denk dat ik daarbij minstens net zoveel van jou heb geleerd als jij van mij. 
Het was jouw oplettendheid waardoor we de 'nasale onsetbias' ontdekten. De vele 
experimenten die we samen hebben gedaan hebben uiteindelijk geresulteerd in twee 
publicaties (Hoofdstuk 4 en 5 in dit boekje).
Martijn, samen met jou begon ik aan een heel nieuw project. We hadden op dat 
moment nog geen idee wat de beste manier was om het aan te pakken. Uiteindelijk 
bleek de manier die we samen hebben uitgeprobeerd niet veel resultaten op te 
leveren, maar de data was hoopgevend genoeg om wel met dit project door te gaan.
Jolanda en Veronica, een paar weken nadat Martijn vertrokken was, pakten jullie het 
project weer op. Intussen hadden we veel geleerd van Martijns pilotexperimenten en 
jullie hebben samen een mooie serie experimenten uitgevoerd waarop uiteindelijk 
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Hoofdstuk 3 is gebaseerd.
Voor Hoofdstuk 2 wil ik mijn voorganger Igor en zijn student Marieke bedanken. 
Dankzij jullie werk had ik alvast een dataset voordat ik goed en wel begonnen was.
Ik wil ook graag iedereen bedanken die bij een of meer van mijn experimenten 
proefpersoon is geweest. Ik weet dat het meestal minstens saai was en soms, vooral 
met coils, ronduit vervelend, maar dankzij jullie inzet heb ik mooie data verkregen.
Het grootste deel van het eerste jaar van mijn promotietraject had ik een kantoortje 
voor mezelf alleen. Dat was wel efficiënt, maar niet erg gezellig. Ik was dan ook erg 
blij toen ik eindelijk gezelschap kreeg. 
Josien, jij was de eerste die me gezelschap kwam houden. Je wist niet alleen mijn 
kamer, maar de hele afdeling te vullen met je vrolijke lach. In de tijd dat jij op de 
afdeling rondliep waren er ook opvallend meer vrijdagmiddagborrels en jamsessies. 
Sydney is vast een gezelligere plek geworden sinds jij daar bent gaan werken.
Artem, kort na Josien kwam jij. We werkten op hetzelfde project, maar ieder met een 
eigen invalshoek. Samen hebben we veel tijd op het CDL doorgebracht om James 
en Re te trainen. Het belangrijkste wat ík daarvan geleerd heb, was een hoop geduld, 
maar jij hebt uiteindelijk gelukkig ook nog heel wat recordings weten te doen. Ik 
hoop dat daar nog eens een mooi paper uitkomt. Ook buiten het werk hebben we veel 
van elkaar geleerd. Jouw Nederlands is ondertussen veel beter dan mijn Russisch, 
maar ik vond het altijd erg leuk om bij jou een Russische film te kijken en пельмени 
of andere vreemde gerechten te proeven. Ik ben blij dat je mijn paranimf wilt zijn 
en wens je veel succes bij het afronden van je eigen promotieproject. Спасибо 
большое!
Jurrian, toen Josien wegging kwam jij onze kamer versterken. Ik kende je al van 
naam omdat we aan hetzelfde project hadden gewerkt voor onze bachelorstage. 
Tussen het werk door hebben we veel interessante gesprekken gevoerd en de tv-
series die je me hebt aangeraden, hebben me geholpen een betere nerd te worden :p.
Denise, Julian en David, jullie begonnen kort na mij aan je promotietraject en het 
grootste deel van de tijd hebben we samen bij biofysica doorgebracht. Het is een stuk 
stiller nu Denise en Julian weg zijn, maar dat is natuurlijk mijn eigen schuld omdat 
ik niet in 4 jaar klaar was. Eigenlijk had ik degene moeten zijn die jullie achterliet...
Ik heb altijd met veel plezier bij biofysica gewerkt. Daarvoor wil ik ook alle andere 
collega's en studenten bedanken die er in de loop van de jaren voor gezorgd hebben 
dat het zo'n gezellige afdeling was, met hun aanwezigheid tijdens koffiepauzes, 
lunch, gewoon op de gang en tijdens dagjes uit.
Je kunt nog zo je best doen als wetenschapper, zonder goed ondersteunend 
personeel komt er van wetenschap niet veel terecht. Ik wil daarom ook Judith, 
Margriet, Annet, Irene, Marieke en Ellen van het secretariaat hartelijk bedanken 
voor hun onvermoeibare hulp met de meest uiteenlopende zaken, van declaraties 
tot afwasborstels. En Marieke, ik durf het zelf nog niet helemaal te geloven, maar ik 
geloof dat ik nu toch echt weg ga. 
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Ook op technisch gebied heb ik veel hulp gehad. Ger, Hans, Günter, Stijn en Perry, 
bedankt voor jullie hulp met experimentele opstellingen, oogspoeljes, projectors en 
computerprogramma's. 
Hoewel het me helaas uiteindelijk niet gelukt is om een experiment met de apen 
uit te voeren, heb ik heel wat uren op het dierenlab doorgebracht. Ik wil het CDL-
personeel en Sigrid daarom bedanken voor hun hulp met de verzorging en de 
operaties van James en co.
Janneke, vanaf de eerste week van onze studie Biomedische Wetenschappen hebben 
we samen opgetrokken. Nadat we allebei een ander hoofdvak hadden gekozen zagen 
we elkaar wat minder, maar pakten we nog regelmatig samen een filmpje. Nu je in 
Den Haag zit gaat dat niet meer zo makkelijk, maar af en toe een weekendje Den 
Haag is ook erg gezellig! Fijn dat je mijn paranimf wilt zijn.
Ik heb geen lange lijst vrienden om hier te bedanken, maar gelukkig heb ik wel een 
aardige rij zusjes:
Anke, Reina en Martine, ik kan me geen leukere zussen wensen. Of we nu met 
z'n allen naar Berlijn fietsen, rondtrekken in Zuid-Afrika of gewoon een middagje 
samen cachen of theedrinken, we hebben altijd wat te kletsen en ik hoop dat dat nog 
lang zo blijft. En met Paul, Bart en Bjorn als zwagers is de familie nog groter en 
gezelliger geworden.
Ten slotte, maar zeker niet het onbelangrijkst, Papa en Mama, bedankt voor een 
fijne jeugd en voor jullie altijd aanwezige ondersteuning tijdens mijn studie en mijn 
promotieperiode. Met al mijn, waarschijnlijk soms onbegrijpelijke, verhalen over 
binoculaire rivaliteit, oogspoelen en apenperikelen kon ik altijd bij jullie terecht. 
Bedankt ook dat ik al die tijd bij jullie mocht blijven wonen, waardoor ik het me kon 
veroorloven om ondanks flinke vertraging dit proefschrift toch nog af te maken. Nu 
wordt het toch echt tijd om op eigen benen te gaan staan, maar ik hoop dat ik nog 
lang op jullie terug kan vallen als dat nodig is.
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